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This thesis studies firm’s operational decisions in strategic settings. In particular,
it focuses on a firm’s dynamic pricing or assortment optimization problems, in the
presence of competitors or customers that respond to the firm’s actions strategically.
We study three problems in this area with different features. We optimize over the
firm’s strategies, and characterize the outcome of the game between the firm and its
strategic counter-parties.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Consider a revenue maximizing firm selling multiple products over finite time horizon.
At each point in time, there are two important questions that it needs to consider.
Which products should be made available to customers now? At what price? These
two questions are fundamental components of the firm’s operational decision. They
are known as the dynamic assortment planning problem, and the dynamic pricing
problem, respectively.
These questions are not trivial even under the simplest setting: a monopolist
facing myopic customers. The decision at any point in time affects future revenue
via remaining inventory. Thus, the problem is usually modeled using dynamic
programming with time periods as decision epochs, and remaining inventory levels as
states. The difficulty then arise due to potentially large state space and action space
in the dynamic program, as well as the uncertainty in demand. To be more precise,
the size of state space is exponential in the number of time periods, and the size of
the action space in dynamic assortment problems is exponential in the number of
products. This makes the dynamic program numerically intractable when the number
of periods or the number of products is large. Approximation schemes have been
developed under these settings. One widely used approach is to approximate the
dynamic program using linear programming. On the other hand, since demand is
uncertain, the firm has to act in response to the realized demand at any point in
time, without knowing what future demand will be. Thus this problem is online, as
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opposed to oﬄine problems in which all future demand are deterministic and the
firm’s decision can be made at the beginning of the selling horizon. Under the same
setting, online problems are more difficult than oﬄine problems, because the firm in
an online setting has less information about the future when making decisions. One
resolution to this challenge is to consider the deterministic (oﬄine) approximation
of this online problem, and develop heuristics for the online problem based on the
optimal solution to the deterministic problem.
In real world, firms often have to consider dynamic pricing and assortment planning
problems under more complicated settings. For example, there often exists a strategic
counter-party who alters its behavior based on the firm’s action, and therefore affects
the firm’s payoff. The strategic counter-party can either be a competitor who changes
the price and availability of its products based on the firm’s decision, or a smart
customer who calculates the expected payoff under each purchasing option and chooses
the best option for herself. Understanding the behavior and decision processes of
these strategic counter-parties is important for the firm. Therefore in this thesis, we
consider dynamic pricing and assortment planning problems in strategic settings.
Apart from the difficulties discussed above, the strategic component adds another
layer of complexity to the problem. When customers are strategic, and each customer’s
payoff depends on other customers’ actions, each customer will have to account for
other customers’ actions. The firm has to analyze the outcome of the customers’
interactions in order to evaluate its revenue under any policy, before it can optimize
over all policies. When the firm’s competitors are strategic in a dynamic problem, it
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needs to analyze the competition among firms in future periods, in order to evaluate
its future payoff and thus balance the trade-off between realizing more sales for the
current period and saving more inventory for the future.
Due to the many difficulties discussed above, in each chapter of this thesis, we
focus on modeling and resolving a subset of these challenges. In Chapter 2, we consider
a service system with two competing firms with strategic customers, assuming a
customer’s payoff depends not only on her own action, but on other customers’ actions
as well. In Chapter 3, we consider a multi-period price competition problem among
multiple firms with limited inventories of substitutable products. In Chapter 4, we
consider a firm’s dynamic assortment optimization problem with limited inventories
of substitutable products, when it has the opportunity to recommend personalized
assortments to customers after they make a purchase. In the remaining sections of
this chapter, we briefly introduce each of these three problems, and summarize our
key contributions.
1.1 When Fixed Price Meets Priority Auctions: Competing
Firms with Different Pricing and Service Rules
In Chapter 2, we consider a service system with two competing firms that offer service
via different pricing and service rules, the fixed-price firm and the bid-based firm. In
the fixed-price firm, service is provided at a fixed rate, and in the bid-based firm,
3
customers submit a bid no less than a reserve price posted by the firm, and pay
their bids. In the fixed-price firm, the expected waiting time is homogeneous across
all customers, increasing in the arrival rate to this firm. In the bid-based firm, the
expected waiting time for a customer is increasing in the arrival rate of customers with
higher bids. Customers have different unit time waiting costs, and minimize the sum
of the payment and the expected total waiting cost. Upon arrival, they strategically
choose a firm to receive service from, and also choose a bid if they decide to receive
service from the fixed-price firm. We assume that the customer cannot observe the
real time congestion in the firms, or other customers’ bids in the bid-based firm. Thus
customers’ decision are only based on steady state expectations.
This model has application in real world, when competing firms offer service via
different pricing structures or service qualities. For example, in the cloud computing
industry, Amazon EC2 offers “spot instances” in which the customers enter an
auction to determine priority of service and payment. On the other hand, Microsoft
Azure charges a fixed price for per hourly use of its service. Similarly in the local
transportation industry, taxi service is usually offered at a fixed price for a specific
original-destination pair, while Didi Dache, the largest car hailing company in China,
gives customers the option to offer a customized amount of tip when they request for
a car.
In order to analyze the competition between the firms, we have to first understand
customers’ decision. Since in both firms, the expected waiting time of a customer
depends on other customers’ choices, an equilibrium analysis is needed to analyze
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the customers’ strategies. We prove the existence and uniqueness of symmetric
equilibrium for the game among customers, and show that the equilibrium has a
simple threshold structure. In particular, customers with high and low waiting costs
choose the bid-based firm, while customers with intermediate waiting costs choose the
fixed-price firm. The bid-based firm serves two functions in equilibrium: customers
with high waiting costs incur less waiting time than that in the fixed-price firm, by
making a payment more than the fixed price, while customers with low waiting costs
can reduce their payment by waiting for a longer period of time.
Using the characterization of the unique symmetric equilibrium for the customers’
decision problem, we proceed to analyze the pricing game between the two firms.
The bid-based firm chooses its reserve price, and the fixed-price firm chooses its fixed
price, each maximizing its own revenue in the subsequent customers’ equilibrium. We
prove that there exists a mixed Nash equilibrium for the pricing game between firms.
Moreover, in a limiting regime where the customer arrival rate and service capacities of
the two firms increase proportionally, we characterize a set of approximate equilibria,
under which the total expected revenue of the two competing firms is comparable to
that under collusion.
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1.2 Price Competition under Linear Demand and Finite In-
ventories: Contraction and Approximate Equilibria
In Chapter 3, we consider a multi-period price competition among multiple firms.
Each firm sells a perishable good with limited inventory. The demand that a firm
sees at any period is assumed to be deterministic and linear in prices of all firms in
that period. In particular, demand at a firm is decreasing in its own price, while
increasing in all other firms’ prices. Each firm chooses its price at each period of the
selling horizon, in order to maximize its own revenue.
This model is applicable to real world settings where multiple firms sell substi-
tutable and perishable products with limited inventory. For example, in the airline
industry, multiple airlines may operate between the same origin and destination, with
similar departure time. Seats on these flights are highly substitutable, thus airlines
set price competitively. Also, many electronic products have similar features, thus
firms taking the prices of their competitors into consideration when setting their
prices.
We study two equilibrium concepts for this problem. In the equilibrium without
recourse, each firm chooses a price trajectory for the whole selling horizon before the
first period and commits to it, assuming that all other firms do the same. In the
equilibrium with recourse, in each period, each firm observes the remaining inventory
levels of all firms, and then chooses a price for that period, assuming that all other
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firms do the same. Although the demand of each firm is a deterministic function of
the prices, so that there is no uncertainty in the responses of the firms, equilibria
with and without recourse can still be very different.
We show that the equilibrium without recourse uniquely exists, by proving that
the best response of each firm to the price trajectories of all other firms is a contraction
mapping. As a result, equilibrium without recourse can be computed by best response
iterations.
For the game with recourse, we give examples under which equilibrium does not
exist, or is not unique. We thus study approximate equilibria for the game with
recourse. We focus on a low influence regime, in which the price charged by a firm
affects its demand much more than it affects the demand of any other firm. We
show that the equilibrium without recourse can be used to construct an approximate
equilibrium with recourse, which has the same price trajectory as the equilibrium
without recourse.
1.3 Personalized Assortment Recommendation after Pur-
chase
In Chapter 4, we consider a firm’s multi-period assortment optimization problem with
limited inventories of substitutable products, assuming that it has the opportunity to
offer a personalized assortment to each customer after she makes a purchase. Each
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period has two stages. A customer arrives to stage 1 and is shown an assortment,
from which she can choose to make a purchase, or to leave without a purchase. If she
makes a purchase in stage 1, she then enters stage 2 in which she is offered another
assortment for her to consider. Customer behavior follows general choice models.
The firm maximizes its expected revenue, by choosing an assortment to offer at each
stage of each time period, based on remaining time and inventory. Moreover, the
assortment offered in stage 2 is personalized based on the customer’s purchase in
stage 1.
This model is applicable for many web-based sellers, who have the opportunity
to make personalized recommendations to customers after they make purchase. For
example, after a customer books a hotel via Priceline.com, she can find rental car
deals recommended to her in the confirmation email that she receives. Similarly,
Amazon.com also make recommendations in the confirmation email that it sends to
customers after they make a purchase. In both cases above, recommendations are
made based on the item purchased by the customer.
Although we do not explicitly model the customer’s strategic behavior in this
chapter, the choice probabilities can be seen as an aggregate outcome of customers’
strategies. We can also extend this model to allow more complicated strategic
behavior. A possible extension is to consider forward looking customers, who may
act suboptimally in the first stage, in order to “disguise” their types and get a better
recommendation in the second stage.
The problem studied in this chapter is an online problem, and we first study an
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oﬄine version of this problem, which can be considered as a fluid approximation
of the original online problem. The oﬄine problem can be modeled using a linear
program, using the probability of offering each assortment at each stage as a decision
variable. This linear program is exponential in the number of products, but it can be
solved efficiently using column generation.
Using the solutions to the oﬄine problem, we propose a balancing algorithm for
the original online problem. The algorithm solves the oﬄine LP once at the beginning
of the selling horizon, and updates the solutions at each time period so that they
remain feasible for the oﬄine LP with the current time and inventory information.
In each time period, the algorithm uses a policy suggested by these feasible solutions.
We prove that the balancing algorithm attains an expected revenue of at least
1/3 of the optimal oﬄine revenue, which is an upper bound on the optimal online
revenue. We also give an example, under which the optimal online revenue is only
47% of the optimal oﬄine revenue. This suggests that the best constant performance
guarantee that any algorithm can achieve is no more than 47%, as long as we do the
analysis by comparison with the oﬄine LP. In a limiting regime, in which the number
of time periods and inventory levels increase proportionally and both tend to infinity,
we prove that the revenue under the balancing algorithm converges in probability to
the optimal oﬄine revenue.
We propose a resolving algorithm as a natural extension of the balancing algorithm.
It follows the balancing algorithm, but periodically resolves the oﬄine LP to adjust
for stochastic realization of sales. The resolving algorithm also has a performance
9
guarantee of 1/3 of the optimal oﬄine revenue, and it is also asymptotically optimal.
Numerical experiments suggest that resolving the LP can significantly improve the
algorithm performance when inventory is scarce, even resolving is performed only
once in the middle of the selling horizon.
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CHAPTER 2
WHEN FIXED PRICE MEETS PRIORITY AUCTIONS:
COMPETING FIRMS WITH DIFFERENT PRICING AND SERVICE
RULES
2.1 Introduction
Competing firms often offer their products and services through various modes
differing in their pricing structure and service quality. One main motivation behind
this service differentiation among competing firms is to target heterogeneous customers,
differing in their preferences over the quality and urgency of service, their tolerance
for uncertainty, etc. For example, in the cloud computing service Amazon EC2, the
customers can choose to obtain service by bidding for a computing resource in a
quasi-auction market (“spot instances”, see [7]), whereas in the competing service
Microsoft Azure, customers pay for a fixed-price per hourly use [49]. Similarly, in the
local transportation industry, a regular taxi service company offers a fixed price for a
specific original-destination pair, while Didi Dache, a major competitor of the taxi
companies in China, gives customers the option to offer a customized amount of tip
to the driver when they request for a car, and the drivers are more likely to accept a
request as the amount of tip increases. (For more information about Didi Dache and
tipping, see [14] and [57].) In this case, the Didi customers are essentially bidding in
a priority queue.
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With an assortment of options to obtain services, customers have to make strategic
trade-offs among the cost, quality and priority of service. This choice is further
complicated by the fact that, owing to the presence of resource constraints on
the firms’ part, each customer’s choice among the different firms influences and
is influenced by how other customers make the same decision. This suggests that
the characteristics of the set of customers availing service from a particular firm is
determined endogenously, and an equilibrium analysis is needed to understand the
customers’ decision. Further, each firm has to model the customers’ equilibrium
response in order to evaluate and optimize the design of their service in order to
target customers with a specific set of characteristics.
To understand the equilibrium behavior of customers and the resulting compe-
tition among firms offering different pricing and service rules, in this chapter, we
consider a setting consisting of customers with heterogeneous delay-sensitivity, and
two competing service providers who offer service via two different pricing and service
rules. In the fixed-price firm, the service is offered at a fixed price, and the service
quality (waiting time) is the same for everyone who chooses to obtain service from
this firm. On the other hand, in the bid-based firm, the service is provided according
to a first-price priority auction, where each customer on arrival submits a bid equal to
the price they will pay for service, and the expected waiting time is decreasing in the
bids. Each customer chooses the firm (and a bid, if she chooses the bid-based firm)
that maximizes her total expected utility, given by the difference between the utility
of receiving service, and her expected cost. This cost is comprised of the customer’s
payment for service and the delay cost she incurs by waiting until service completion.
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A customer’s strategy in this context consists of her choice of the firm to obtain
service from (or to balk without obtaining service), and her bid in the bid-based
firm if she chooses to obtain service there. We analyze a symmetric equilibrium of
the preceding system, where all customers adopt the same strategy, and where each
customer is making a best response to others’ strategies.
For given fixed price in the fixed-price firm, we show by explicit construction that
there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium. More importantly, we characterize the
structure of the equilibrium strategy, and show that it has a multi-threshold structure:
the bid-based firm is visited by customers with very high or very low delay-sensitivity,
whereas the fixed-price firm is visited by customers with moderate delay-sensitivity.
This result can be extended to the case where the bid-based firm charges a reserve
price.
This structural characterization of the symmetric equilibrium of the customers’
game provides the main insight of this chapter, namely that the bid-based firm
simultaneously enables two sets of customers, with markedly different characteristics,
to make optimal trade-offs between the delay costs and the cost of obtaining service.
On one hand, for those customers with very low unit waiting cost, it acts as a means
to reduce their total cost by submitting low bids and waiting longer for service. On
the other hand, for customers with very high unit waiting costs, it acts as a venue to
demand high priority (and lower waiting time) for service. This insight coincides with
what we see in the China’s local transportation service industry, in which Didi Dache
has a reserve price that is much lower than the price charged by the taxi company
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(usually about 30% lower, see [66]), but some delay-sensitive customers choose to add
a considerable amount of tip to avoid waiting (see [64]).
Finally, using the uniqueness of the customers’ equilibrium strategy, we study
the price competition game between the two firms, where the fixed-price firm sets
the fixed-price and the bid-based firm sets the reserve price. We show existence of a
mixed Nash equilibrium. Moreover, by analyzing the game in a limiting regime where
the arrival rate and the firms’ service capacity increase proportionally, we show the
total expected revenue in equilibrium achieved by the two firms under competition is
close to the revenue obtained by firms under collusion.
We summarize our main contributions as follows:
(1) Characterization of structure of customers’ equilibrium strategy: We show that,
in any symmetric equilibrium, the customers’ strategy has a simple multi-threshold
structure: among all customers who choose to obtain service from the system, the
customers with relatively high per unit time waiting cost and those with relatively
low per unit time waiting costs choose to obtain service from the bid-based firm.
On the other hand, the customers who obtain service from the fixed-price firm have
relatively moderate per unit time waiting cost. Consequently, in this market, the
fixed-price firm only attracts customers with moderate waiting costs.
(2) Existence and uniqueness of customers’ equilibrium: Using the structure of the
equilibrium strategy, we show the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium
of the customers’ game. Our proof proceeds by obtaining necessary and sufficient
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conditions on a threshold strategy to constitute a symmetric equilibrium. These
conditions are obtained by imposing the continuity of the expected waiting times
and total cost of the customers with unit waiting costs at the thresholds. Finally, we
show the existence (and uniqueness) by explicitly constructing a solution satisfying
these conditions.
(3) Competition between firms: Finally, we investigate how competing firms set
their prices in order to maximize their revenue in equilibrium. Using the uniqueness of
the customers’ equilibrium strategy, we study the resulting price competition between
the two firms, where the fixed-price firm sets the fixed-price and the bid-based firm
sets the reserve price, and show existence of a mixed Nash equilibrium. Moreover,
we analyze this competition under a limiting regime where the arrival rate and the
firms’ service capacity increase proportionally. For the resulting limiting game, we
show that the total expected revenue in equilibrium achieved by the two firms under
competition is close to the revenue obtained by firms under collusion.
2.1.1 Literature review
There are multiple strands of literature from game theory and auctions, revenue
management, and queueing theory that are related to our work.
Our work builds on existing work on revenue maximizing pricing policies of a
monopolist, in the presence of strategic customers. [47] consider a queueing system
with a single server and finite number of customer classes each with a different
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per unit time waiting cost and service time distribution. The authors devise an
incentive compatible pricing policy, such that the social welfare is maximized when
each customer class endogenously choose their arrival rate and priority. Similar
models have been studied in the context of a revenue maximizing service provider
[2, 70, 28].
Although we do not specify a queueing model in this chapter, our results is
applicable to many commonly used queueing models (e.g., G/M/k priority queues),
since the expected waiting time function under those models satisfy our assumptions.
Thus, the analysis of customers’ behavior in the bid-based firm is closely related to
priority queues. One of the earliest work in priority queues is by [36]. He considers
a model of an M/M/1 queue where service is provided in the decreasing order of
the customers’ bids, and where the customers are non-strategic with an exogenously
specified bid distribution. In this setting, he obtains expressions for the expected
waiting time as a function of the bid in both preemptive and non-preemptive settings.
[8, 44, 29, 32, 35] build on this work by considering strategic customers that determine
their priorities endogenously through their payments. Our analysis of the bid-based
queue further makes use of results from auction theory [53, 38]. More broadly, our
work contributes to the literature at the intersection of game theory and queueing
theory. See [33] for a comprehensive survey of various models of queueing systems
with strategic customers and servers.
There are a number of papers that study a market with firms offering a multitude
of price-quality combinations (offered by either a monopolist or competing firms) for
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customers to choose from. [52] consider a monopolist choosing a price-quality schedule
to maximize its revenue. [4] consider revenue maximizing price/lead-time menu for
a single server system where customers’ value for service completion is a monotone
continuous function of their per unit time waiting cost. [55] study a similar model
where the per unit time waiting costs are a linear or sublinear function of the value of
service, and they consider the asymptotic regime with large arrival rates and service
capacity. See also [67] and [45] for related models studying pricing and scheduling
policy in the asymptotic large system regime. [34] consider a competition on price
and quality in the cloud computing market. In these papers, the customers’ strategies
in equilibrium have similar structure as that in our model, such that customers who
prefer higher quality pay higher price, which also leads to threshold structure of
customers’ strategy when the price-quality menu is discrete. However, our analysis of
the customers’ strategy is fundamentally different and more complex. This is mainly
because for a fixed price-quality menu, a customer’s payoff is a function of her own
action only, and independent of other customers’ actions. Thus there is no game
among customers, and the customers’ strategy can be solved by an optimization
problem. However, in our model, the quality of service, as measured by the expected
waiting time, is a function of a customer’s own strategy as well as those of others.
Consequently, the customers’ decision is the outcome of a game among customers.
There are some papers which consider the game among customers in a market
with multiple pricing and service policies [17, 12, 69, 1]. [3] analyze a queueing system
under different pricing and service policies, where customers are strategic and have
a value for service that depends multiplicatively on their delay cost. [1] model the
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Amazon EC2 cloud computing service as a hybrid system where customers can choose
to enter a bid-based priority queue, or to obtain service from a fixed-price queue
with infinite capacity. The authors show that any equilibrium has a single threshold
structure, with all customers below the threshold entering the bid-based priority queue,
and the rest the fixed-price queue. [12] prove the existence of similar single threshold
strategy equilibrium in the context of a seller adopting a fixed-price or an auction
mechanism to sell their products. In contrast, in our model, the fixed-price firm has
finite capacity, implying that customers obtaining service from the fixed-price firm
may have to wait for service. This waiting for service in the fixed-price firm induces
customers with high unit waiting cost to choose the bid-based firm in equilibrium,
resulting in an equilibrium strategy with a multi-threshold structure.
In our model, the customers with intermediate types (defined by their unit time
waiting costs) choose the fixed-price firm, while the customers on the two extremes
choose the bid-based firm. Similar intermediate-versus-extremes equilibrium structure
was recognized in several other papers under different circumstances. [71] consider
trading position on a FIFO queue with an intermediary at a fee, when customers
have different unit time waiting costs. They show that in equilibrium, customers with
intermediate waiting costs do not participate in the trade and remain in their FIFO
position, while customers with lower or higher waiting costs trade their priorities.
[4] study the design of a price/lead-time menu in order to maximize revenue, when
customers differ in patience levels. They conclude that pricing out the customers
with intermediate patience levels while serving the most patient and impatient ones
may increase revenue.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we describe our
model of a market with a fixed-price firm and a bid-based firm. In Section 2.3, we
study the customers’ game, and characterize the structure of the strategy in any
symmetric equilibrium. Using this structure, in Section 2.4 we obtain necessary
and sufficient conditions for a strategy to constitute an equilibrium, and prove our
main result, namely the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium of the
customers’ game. Finally, in Section 2.5, we study the firms’ game, and prove the
existence of mixed Nash equilibrium. We also study the price of stability of the firms’
game in a limiting regime, and characterize the conditions under which it is small.
2.2 Model
Consider a setting with two competing firms, a fixed-price firm and a bid-based firm,
offering service to a Poisson stream of customers with rate λ > 0. The fixed-price
firm charges a fixed price P > 0 to offer a service where all customers incur uniform
expected waiting times until service completion. This uniform expected waiting time
increases with the arrival rate of customers. We assume that the fixed-price firm has
a finite service capacity of n, such that if the arrival rate of customers to the firm is
greater than or equal to n, then the firm can no longer ensure finite expected waiting
times. For example, the fixed-price firm may use an G/G/n FIFO queue to provide
service to its customers.
On the other hand, the bid-based firm provides service via a first-price auction
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[38] with reserve price r. More precisely, customers arriving to the bid-based firm
submit a bid no less than r on arrival that denotes the price they are willing to pay
for service. Customers are then served in the decreasing order of their bids (with ties
broken uniformly at random), and are charged their bid upon service completition.
We assume that the bid-based firm has a service capacity of k, implying that if the
total arrival rate of customers to the firm is greater than or equal to k, then the
firm cannot ensure finite expected waiting time to all of its customers. For most
of our analysis, we assume that a customer of the bid-based firm experiences an
expected waiting time that depends only on the arrival rates of customers with higher
bids. For example, the bid-based firm may provider service to its customers using a
G/M/k preemptive priority queue. (Note that for a non-preemptive priority queue,
a customer’s expected waiting time also depends on the arrival rate of customers
with lower bids. Our analysis in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 can be reproduced for
non-preemptive queues; see Appendix A.7 for details.)
Each arriving customer is characterized by three features: their service requirement,
their value for service completion and their cost for waiting until service completion.
We address each one separately below.
We assume that each customer’s service requirement is exponentially (and indepen-
dently) distributed with mean 1 (equal to the service rate µ = 1). The homogeneity
of service requirement is a restrictive assumption, and a more general model will allow
for non-homogeneous distribution for the service requirement. On the other hand,
our model can easily accommodate more general distributions for service requirement,
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and the independence assumption can be expected to hold in many service systems
where the customer base is fairly large and diverse.
Next, each customer obtains a value V > 0 upon service completion. As men-
tioned earlier, we assume that this value is uniform across customers. Although this
assumption may seem restrictive, one justification arises out of the interpretation of
the value V as the opportunity cost faced by the customer. For example, one may
consider V to be fixed price charged by a competitor to the two firms who offers
service with negligible waiting times. In such settings, if each customer has access to
this competitor, then our assumption of uniform value of service completion holds.
However, if not all customers can access this competitor, then a more appropriate
model would require different values of service completion for different (classes of)
customers.
Finally, we assume that the customers incur a heterogeneous cost for waiting until
service completion. More precisely, each customer incurs a disutility proportional
to the total time she spends in the system until service completion, and we refer to
the proportionality constant as the customer’s unit waiting cost. We assume that
each customer’s unit waiting cost c is drawn independently and identically from a
continuously differentiable bounded distribution F . For ease of notation, we assume
that this distribution F is the uniform distribution on [0, 1] in this chapter. All of our
analytical results extend directly to the general case, as we discuss in Appendix A.1.
We assume the arrival rate λ, the price P in the fixed-price firm, the reserve
price r in the bid-based firm, the distribution of the service requirement, the value
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of service completion V , the service capacities k and n, and the distribution F of
customers’ unit waiting cost are common knowledge among the customers and the
two service providers.
On arrival to the system, each customer decides based on her unit waiting cost,
whether to obtain service and if so, from which firm. If she decides to obtain service
from the bid-based firm, then she further chooses a bid to submit. A customer
choosing not to obtain service leaves the system never to return, and obtains zero
utility. A customer with unit waiting cost c waiting for a time W until service
completion, and making a payment m obtains a utility equal to V − c ·W −m. (We
refer to the quantity c ·W + m as the total cost incurred by the customer.) We
assume that the customers are strategic and seek to maximize their total expected
utility, where the expectation is with respect to the steady state distribution of the
system. Implicitly, this steady state expectation entails assuming that the customers
cannot observe the state of the system, such as the queue lengths in each firm or the
existing bids in the bid-based firm, before making their decision. This assumption is
valid in many settings, especially when the queue is not physical, e.g., in call centers,
online service industry, etc.
Consequently, we represent a customer’s strategy by a pair of functions x(·) and
b(·) of her unit waiting cost c, where x(c) ∈ {LEAVE,FIX,BID} denotes her decision
about whether to obtain service and if so, from which firm, and b(c) ≥ 0 denotes her
bid upon joining the bid-based firm. We refer to the function x(·) as the customer’s
service decision and the function b(·) as her bid function. For the sake of completeness,
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we define b(c) = P if x(c) = FIX and b(c) = 0 if x(c) = LEAVE.
We focus on the symmetric setting, where all customers follow the same strategy
(x, b). In this scenario, we let wF (x, b) denote the expected waiting time in the
fixed-price firm in steady state. For a customer with unit waiting cost c, the expected
total cost on receiving service from the fixed-price firm is then given by cwF (x, b) +P .
Similarly, we let wB(b′|x, b) denote the expected waiting time in steady state for a
customer joining the bid-based firm and making a bid b′. The total expected cost for
such a customer with unit waiting cost c is then given by cwB(b′|x, b) + b′.
We say a strategy (x, b) forms a symmetric equilibrium if, assuming all other
customers act according to the strategy (x, b), each customer’s expected utility is
maximized by following the same strategy (x, b). Formally, we require that (x, b)
satisfy the following conditions:
x(c) =

LEAVE, only if V ≤ min{minb′{cwB(b′|x, b) + b′}, cwF (x, b) + P};
FIX, only if cwF (x, b) + P ≤ min{V,minb′{cwB(b′|x, b) + b′}};
BID, only if minb′{cwB(b′|x, b) + b′} ≤ min{cwF (x, b) + P, V },
and
b(c) ∈ arg min
b′
{cwB(b′|x, b) + b′} , if x(c) = BID.
Here, we break ties arbitrarily. The first condition specifies that the customer will
choose to obtain the service only if the total expected cost is less than or equal to the
value of service completion. In this case, the customer will choose the fixed-price firm
if the total expected cost therein is no more than that in the bid-based firm under
the best possible bid. Otherwise, the customer will choose the bid-based firm. The
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second condition requires that upon choosing to obtain service from the bid-based
firm, the customer will enter a bid that minimizes her total expected cost.
2.3 Equilibrium structure of the customers’ game
In this section, we characterize the structure of the equilibrium strategy of the
customers’ game. This structure is used later in our proof of the existence of
customers’ equilibrium. For the ease of notation, we assume in Sections 2.3 and 2.4
that r = 0. We will extend all results to the case where r > 0 in Subsection 2.4.3.
2.3.1 Structure of customers’ equilibrium bidding function
We begin our analysis of the symmetric equilibrium by focusing on the equilibrium
bidding function. We show that in a symmetric equilibrium (x, b), the bidding function
b(·) is completely specified once the service decision x(·) is known. Towards this, for
c ∈ [0, 1], define B(c|(x, b)) as the proportion of customers in the bid-based firm with
unit waiting cost below c: B(c|(x, b)) , ∫ c0 I{x(u) = BID}du. We have the following
lemma showing the monotonicity of the expected waiting time, payment, and the
total cost in any symmetric equilibrium. The proof relies on the fact that a customer
does not gain by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium strategy. We provide
the details in Appendix A.2.
Lemma 1. In any symmetric equilibrium (x, b) of the customers’ game, for all
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customers that choose to obtain service, the expected waiting time is non-increasing,
the expected payment is non-decreasing, and the total expected cost is strictly increasing
in the unit waiting cost. Moreover, the bidding function is strictly increasing at all
unit waiting cost c where B(c|(x, b)) is strictly increasing.
The implication of the lemma is as follows. In a symmetric equilibrium, the bidding
function b(c) is strictly increasing whenever B(c|(x, b)), the proportion of customers
in the bid-based firm with unit waiting cost lower than c, is strictly increasing. And
since the service in the bid-based firm is in the decreasing order of bids, this implies
that in equilibrium, the customers in the bid-based firm are served in decreasing
order of the unit waiting cost. Thus, the expected waiting time of a customer in the
bid-based firm is solely a function of the service decision x(·) and their unit waiting
cost c. We use w(c|x) to denote the expected waiting time of a customer with unit
waiting cost c when everyone uses the service decision function x(·). Using this result,
we obtain the following characterization of the expected waiting time function and
the bidding function in terms of the service decision in equilibrium.
Lemma 2. In any symmetric equilibrium (x, b), the expected waiting time function
w(·|x) and the bidding function b(·) are completely determined by the customers’
service decision x(·). In particular, the bidding function satisfies
b(c) =
∫ c
0
w(t|x)dt− cw(c|x). (2.1)
for all c such that x(c) 6= LEAVE.
Proof sketch. From Lemma 1, we obtain that in equilibrium, a customer’s expected
waiting time in the bid-based firm depends only on the proportion of customers in
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the bid-based firm with lower unit waiting costs, which in turn depends only on
the service decision x(·) and the customer’s unit waiting cost. Since the expected
waiting time in the fixed-price firm depends only on the proportion of customers
in the fixed-price firm, this holds true also for a customer in the fixed-price firm.
Together, this implies that, in a symmetric equilibrium (x, b), the expected waiting
time of a customer is given by a function w(c|x) only of their unit waiting cost c and
the service decision x(·).
To obtain (2.1), note that in equilibrium, for any customer with unit waiting cost c,
the marginal decrease in the expected waiting cost resulting from a marginal increase
in the bid, must equal the marginal increase in the resulting payment. Assuming
differentiability, this implies b′(c) = −cw′(t|x), which on integrating yields (2.1). See
Appendix A.2 for details. 
As a consequence of Lemma 2, in order to find a symmetric equilibrium, it suffices
to focus only on the customers’ service decision x(·), and use (2.1) to obtain the
bidding function b(·). Moreover, for any given service decision x(·), if customers bid
according to the bidding function given by (2.1) in the bid-based firm, we observe
that the total expected cost of a customer is given by
TC(c|x) , cw(c|x) + b(c) =
∫ c
0
w(t|x)dt, (2.2)
for all x(c) 6= LEAVE.
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2.3.2 Structure of the customers’ equilibrium service deci-
sion
Having characterized the bidding function in a symmetric equilibrium of the customers’
game, we now focus on the service decision x(·) in a symmetric equilibrium. Before
we proceed, we note that starting from an equilibrium, if we alter the actions of a
measure zero set of customers from their current action to a different best response
action, the resulting service decision continues to be a symmetric equilibrium (without
a specific tie-breaking rule). Thus, in order to avoid unnecessary technicalities, in the
rest of the chapter, we focus only on those symmetric equilibria where each action is
either employed by a set of customers of positive measure, or never adopted by any
customers. (In particular, we ignore equilibria where one of the firms services a set
of customers with measure zero.) Then, the following theorem, the main result of
this section, states that the service decision x(·) in any symmetric equilibrium has a
simple multi-threshold structure.
Theorem 1. Let V > 0 and P > 0. In any symmetric equilibrium (x, b), the service
decision function x(·) has multi-threshold structure. Specifically, there exists thresholds
0 < c1 ≤ c2 ≤ c` ≤ 1, such that
x(c) =

LEAVE, if c ∈ (c`, 1];
FIX, if c ∈ (c1, c2);
BID, if c ∈ [0, c1] ∪ [c2, c`].
For a symmetric equilibrium with no customer obtaining service from the fixed-price
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firm, the thresholds satisfy c1 = c2 = c` ∈ (0, 1]. For a symmetric equilibrium with
some customers obtaining service from the fixed-price firm, the thresholds satisfy
0 < c1 < c2 < c` ≤ 1.
Proof. Fix a symmetric equilibrium (x, b). Consider customer with unit waiting cost
c, who obtains service in equilibrium. The total expected cost of such a customer in
equilibrium is no more than V , i.e., cw(c|x) + b(c) ≤ V . Thus, the total expected cost
of any customer with unit waiting cost c′ < c using action (x(c), b(c)) is less than V .
Consequently, the expected total cost of such a customer using action (x(c′), b(c′)) is
also less than V , and such a customer also chooses to obtain service. Thus, there exits
a threshold c` ∈ [0, 1] such that all customers with unit waiting cost below c` choose
to obtain service (i.e, x(c) ∈ {FIX,BID}), and the rest choose to leave the system
without obtaining service (i.e., x(c) = LEAVE). Observe that for V > 0, we have
c` > 0, for if no other customers obtain service from the system, then it is optimal
for small enough  > 0, a customer with unit waiting cost  strictly prefers to obtain
service from the bid-based firm by making a small enough bid. (Note that it may be
the case that c` = 1, implying that no customers choose to leave the system without
obtaining service.)
Now, we consider how customers with unit waiting cost below c` choose between
the fixed-price firm and the bid-based firm. Let CF denote the set of unit waiting costs
for which the customer’s equilibrium choice is to obtain service from the fixed-price
firm. We begin by showing that the set CF is convex.
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Let c, cˆ ∈ CF with cˆ < c. Since x(c) = x(c′) = FIX, we obtain in equilibrium,
cwF (x) + P ≤ min
b′
{cwB(b′|x) + b′}, cwF (x) + P ≤ V,
cˆwF (x) + P ≤ min
b′
{cˆwB(b′|x) + b′}, cˆwF (x) + P ≤ V.
Let β ∈ (0, 1), and c˜ = βc+(1−β)cˆ. Taking convex combination of the two inequalities
on the right side above, we obtain c˜wF (x) + P ≤ V , implying the customer with unit
waiting cost c˜ would prefer obtaining service from the fixed-price firm over leaving
without obtaining service. Similarly, we obtain
c˜wF (x) + P ≤ βmin
b′
{cwB(b′|x) + b′}+ (1− β) min
b′
{cˆwB(b′|x) + b′}
< min
b′
{c˜wB(b′|x) + b′}.
Thus, the customer with unit waiting cost c˜ would strictly prefer obtaining service
from the fixed-price firm over obtaining service from the bid-based firm. Taken
together, this implies x(c˜) = FIX, and hence CF is convex.
If CF is empty, then all customers with unit waiting cost below c` choose to
obtain service from the bid-based firm, and the service decision function is given by
x(c) = BID for c ≤ c`, and x(c) = LEAVE for c > c`. This fits the representation of
the service decision function in the theorem with c1 , c` and c2 , c`.
Hence, for the rest of the proof, suppose CF is non-empty. Define c1 , inf CF and
c2 , supCF , such that c1 < c2. We now show that 0 < c1 and c2 < c`.
Suppose c1 = 0. By convexity of CF , this implies that there exists an ¯ > 0, such
that x(c) = FIX for all c < ¯. For a customer with unit waiting cost  < ¯, his total
expected cost is wF (x) + P . Suppose instead the customer chooses to obtain service
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from the bid-based firm with a zero bid. This ensures that his expected waiting time
is equal to that of a customer with the lowest priority in the bid-based firm. By
Lemma 1, the expected waiting time in equilibrium is non-increasing in unit waiting
cost, and hence the expected waiting time of a customer with the lowest priority in
the bid-based firm is at most w(|x) = wF (x). Thus, the total expected cost of the
customer with unit waiting cost  on choosing to obtain service from the bid-based
firm with a zero bid is at most wF (x) < wF (x)+P . This contradicts the assumption
that (x, b) is an equilibrium. Hence, we obtain that in any symmetric equilibrium,
c1 > 0.
Finally, suppose c2 = c`. Since CF is convex (and non-empty), this implies that all
customers with unit waiting cost below c1 obtain service from the bid-based firm, all
customers with unit waiting cost between c1 and c` obtain service from the fixed-price
firm, and the rest choose to leave without obtaining service. Consequently, a customer
with unit waiting cost c1 has the highest priority in the bid-based firm, and has an
expected waiting time of 1. From Lemma 1, we know that the expected waiting
time in an equilibrium is non-increasing in the unit waiting cost, implying that the
expected waiting time of a customer in the fixed-price firm, wF (x), is less than or
equal 1. However, since CF is non-empty, the expected waiting time in the fixed-price
firm has to be strictly greater than the service completion time 1. Thus we obtain a
contradiction.
Summing up, we obtain that any symmetric equilibrium (x, b) where at least some
customers choose to obtain service from the fixed-price firm, there exists thresholds
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0 < c1 < c2 < c` ≤ 1, such that for all c ∈ [0, c1] ∪ [c2, c`], we have x(c) = BID, for all
c ∈ (c1, c2), we have x(c) = FIX, and for all c ∈ (c`, 1], we have x(c) = LEAVE. 
The preceding theorem states that in a symmetric equilibrium, a customer’s
decision about which firm to obtain service from has a simple threshold structure:
customers with very low and very high unit waiting cost choose to obtain service
from the bid-based firm, and those with intermediate unit waiting cost prefer to
obtain service via the fixed-price firm. This structure suggests that the bid-based
firm serves two different functions in the system. For those customers with very high
unit waiting cost, the bid-based firm provides means to obtain high priority and get
service immediately. On the other hand, for customers with very low unit waiting
cost, the bid-based firm allows them to obtain service at low costs, albeit after longer
waiting times.
In Fig. 2.1 and Fig. 2.2 we illustrate the equilibrium strategy, the expected waiting
time in equilibrium and the equilibrium payment for the following parameter values:
λ = 40, P = 3, and V is sufficiently high that every customer obtains service in
equilibrium. The bid-based firm is an M/M/20 preemptive priority queue, and
the fixed-price firm is an M/M/30 FIFO queue. From these plots, we observe the
threshold structure of equilibrium, and the monotonicity of the expected waiting
time and the payment with respect to unit time waiting cost. Note also that the
low unit waiting cost customers in the bid-based firm pay less than the price in the
fixed-price firm, and wait longer for service completion, while the high unit waiting
cost customers in the bid-based firm pay more than the price in the fixed-price firm,
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Figure 2.1: Expected payment in equilibrium of the customers’ game
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Figure 2.2: Expected waiting time in equilibrium of the customers’ game
and have lower waiting times.
From the perspective of equilibrium analysis, the preceding theorem is important.
From Lemma 2, in any symmetric equilibrium (x, b), the customers’ bidding function
b(·) is fully specified from the service decision x(·). Combining this result with
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the preceding theorem, we obtain that any symmetric equilibrium (x, b) can be
characterized by three thresholds c1, c2, c` ∈ [0, 1]. Thus from this point on, we
only need to consider symmetric strategies characterized by c1, c2, c`. This greatly
simplifies the analysis for showing existence of the equilibrium, as we see in the
following section.
2.4 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in customers’
game
Having determined the structure of a symmetric equilibrium of customers’ game, we
are now ready to present our main results regarding the existence and uniqueness of
customers’ equilibrium. We present our results in two steps: first, in Section 2.4.1,
we consider a system where obtaining service is mandatory for all customers, denoted
by SYSman. Although this restriction is impracticable, we use the results for this
system to show existence (and uniqueness) in the original system where customers
have the option to leave the system without obtaining service, which we denote by
SYSop. This is achieved by carefully relating an equilibrium of the SYSman system
with a corresponding equilibrium of the SYSop system. We provide the details in
Section 2.4.2. We then extend the results to systems with positive reserve price in
Section 2.4.3.
To state our results, we need two primitives. Let Γ(x) denote the expected waiting
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time of a customer in the bid-based firm, if the arrival rate of customers to that firm
with higher priority is equal to x ∈ [0, k). And, let Φ(x) denote the expected waiting
time of a customer in the fixed-price firm, if the arrival rate of the customers to that
firm is x ∈ [0, n).
We make the following assumptions on Γ(x) and Φ(x).
Assumption 1. 1. The function Γ is finite, strictly increasing and continuous in
[0, k), and infinite after k.
2. The function Φ is finite, strictly increasing and continuous in [0, n) and infinite
after n.
3. Γ(0) = Φ(0) = 1.
4.
∫ y
0 Γ(t)dt→∞, as y → k.
The following lemma shows that Assumption 1 holds under many commonly
studied queueing system. The proof is given in Appendix A.3.
Lemma 3. Suppose the fixed-price firm operates a G/G/n queue with service rate 1,
and the bid-based firm operates a G/M/k preemptive queue with service rate 1. Then
the system satisfies Assumption 1.
Note that implicitly, we have used the fact that the queue in the bid-based firm
is preemptive. Without this assumption, the expected waiting time of a customer
will be a function not only of the arrival rate of the customers with higher priority,
but also of the total arrival rate to the queue. However all our analysis in Sections
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2.3 and 2.4 can be reproduced for non-preemptive queues. Please refer to Appendix
A.7 for details.
Following Theorem 1, we represent a customer’s strategy by a vector of thresholds
c¯ = (c1, c2, c`). Assuming all customers follow the strategy c¯, let wF (c¯) be the expected
waiting time in the fixed-price firm. Similarly, let wB(c|c¯) be the expected waiting
time of a customer of unit waiting cost c if she chooses to obtain service from the
bid-based firm and subsequently makes the optimal bid from (2.1). Letting α = c2−c1
for simplicity of notation, we have the following expressions:
wF (c¯) = Φ(λα), (2.3)
wB(t|c¯) =

Γ(λc` − λt) if t ∈ [c2, c`];
Γ(λc` − λα− λt) if t ∈ [0, c1].
(2.4)
The first equation follows from the fact that, under strategy c¯, the arrival rate of
customers to the fixed-price firm equals λ(c2− c1) = λα. The second equation follows
from the fact that for t ∈ [c2, c`], the arrival rate of customers to the bid-based firm
with higher priority than the customer with unit waiting cost t is equal to λ(c` − t),
whereas it equals λ(c` − α − t) for t ∈ [0, c1], since all customers with unit waiting
cost in [c1, c2] obtain service from the fixed-price firm. (Note that these expressions
make use of our assumption that the unit waiting costs are uniformly distributed.
We briefly describe in Appendix A.1 how these expressions differ for non-uniform
distributions.)
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2.4.1 System with mandatory service requirement
We first consider the setting where the customers do not have the option to leave the
system without obtaining service. In other words, we assume that the customers’ value
for service completion V is sufficiently high to render obtaining service mandatory for
all customers. Denote such a system by SYSman(λ, P ) if the arrival rate is λ and the
fixed-price price is P . In such a setting, customers arrive to the system and make
the choice between obtaining service from the fixed-price firm or the bid-based firm,
and a symmetric equilibrium for this system can be represented as c¯ = (c1, c2, 1). In
the following, we show that for all λ ∈ (0, n + k) and for all P ≥ 0, there exists a
unique symmetric equilibrium. Towards that goal, define Pmax(λ) as follows:
Pmax(λ) ,

1
λ
∫ λ
0 Γ(t)dt− 1 if λ < k;
∞ otherwise.
(2.5)
As we show below, for each arrival rate λ, Pmax(λ) imposes a bound on the value
of the price P in the fixed-price firm, so that for P ≥ Pmax(λ), no customer obtains
service from the fixed-price firm in a symmetric equilibrium of the customers’ game.
Suppose the strategy c¯ = (1, 1, 1) constitutes a symmetric equilibrium, where no
customers choose to obtain service from the fixed-price firm. In such an equilibrium,
if the customer with unit waiting cost equal to one obtains service from the fixed-price
firm, her expected waiting time to service completion is 1 and her expected payment is
P . Since in equilibrium such a customer prefers obtaining service from the bid-based
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firm, it must be the case that ∫ 1
0
wB(t|c¯) dt ≤ 1 + P. (Pref-BID)
Here, the left hand side denotes the total expected cost of the customer with unit
waiting cost c`, as per (2.2). The necessary condition (Pref-BID) requires that this be
less than that of obtaining service from the fixed-price firm. Note that, using (2.4),
it is straightforward to show that this implies P ≥ Pmax(λ). Thus, for c¯ = (1, 1, 1) to
be a symmetric equilibrium for SYSman(λ, P ), a necessary condition is P ≥ Pmax(λ).
The following theorem shows that it is also sufficient. The proof of this theorem is
given in Appendix A.4.
Theorem 2. There exists a unique symmetric customers’ equilibrium of the system
SYSman(λ, P ) of the form c¯ = (1, 1, 1) if and only if P ≥ Pmax(λ).
The preceding theorem states that for any λ ∈ (0, n+ k), Pmax(λ) is the highest
price in the fixed-price firm for which one may expect customers to choose that
firm for obtaining service. For values of P greater than Pmax(λ), all customers
prefer the bid-based firm over the fixed-price firm. The following theorem, our main
result, shows that for values of P less than Pmax(λ), there exists a unique symmetric
equilibrium, in which there is a positive arrival rate of customers to the fixed-price
firm.
Theorem 3. For all 0 < P < Pmax(λ), there exists a unique symmetric customers’
equilibrium c¯ = (c1, c2, 1), with 0 < c1 < c2 < 1. In other words, in equilibrium, the
arrival rate of customers to the fixed-price firm is positive.
Our proof proceeds by first identifying a set of necessary and sufficient conditions
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for a strategy c¯ = (c1, c2, 1) to be a symmetric equilibrium for SYSman(λ, P ), and
second showing that these conditions have a unique solution by explicit construction.
In the following, we provide the intuition behind these necessary and sufficient
conditions.
Suppose 0 < P < Pmax(λ), and consider a symmetric equilibrium c¯ = (c1, c2, 1)
with 0 < c1 < c2 < 1, where the arrival rate of customers to the fixed-price firm is
positive. In this equilibrium, a customer with unit waiting cost c1 must be indifferent
between obtaining service in the bid-based firm and the fixed-price firm. For otherwise,
a customer with unit waiting costs slightly higher than c1 would strictly prefer to
mimic the behavior customer with unit waiting cost c1. Equating the customer’s
total expected cost, we have∫ c1
0
wB(t|c¯)dt = c1wF (c¯) + P. (ContT-P)
Note that since all customers with unit waiting cost below c1 obtain service from
the bid-based firm, we have w(t|c¯) = wB(t|c¯) and consequently, as per (2.2), the left
hand side denotes the total expected cost of a customer with unit waiting cost c1.
On the other hand, the right hand side denotes the total expected cost for such a
customer on obtaining service from the fixed-price firm.
Similarly, consider a customer with unit waiting cost c2. Since all customers with
unit waiting costs between c1 and c2 obtain service from the fixed-price firm, the
expected waiting time of the customer with unit waiting cost c2 must equal that of a
customer with unit waiting cost c1. Since from Lemma 1, we know that the expected
waiting time in equilibrium is non-increasing in the unit waiting cost, and since all
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customers in the fixed-price firm have waiting times wF (c¯), it follows that
wB(c2|c¯) = wB(c1|c¯) = wF (c¯). (ContW-P)
The necessary condition (ContW-P) thus states that the expected waiting time in
equilibrium must be continuous at c1.
The following proposition formalizes the preceding discussion, and shows that
the aforementioned necessary conditions are also sufficient for a strategy to be an
equilibrium. We provide the proof in Appendix A.3.
Proposition 1. A strategy c¯ = (c1, c2, 1), with 0 < c1 < c2 < 1, is a symmetric
customers’ equilibrium for the system SYSman(λ, P ) with 0 < P < Pmax(λ) if and only
if the conditions (ContT-P) and (ContW-P) hold.
Using (2.4) and (2.3), we can summarize the conditions (ContT-P) and (ContW-P)
as follows: ∫ c1
0
Γ(λ(1− α− t))dt = c1Φ(λα) + P
Γ(λ(1− α− c1)) = Φ(λα). (2.6)
Thus, following Proposition 1, showing the existence (and uniqueness) of a symmetric
equilibrium for the system SYSman(λ, P ) with P ∈ (0, Pmax(λ)) requires showing that
there exists a (unique) c1 ∈ [0, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1− c1] that satisfy the set of equations
(2.6). We show that this is indeed the case in the proof of Theorem 3. We provide
the details of the proof in Appendix A.4.
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2.4.2 System with optional service requirement
In this section, we extend our existence and uniqueness result to systems where
customers may choose not to obtain service. We denote the system with optional
service requirement with arrival rate λ, fixed price P , and the value of service
completion V by SYSop(λ, P, V ).
For this system, consider a symmetric equilibrium c¯ = (c1, c2, c`). In equilibrium,
each customer choosing to obtain service must have a total expected cost that is less
than or equal to the value of service completion V . In particular, this holds for a
customer with unit waiting cost c`. Moreover, if c` is strictly less than one, the total
expected cost of such a customer must exactly equal to V . For if this were not true,
a customer with unit waiting cost slightly greater than c` would find it preferable to
obtain service from the system. Thus, we obtain the following necessary condition on
an equilibrium:
c` < 1,
∫ c`
0
w(t|c¯)dt = V, OR c` = 1,
∫ c`
0
w(t|c¯)dt ≤ V. (IND)
Here, as per (2.2), the integral denotes the total expected cost of a customer with unit
waiting cost c`. Note that we have w(t|c¯) = wF (c¯) for t ∈ (c1, c2) and w(t|c¯) = wB(t|c¯)
for t ∈ [0, c1] ∪ [c2, c`]. Using (IND), we can now relate the symmetric equilibria of
the system SYSop with those of the system SYSman. The following lemmas formalize
this argument. The proof is provided in Appendix A.3.
Lemma 4. If the strategy (c1, c2, 1) is a symmetric equilibrium for the system
SYSman(λ, P ) with λ ∈ (0, n+ k), then the strategy c¯(u) = (c1u, c2u, u) for u ∈ (0, 1]
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is a symmetric equilibrium for the system SYSop(λu , Pu, V ) if and only if the condition
(IND) holds for the strategy c¯(u).
The preceding lemma states that a symmetric equilibrium of the system SYSman
can be used to construct a symmetric equilibrium of a related SYSop system, as long
as one can ensure that the condition (IND) is satisfied. Conversely, the following
lemma constructs a symmetric equilibrium for a SYSman system using the symmetric
equilibrium of a related SYSop system.
Lemma 5. If the strategy (c1, c2, u) is a symmetric equilibrium of the system
SYSop(λ, P, V ) then the strategy
(
c1
u
, c2
u
, 1
)
is a symmetric equilibrium of the sys-
tem SYSman
(
λu, P
u
)
.
Let Uλ = (0, 1]∩ (0, n+kλ ). The preceding lemmas, together with Theorem 3, imply
that there exist functions Ci : Uλ → [0, 1] for i = 1, 2, such that for each u ∈ Uλ, we
have C1(u) ≤ C2(u) ≤ u, and the strategy
(C1(u)
u
, C2(u)
u
, 1
)
is the unique symmetric
equilibrium of the system SYSman(λu, Pu ). Using this, we now state the existence (and
uniqueness) result for the system SYSop(λ, P, V ).
Theorem 4. For each λ > 0, P > 0 and V > 0, there exists u = u(λ, P, V ) ∈ Uλ
such that the strategy (C1(u), C2(u), u) constitutes the unique symmetric customers’
equilibrium for the system SYSop(λ, P, V ). Further, for each λ > 0 and V > 0,
there exists a threshold P (λ, V ) such that for all P ≥ P (λ, V ), in the symmetric
equilibrium, the arrival rate of customers to the fixed-price firm is zero, whereas for
all P ∈ (0, P (λ, V )), the arrival rate of customers to the fixed-price firm is positive.
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To see the intuition behind the result, observe that, by using the expressions
(2.4) and (2.3), we can write the expected waiting time function for the strategy as
C¯(u) = (C1(u), C2(u), u),
w(t|C¯(u)) =

Γ(λu− λt) if t ∈ [C2(u), u];
Φ(λA(u)) if t ∈ (C1(u), C2(u));
Γ(λu− λA(u)− λt) if t ∈ [0, C1(u)],
where A(u) = C2(u)− C1(u). By straightforward algebra, the condition (IND) then
reduces to ∫ u−A(u)
0
Γ(λt)dt+A(u)Φ(λA(u)) ≤ V, if u < 1,∫ u−A(u)
0
Γ(λt)dt+A(u)Φ(λA(u)) = V, if u = 1. (2.7)
Thus, showing the existence (and uniqueness) of a symmetric equilbrium for the
system SYSop(λ, P, V ) requires showing that the preceding equation has a unique
solution u = u(λ, P, V ). This is obtained by showing that both A(u) and u−A(u) are
continuous and non-decreasing in u ∈ Uλ. We provide the details in Appendix A.5.
2.4.3 System with positive reserve price
The existence and uniqueness of customers’ equilibrium can be easily extended to the
setting where reserve price in the bid-based firm r is positive. When P > r, there
is an straightforward one-to-one mapping between the systems with fixed price P ,
reserve price r, value V , and the system with fixed price P − r, reserve price 0, value
V − r. In particular, the two systems have the same equilibrium thresholds, and any
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customer who receives service in equilibrium pays an additional r in the former system
in addition to her payment in the latter system. To see this, note that in the former
system, all customers who receive service pays at least r, thus subtracting r from
both the prices and the value does not change the customers’ service decision. As a
result, we can obtain the service decisions in the former system with reserve price, by
calculating that in the latter system, which has zero reserve price. Customers’ bids
in the former system is then given by r plus their bids in the latter system.
When P ≤ r, the system cannot be mapped directly to any system that we have
studied in the earlier parts of the chapter. However, we can follow the same analysis
procedures, to show that there exists a unique customers’ equilibrium. In particular,
c1 is equal to 0 in equilibrium, and (c2, c`) satisfies condition (IND), as well as a
condition which suggests that the customer with unit waiting cost c2 is indifferent
between the two firms (or c2 = c` and the customer with unit waiting cost c2 prefers
fixed-price over bid-based). Namely,
c` < 1, P +
∫ c`
0
w(t|c¯)dt = V, OR c` = 1, P +
∫ c`
0
w(t|c¯)dt ≤ V, (IND)
and
c2 < c`, P + c2wF (c¯) = r + c2wB(c2|c¯),
OR c2 = c`, P + c2wF (c¯) ≤ r + c2wB(c2|c¯).
The following theorem summarizes the discussions above.
Theorem 5. For each λ > 0, P > 0, r > 0 and V > 0, there exists a strategy
characterized by thresholds c¯ = (c1, c2, c`) that constitutes the unique symmetric
customers’ equilibrium for the system with optional service requirements. In particular,
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when r ≥ P , we have c1 = 0 and the equilibrium strategy is a two-thresholds strategy.
2.5 Competition between firms
Next, using the unique equilibrium among the customers for any given fixed price
P and reserve price r, we study the competition between the two firms in setting
their prices. In particular, we consider a game between the two firms, where the
firm operating fixed-price service sets P and the firm operating bid-based service sets
r so as to maximize their respective expected revenue. In this resulting game, we
investigate the existence of Nash equilibria.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the fixed-price firm chooses P ∈ [0, V ]
and the bid-based firm chooses r ∈ [0, V ], since otherwise no customer would obtain
service from the respective firm, resulting in zero profit for that firm. Furthermore,
we assume that V ≥ 1. This is because, if V < 1, some customers would never choose
to obtain service from either firm, even if they were to be served immediately upon
arrival, and such customers can be ignored for the sake of analysis. The resulting
system with V < 1 can then be mapped to a system with V ≥ 1 and lower λ, using
techniques as in the proof of Lemma 4.
Given these assumptions, we now state the following result regarding the existence
of mixed Nash equilibria for the game between the two firms.
Theorem 6. For V > 1, the game between the two firms has a mixed Nash equilibrium.
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This result follows from the continuity of the expected revenue of the two firms
in P and r, and from the fact that they take values in a compact set. We prove the
former statement by showing that c¯ is continuous in both P and r. The details are
given in Appendix A.6.
Since we only obtain existence of equilibrium in mixed strategies for the general
case, we next analyze the system under a specific assumption for the expected waiting
times and in a regime where the arrival rate and the service capacity is large. In
Section 2.5.2, we analyze this system in the limit where the arrival rate goes to
infinity, and fully characterize the set of pure equilibria of the limiting game. Using
standard arguments, we show in Theorem 7 that these pure equilibria are -equilibria
for the system for finite, but large enough, arrival rate. Finally, in Section 2.5.3, we
use the characterization of the set of pure equilibria of the limiting game to study
its revenue properties, in comparison to the setting where the fixed-price and the
bid-based service were operated by a single firm. In particular, we show that the
total revenue in the equilibria of the limiting game is fairly close to that obtained in
the system with a single firm. These results together suggest that for large arrival
rates and large capacity, the competition between the firms does not significantly
affect the revenues in equilibrium.
45
2.5.1 High arrival rate and high capacity regime
In this subsection, we introduce the limiting regime and the waiting time expressions
under which we perform our analysis. In particular, we consider the limiting regime
where λ→∞, with n = qFλ and k = qBλ, for some qF > 0 and qB > 0. Since n and
k denote the capacities of the two firms, this regime applies to settings where the
arrival rate and the capacities of the two firms are proportionally large. We restrict
our analysis in the following parameter regime.
Assumption 2 (Duopoly regime). 1. 0 < qF < 1 and 0 < qB < 1
2. qF + qB ≥ 1.
In particular, the first condition ensures that no firm has enough capacity to serve
all customers in the market, while the second condition ensures that the two firms
together have enough capacity to serve everyone.
To obtain analytical expressions for the thresholds, we focus on a setting with
explicit expected waiting time expressions wF (·) and wB(·|c¯), motivated by M/M/1
FIFO and (preemptive) priority queues. In particular, suppose the strategy adopted
by the customers is given by c¯ = (c1, c2, c`). Let ρF = λ(c2 − c1)/n denote the
congestion (see [27]) at the fixed-price firm, and let ρB = λ(c` − c2 + c1)/k denote
the congestion at the bid-based firm.
We assume that the expected waiting time at the fixed-price firm is given explicitly
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by
wF (c¯) =
ρF
1− ρF
1
n
+ 1.
Essentially, making this assumption implies that when a customer waiting for service
in the fixed-price firm, the service requirement ahead of her decreases at rate n. The
first term then denotes the waiting time until the beginning of service in an M/M/1
FIFO queue with service rate n and arrival rate λ(c2 − c1). Once the customer starts
her service, her service is processed at rate 1, and incurs an additional waiting time
of one, as in the second term. As an example of an instance where this waiting time
expression holds, consider a airport taxi service, where customers are riders waiting
for taxi, each of which arrive at rate n. Thus, the time waiting for arrival of a taxi is
given by the first term in the expression. Once a taxi arrives, the time it takes to
reach the destination is fixed and independent of the service rate n.
Similarly, we assume the expected waiting time of a customer with unit waiting
cost c in the bid-based firm is given by
wB(c; c¯) =
1
k(1− ρB + ρBB(c; c¯))2 −
1
k
+ 1,
where B(c; c¯) is the fraction of customers that join the bid-based firm with unit cost
less than c. Namely, we have
B(x; c¯) =

x
c`−c2+c1 if x ≤ c1;
x+c1−c2
c`−c2+c1 if x ≥ c2.
To obtain the expression for wB(·; c¯), we again make the assumption that for a
customer waiting for service in the bid-based firm, the service requirement ahead of
her decreases at rate k. The first two terms then denote the waiting time until the
beginning of for service in a M/M/1 priority queue with service rate κ and total
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arrival rate λ(c`−c2 +c1), where we have used the waiting time expression for priority
queues as in in [36]. The last term then denotes the time in service.
2.5.2 Equilibria among firms in the limiting system
Substituting the above expected waiting time expressions into equations (ContT-P),
(ContW-P) and (IND), let (cλ1 , cλ2 , cλ` ) denote the equilibrium thresholds for any fixed
λ > 0. Recall that αλ = cλ2 − cλ1 . The following lemma characterizes the limiting
thresholds and the expected revenue per arrival as λ approaches infinity under
Assumption 2. The proof is given in Appendix A.6.
Lemma 6. Under Assumption 2, as λ goes to +∞, the asymptotic properties of the
system are given by:
1. If P > r and P < V − qB, we have cλ` → c∞` (P, r) = min{V − P, 1}, cλ1 →
c∞1 (P, r) = c∞` (P, r)
√
qB/
(
1
qF+qB−c∞` (P,r)
− 1
qF
+ 1
qB
)
, and α → α∞(P, r) =
c∞` (P, r)− qB. Moreover, the limiting expected revenue of the fixed-price firm
per arrival is R∞F (P, r) = (c∞` (P, r)− qB)P , and the limiting expected revenue
of the bid-based firm per arrival is R∞B (P, r) = qBP .
2. If P ≤ r and r < V − qF , we have cλ` → c∞` (P, r) = min{V − r, 1}, cλ1 → 0, and
αλ → α∞(P, r) = qF . Moreover, the limiting expected revenue of the fixed-price
firm per arrival is R∞F (P, r) = qFP , and the limiting expected revenue of the
bid-based firm per arrival is R∞B (P, r) = (c∞` (P, r)− qF ) r.
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3. If P > r and P ≥ V − qB, we have that cλ1 , cλ2 and cλ` all tend to min{V − r, qB}
as λ → ∞. The limiting expected revenue of the fixed-price firm per arrival
is R∞F (P, r) = 0, and the limiting expected revenue of the bid-based firm per
arrival is R∞B (P, r) = qBr.
4. If P ≤ r and r ≥ V − qF , we have cλ1 → 0, whereas cλ2 and cλ` both tend to
min{V − P, qF} as λ → ∞. The limiting expected revenue of the fixed-price
firm per arrival is R∞F (P, r) = qFP , and the limiting expected revenue of the
bid-based firm per arrival is R∞B (P, r) = 0.
From Lemma 6, we obtain that the firms’ limiting expected revenue per arrival
has simple closed form. We thus study a “limiting game”, where the fixed-price and
bid-based firms choose P and r respectively to maximize their payoffs R∞F (P, r) and
R∞B (P, r). First, we justify this analysis of the limiting game via the following theorem,
which states that any Nash equilibrium of the limiting game is an -equilibrium of
the original game.
Theorem 7. For any  > 0, there exists a λ0, such that for any λ > λ0, every
equilibrium (P, r) of the limiting game is an -equilibrium in the original game with
arrival rate λ.
This theorem follows from the continuity of the firms’ revenue in λ, which follows
directly from the continuity of the equilibrium thresholds in λ. The details are given
in Appendix A.6.
With this theorem in place, we now characterize the set of Nash equilibria of
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the limiting game in the following lemma. The details of the proof are provided in
Appendix A.6.
Lemma 7. The following holds under Assumption 2.
1. If V ≥ 2 − qB, the set of Nash equilibria of the limiting game is given by
{(P, r) : P = V −1, r ≤ 1−qB
qF
(V −1)}. Under any equilibrium (P, r), R∞B (P, r) =
qB(V − 1) and R∞F (P, r) = (1− qB)(V − 1).
2. If V < 2−qB, the set of Nash equilibria of the limiting game is given by {(P, r) :
P = V−qB2 , r ≤ V − 1}. Under any equilibrium (P, r), R∞B (P, r) = qB V−qB2 and
R∞F (P, r) =
(
V−qB
2
)2
.
2.5.3 Price of stability of the limiting system
From the preceding lemma, we obtain that for fixed parameters qB, qF and V , the
firms’ payoffs R∞B and R∞F are the same under all Nash equilibria. In the following,
we compare the total revenue obtained by the two firms in any such equilibrium to
the maximum total revenue that can be obtained if the two firms colluded to set
P and r. More precisely, we define the price of stability (PoS) (see [56]) to be the
ratio of the maximum revenue obtained by the two firms under collusion to the total
revenue of the two firms in equilibrium. We have the following result for the price of
stability in the limiting game.
Theorem 8. For V ≥ 2, we have PoS = 1. For 1 ≤ V < 2, PoS is strictly decreasing
in V , with PoS ≤ 98 if 1.5 ≤ V < 2 and PoS ≤ 11−q2B if 1 ≤ V < 1.5.
50
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix A.6. From this theorem, we
see that in the firms’ limiting game, for small qB or large V , the price of stability
is relatively low. Moreover, for sufficiently large V , the total payoff under Nash
equilibria is the same as the total payoff under the collusion. This suggests that
in the limiting game, the competition between the two firms does not significantly
affect the revenues in equilibrium. By Theorem 7, we conclude the same holds for
-equilibrium in the finite system for large enough arrival rates.
We conclude this section by two numerical examples that illustrate our discussion
above. Figure 2.3 shows the total revenue per arrival in a Nash equilibrium and under
collusion, as k, n and λ increase proportionally, assuming qB = qF = 0.5, and V = 5.
Figure 2.4 shows the price of stability1 for the same set of parameters. Observe that
the ratio is very close to 1 for large λ, which coincides with the first case of Theorem
8. Similarly, Figure 2.5 and 2.6 show the revenues and price of stability as k, n and λ
increase proportionally, assuming qB = qF = 0.5, and V = 1.5. The price of stability
fluctuates around 9/8 for large λ, which coincides with the second case of Theorem 8.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyze a model of two competing service providers offering service
which differ in pricing rules and priority of service. We show under general settings
the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium of the customers’ game,
1Note that we do not have any monotonicity results for the price of stability as arrival rate
increases. Thus we have zig zag patterns for price of stability.
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Figure 2.3: Total revenue per arrival in Nash equilibrium and under collusion,
when V = 5
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Figure 2.6: Ratio between the per arrival total revenues, when V = 1.5
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where the customers’ strategy has a multi-threshold structure. In particular, we show
the customers endogenously segregate between the two firms, with customer with
very low and high waiting costs choosing to the obtain service from the bid-based
firm, whereas customers with moderate waiting costs choosing to obtain service from
the fixed-price firm. With the characterization of the unique equilibrium among
the customers, we study the price competition between the two firms, and show
that under high arrival rate and explicit waiting time assumptions, the competition
between the two firms does not substantially affect the total revenue per arrival.
There are many avenues for future research. In many practical applications, one
needs to consider service abandonments and dynamic pricing of the firms in response
to the real-time state of the system. Incorporating these practical considerations into
our model is an interesting area for future research.
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CHAPTER 3
PRICE COMPETITION UNDER LINEAR DEMAND AND FINITE
INVENTORIES: CONTRACTION AND APPROXIMATE
EQUILIBRIA
In many practical situations, multiple firms selling substitutable products set
their prices competitively to sell limited inventories over a finite selling horizon, given
that the demand of each firm jointly depends on the prices charged by all firms.
For example, airlines competitively set the prices for their limited seat inventories
in a particular market. Firms selling electronic products take the prices of their
competitors into consideration when setting their prices. In this chapter, we consider
multiple firms with limited inventories of substitutable products. Each firm chooses
the prices that it charges for its product over a finite selling horizon. The demand
that each firm faces is a deterministic function of the prices charged by all of the
firms, where the demand of a firm is linearly decreasing in its price and linearly
increasing in the prices of the other firms. Each firm chooses its prices over a finite
selling horizon to maximize its total revenue.
Main Contributions. We study two types of equilibrium for the competitive
pricing setting described above. In an equilibrium without recourse, at the beginning
of the selling horizon, each firm selects and commits to the prices it charges over the
whole selling horizon, assuming that the other firms do the same. In an equilibrium
with recourse, at each time period in the selling horizon, each firm observes the
inventories of all of the firms and chooses its price at the current time period, again
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under the assumption that the other firms do the same. Essentially, an equilibrium
without recourse corresponds to an open-loop equilibrium [19], whereas an equilibrium
with recourse corresponds to a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) [20] in the dynamic
game among the firms. Despite the fact that the demand of each firm is a deterministic
function of the prices so that there is no uncertainty in the firms’ responses, we show
a clear contrast between the two equilibrium notions.
We consider the diagonal dominant regime, where the price charged by each firm
affects its demand more than the prices charged by the other firms. In other words,
if all of the competitors of a firm decrease their prices by a certain amount, then
the firm can decrease its price by the same amount to ensure that its demand does
not decrease. This regime is rather standard in the existing literature and it is used
in, for example, [6] and [21]. Focusing on the equilibrium without recourse, we show
in Section 3.1 that the best response of each firm to the price trajectories of the
other firms is a contraction mapping, when viewed as a function of the prices of the
other firms. In this case, it immediately follows that the equilibrium without recourse
always exists and it is unique (see [68, Section 2.5]).
We give counterexamples in Section 3.2 to show that an equilibrium with recourse
may not exist or may not be unique. Motivated by this observation, we look for an
approximate equilibrium that is guaranteed to exist. We call a strategy profile for the
firms an -equilibrium with recourse if no firm can improve its total revenue by more
than  by deviating from its strategy profile. We consider a low influence regime,
where the effect of the price of a firm on the demand of another firm is diminishing,
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which naturally holds when the number of firms is large. We show in Section 3.3
that the equilibrium without recourse can be used to construct an -equilibrium with
recourse that has the same price trajectory as the equilibrium without recourse. So,
intuitively speaking, an -equilibrium with recourse is expected to exist when the
number of firms is large.
Our results fill a gap in a fundamental class of revenue management problems.
Although there is no uncertainty in the firms’ responses, the equilibria with and
without recourse are not the same concept and can be qualitatively quite different.
While the equilibrium without recourse uniquely exists, the same need not hold for the
equilibrium with recourse. Also, our contraction argument for showing the existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium without recourse uses the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) conditions for the firm’s problem. Though contraction arguments are standard
for showing existence and uniqueness of equilibrium [68], to the best of our knowledge,
this duality-based contraction argument is new for price competition under limited
inventories. This argument becomes surprisingly effective when dealing with linear
demand functions, but it is an open question whether similar arguments hold for
other demand functions. Lastly, our results indicate that in a low influence regime the
equilibrium without recourse can be used to construct an -equilibrium with recourse
with the same price trajectory as the equilibrium without recourse.
Literature Review. Similar to us, [21] considers price competition among
multiple firms with limited inventories over a finite selling horizon. There are three key
differences between their work and ours. First, they focus on a continuous-time setting,
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whereas we study a discrete-time formulation. Second, they consider a generalized
Nash game [60] where each firm considers all firms’ capacity constraints while setting
their prices, whereas in our model, each firm only considers its own capacity constraints.
Most importantly, they focus on open-loop and closed-loop equilibria, and show that
in the diagonally dominant regime a unique open-loop equilibrium exists and coincides
with a closed-loop equilibrium. Although an equilibrium without recourse in our
setting is the same as an open-loop equilibrium, our equilibrium with recourse is
more restrictive than their closed-loop equilibrium. In particular, their closed-loop
equilibria need not be perfect, whereas our equilibrium with recourse is a Markov
perfect equilibrium. Thus, we show that the equilibrium with recourse can be
different from the equilibrium without recourse. More precisely, although the former
equilibrium need not exist or be unique, the latter is an approximate equilibrium
with recourse in the low influence regime.
There are a number of papers that study price competition over a single period.
[50] shows that pure Nash equilibrium (NE) exists for a wide class of supermodular
demand models. [22] provides sufficient conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium in
the Bertrand game when the demands of the firms are nonlinear functions of the
prices, there is a non-linear cost associated with satisfying a certain volume of demand
and each firm seeks to maximize its expected profit. [58] identifies the conditions
for existence and uniqueness of pure NE when the demands are characterized by
a mixture of multinomial logit models and the cost of satisfying a certain volume
of demand is linear in the demand volume. [26] considers price competition among
multiple firms when the relationship between demand and price is characterized by
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the nested logit model and provides conditions to ensure the existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium. [54] proves the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in a price
competition between two suppliers when capacity is private information.
Considering the papers on price competition over multiple time periods, [39]
studies a stochastic game when there are strategic consumers choosing the time to
purchase. [41] studies a competitive pricing problem when the relationship between
demand and price is captured by the multinomial logit model and inventory levels
are public information. [46] studies the pricing game between two firms with limited
inventories facing stochastic demand. The authors characterize the unique subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium. [43] shows the existence of a unique pure MPE in a pricing
game between two firms offering vertically differentiated products.
3.1 Equilibrium without Recourse
There are n firms indexed by N = {1, . . . , n}. Firm i has ci units of initial inventory,
which cannot be replenished over the selling horizon. There are τ time periods in the
selling horizon indexed by T = {1, . . . , τ}. We use pti to denote the price charged by
firm i at time period t. Using pt = (pt1, . . . , ptn) to denote the prices charged by all
of the firms at time period t, the demand faced by firm i at time period t is given
by Dti(pt) = αti − βti pti +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j, where αti > 0, βti > 0 and γti,j > 0. We assume
that the price charged by each firm affects its demand more than the prices charged
by the other firms, in the sense that ∑j 6=i γti,j < βti for all i ∈ N , t ∈ T . Also, using
pt−i = (pt1, . . . , pti−1, pti+1, . . . , ptn) to denote the prices charged by firms other than
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firm i at time period t, to avoid negative demand quantities, we restrict the strategy
space of the firms such that each firm i charges the price pti at time period t that
satisfies αti − βti pti +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j ≥ 0, given the prices pt−i charged by the other firms.
If the firms other than firm i commit to the price trajectories p−i = {pt−i : t ∈ T},
then we can obtain the best response of firm i by solving the problem
max
{∑
t∈T
(
αti − βti pti +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p
t
j
)
pti :
∑
t∈T
(
αti − βti pti +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p
t
j
)
≤ ci, (3.1)
αti − βti pti +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p
t
j ≥ 0 ∀ t ∈ T, pti ≥ 0 ∀ t ∈ T
}
.
Since βti > 0, problem (3.1) has a strictly concave objective function and linear
constraints, which implies that the best response of firm i is unique.
Using the non-negative dual multipliers vi and {uti : t ∈ T} for the first and second
constraint in problem (3.1), the KKT conditions for this problem are
(∑
t∈T
(
αti − βti pti +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p
t
j
)
− ci
)
vi = 0,
(
αti − βti pti +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p
t
j
)
uti = 0 ∀ t ∈ T, (3.2)
αti − 2 βti pti +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p
t
j + βti (vi − uti) = 0 ∀ t ∈ T.
Since problem (3.1) has a concave objective function and linear constraints, the
KKT conditions above are necessary and sufficient at optimality; see [10]. In other
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words, for a feasible solution {pti : t ∈ T} to problem (3.1), there exist corresponding
non-negative dual multipliers vi and {uti : t ∈ T} that satisfy the KKT conditions
in (3.2) if and only if {pti : t ∈ T} is the optimal solution to problem (3.1). Note
that we do not associate dual multipliers with the constraints pti ≥ 0 for all t ∈ T in
problem (3.1) since it is never optimal for firm i to charge a negative price. Therefore,
we can actually view the constraints pti ≥ 0 for all t ∈ T as redundant constraints.
We use the KKT conditions in (3.2) extensively to characterize the best response
of firm i to the price trajectories p−i of the other firms. In the rest of this section,
we exclusively focus on the strategies without recourse, where each firm i commits to
a price trajectory {pti : t ∈ T} at the beginning of the selling horizon and does not
adjust these prices during the course of the selling horizon. If the price trajectory
{pti : t ∈ T} chosen by each firm i is the best response to the price trajectories p−i
chosen by the other firms, then we say that the price trajectories {pt : t ∈ T} chosen
by the firms is an equilibrium without recourse. We show that there exists a unique
equilibrium without recourse. Furthermore, if we start with any price trajectory
{pt : t ∈ T} for the firms and successively compute the best response of each firm to
the price trajectories of the other firms, then the best response of each firm forms a
contraction mapping when viewed as a function of the prices charged by the other
firms. Using this result, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium without
recourse. To capture the best response of firm i to the prices charged by the other
firms, we define for each ν ≥ 0, the set of time periods
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Ti(ν,p−i) =
{
t ∈ T : α
t
i +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j
βti
> ν
}
.
In the next lemma, we use Ti(·,p−i) to give a succinct characterization of the
solution {pti : t ∈ T} and the corresponding dual multipliers vi and {uti : t ∈ T} that
satisfy the KKT conditions.
Lemma 8. If a feasible solution {pti : t ∈ T} to problem (3.1) and the corresponding
non-negative dual multipliers vi and {uti : t ∈ T} satisfy the KKT conditions in (3.2),
then we have
pti =

(αti +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p
t
j)/(2 βti) + vi/2 if t ∈ Ti(vi,p−i)
(αti +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p
t
j)/βti if t 6∈ Ti(vi,p−i),
uti =

0 if t ∈ Ti(vi,p−i)
vi − (αti +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p
t
j)/βti if t 6∈ Ti(vi,p−i).
Proofs of all lemmas are in Appendix B.1. By Lemma 8, we can characterize the
solution {pti : t ∈ T} and the dual multipliers vi and {uti : t ∈ T} that satisfy the
KKT conditions in (3.2) only by using the value of vi. If we know the value of vi,
then we can compute the set of time periods Ti(vi,p−i), in which case, we can choose
the values of {pti : t ∈ T} and {uti : t ∈ Ti} as given in Lemma 8. Throughout the
rest of this section, we indeed choose the values of {pti : t ∈ T} and {uti : t ∈ Ti}
as given in Lemma 8, since we are interested in solutions that satisfy the KKT
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conditions. Naturally, we do not know the value of vi that allows us to obtain an
optimal solution {pti : t ∈ T} to problem (3.1). In the next lemma, we give a
characterization of the value of vi that corresponds to the solution {pti : t ∈ T} and
the dual multipliers vi and {uti : t ∈ T} satisfying the KKT conditions in (3.2). In
particular, we consider the function
Gi(ν,p−i) =

∑
t∈Ti(ν,p−i)
(αti − βtiν +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p
t
j)− 2ci if ν > 0 ∑
t∈Ti(ν,p−i)
(
αti +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p
t
j
)
− 2 ci
+ if ν = 0.
Lemma 24 in Appendix B.1 shows that Gi(·,p−i) is strictly decreasing over some
[0, ν∗] and has a unique root. In the next lemma, we use its root to characterize a
solution to the KKT conditions.
Lemma 9. If a feasible solution {pti : t ∈ T} to problem (3.1) and the corresponding
non-negative dual multipliers vi and {uti : t ∈ T} satisfy the KKT conditions in (3.2),
then we have Gi(vi,p−i) = 0.
By Lemma 9, if a feasible solution {pti : t ∈ T} to problem (3.1) and the
corresponding non-negative dual multipliers vi and {uti : t ∈ T} satisfy the KKT
conditions in (3.2), then vi must be the unique root of Gi(·,p−i). Also, by Lemma 8,
the values of {pti : t ∈ T} and {uti : t ∈ T} must be given as in Lemma 8. In the next
theorem, we use these results to show that the best response of firm i is a contraction
mapping when viewed as a function of the prices of the other firms.
Theorem 9. Let {pti(p−i) : t ∈ T} be the optimal solution to problem (3.1) as a
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function of the prices charged by the firms other than firm i. For any two price
trajectories pˆ−i = {pˆt−i : t ∈ T} and p˜−i = {p˜t−i : t ∈ T} adopted by the firms other
than firm i, we have
|pti(pˆ−i)− pti(p˜−i)| ≤ max
t∈T

∑
j 6=i γti,j |pˆtj − p˜tj|
βti
.
Proof Outline. Use Mi to denote the right hand side of the inequality in the theorem.
Let pˆti = pti(pˆ−i) and p˜ti = pti(p˜−i). Let vˆi and v˜i be such that Gi(vˆi, pˆ−i) = 0
and Gi(v˜i, p˜−i) = 0. Without loss of generality we assume vˆi ≥ v˜i. Otherwise, we
interchange their roles. In the proof, we show that |pˆti−p˜ti| ≤ 12Mi+ 12 max{Mi, vˆi− v˜i},
by considering four cases on whether t is in Ti(vˆi, pˆ−i) and Ti(v˜i, p˜−i). In each
case, we use Lemma 8 to get expressions for pˆti and p˜ti. Once we have |pˆti − p˜ti| ≤
1
2Mi +
1
2 max{Mi, vˆi − v˜i}, we only need to show that vˆi − v˜i ≤Mi. We use Lemma 9
and the definition of Ti(·, ·) to show that Gi(vˆi −Mi, p˜−i) ≥ 0. Then vˆi −Mi ≤ v˜i
follows from simple monotonicity properties of G(·, p˜−i) given in Lemma 24. The
details are in Appendix B.1. 
For the vector y = {yt : t ∈ T}, define the norm on <τ as ‖y‖∞ = maxt∈T |yt|.
Since ∑j 6=i γti,j < βti for all i ∈ N and t ∈ T , Theorem 9 implies that firm i’s best
response is a contraction under ‖ · ‖∞, when viewed as a function of the other firms’
prices. Therefore, it immediately follows that if the price charged by each firm affects
its demand more than the prices charged by the other firms, then there always exists
a unique equilibrium without recourse.
The contraction mapping also presents an efficient computation scheme. Let
M = maxi∈N,t∈T
∑
j 6=i γti,j/β
t
i and note that since
∑
j 6=i γti,j < β
t
i for all i ∈ N , t ∈ T ,
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we have M < 1. Performing best-response iterations converges linearly to the
unique equilibrium at rate M (see [59, Theorem 6.3.3]). In each iteration, one
must solve the problems (3.1) for each i ∈ N . Using Lemma 24 in Appendix
B.1, each of these n problems can be solved by bisection on vi, as we can show
that vi ≥ 0 must lie in a bounded interval. To see this, recall that the firms’
prices must satisfy αti − βti pti +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N . Rearranging, we
get pti ≤ αti/βti +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j/β
t
i ≤ maxi∈N{αti/βti} + M maxj∈N{ptj}, which implies
that maxi∈N{pti} ≤ maxi∈N{αti/βti}/(1 − M) = Pmax. Then using the definition
of T (ν,p−i), we obtain that T (ν,p−i) is empty if ν > Pmax, which implies that
vi ≤ Pmax.
3.2 Equilibrium with Recourse
In this section, we consider strategies with recourse, where each firm can change its
price at each time period based on its inventory and the inventories of the other firms.
In other words, the firms do not commit to a price trajectory at the beginning of
the selling horizon. We let xti be the inventory of firm i at the beginning of time
period t. Focusing on Markovian strategies without loss of generality, as a function
of the inventories xt = (xt1, . . . , xtn) of all of the firms, we use P ti (xt) to denote the
price charged by firm i at time period t. It is useful to view P ti (·) as a function that
determines the strategy of firm i at time period t as a function of the inventories of
all of the firms. We use P t = (P t1(·), . . . , P tn(·)) to capture the strategies of all of the
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firms at time period t and P t−i = (P t1(·), . . . , P ti−1(·), P ti+1(·), . . . , P tn(·)) to capture the
strategies of the firms other than firm i at time period t. If the firms other than firm
i use the strategies P−i = {P t−i : t ∈ T}, then we can find the best response strategy
of firm i by solving the dynamic program
V ti (xt) = max

(
αti − βti pti +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j P
t
j (xt)
)
pti + V t+1i (xt+1) :
αti − βti pti +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j P
t
j (xt) ≥ 0,
xt+1i =
[
xti − (αti − βti pti +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j P
t
j (xt))
]+
,
xt+1` =
[
xt` −
(
αt` − βt`P t` (xt) + γt`,ipti +
∑
j 6∈{i,`}
γt`,jP
t
j (xt)
)]+
∀` ∈ N \ {i},
pti ≥ 0, xt+1` ≥ 0 ∀ ` ∈ N
,
with the boundary condition that V τ+1i (·) = 0. An optimal solution to the problem
above characterizes the best response strategy of firm i at time period t.
For the strategies {P t : t ∈ T} to form an equilibrium with recourse, we require
that for each t ∈ T , all inventories xt, and each i, the strategy {P si (·) : s = t, . . . , τ}
chosen by firm i in the periods subsequent to time t is a best response against other
firms’ strategies {P s−i(·) : s = t, . . . , τ} in the subsequent time periods. In other words,
we require the strategies {P t : t ∈ T} to form a Markov perfect equilibrium [20]. In
the previous section, we show that there always exists a unique equilibrium when
we focus on strategies without recourse. We give two numerical examples to show
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that if we focus on strategies with recourse, then there may not exist an equilibrium
or there may be multiple equilibria. Consider the case where there are two firms
and the selling horizon has two time periods. For given inventories of the two firms
at the second time period, the problem of computing the equilibrium strategy at
the second time period is identical to finding an equilibrium without recourse. So,
there exists a unique equilibrium strategy for the firms at the second time period
for given inventories. Note that the prices charged by the firms in an equilibrium
without recourse at the second time period depend on the inventories of the firms at
the second time period, which, in turn, depend on the prices charged by the firms at
the first time period. To obtain an equilibrium with recourse, we compute the best
response strategy of each firm at the first time period as a function of the price of
the other firm at the first time period. Recall that if we fix the prices of the firms at
the first time period, then we fix the inventories at the second time period, in which
case, we can compute the equilibrium strategies at the second time period. We plot
the best response of each firm at the first time period as a function of the price of
the other firm. An equilibrium with recourse corresponds to the intersection of the
two best response curves.
Consider the parameters αti = 4, β1i = 4, β2i = 2, γ1i,j = 16/5, γ2i,j = 1, ci = 3 for
all i ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i and t ∈ {1, 2}, which satisfy ∑j 6=i γti,t < βti for all i, t ∈ {1, 2}, so
that we know that there exists a unique equilibrium without recourse. In Figure 3.1,
the solid line plots the best response of second firm at the first time period on the
vertical axis, as a function of the price of the first firm on the horizontal axis, whereas
the dashed line plots the best response of the first firm at the first time period on the
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Figure 3.1: Best responses when equilibrium does not exist.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
First Period Price of Firm 1
To
ta
l R
ev
en
ue
 fo
r F
irm
 1
Figure 3.2: Revenue of the first firm as a function of its first period price.
horizontal axis as a function of the price of the second firm on the vertical axis. The
two best response functions do not intersect. Therefore, an equilibrium with recourse
does not exist. The main driver of the lack of equilibrium is the discontinuity in the
best response function, which arises because the revenue of each firm is a multi-modal
function of its first time period price. In Figure 3.2, we show first firm’s revenue as a
function of its price at the first time period, when the second firm’s price is fixed at
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Figure 3.3: Best responses when there are multiple equilibria.
2.2. So, firm 1 can jump from one mode to another based on the price of the second
firm. Considering the parameters αti = 4, β1i = 5, β2i = 2, γ1i,j = 0.1, γ2i,j = 1 and
ci = 5 for all j 6= i and i, t ∈ {1, 2}, Figure 3.3 shows the best response of each firm
at the first time period as a function of the other firm’s price. The best response
functions intersect at two points, indicating multiple equilibria with recourse.
3.3 An Approximate Equilibrium
If for each firm i, any deviation from the strategy {P ti (·) : t ∈ T} cannot increase
the revenue of firm i by more than  given that the other firms use the strategies
P−i, then we say that the price strategies {P t : t ∈ T} chosen by the firms is an
-equilibrium with recourse. Since there may not exist an equilibrium with recourse
or there may be multiple equilibria with recourse, we focus on -equilibria with
recourse. We consider a low influence regime, where, roughly speaking, the price
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charged by a firm affects its demand more than the prices charged by each of the
other firms. In particular, we consider the regime where the price charged by a
firm affects its demand so much more than the prices charged by each of the other
firms such that we have γti,j/βti < (1/M) − 1, where M is as defined at the end
of Section 2. When ∑j 6=i γti,j < βti and the number of firms is large, we expect
this assumption to hold. For example, if we have a symmetric setting, where the
parameters related to each firm are the same, then under the assumption that∑
j 6=i γti,j < β
t
i , we have γti,j/βti < 1/(n− 1), in which case, the low influence regime
naturally holds as the number of firms gets large. In the low influence regime, we
show that the equilibrium without recourse studied in the previous section can be
used to construct an -equilibrium with recourse. Intuitively, this result uses the fact
that if γti,j/βti is small, then any deviation of a firm from a given price trajectory has
little influence on the prices of the other firms in the subsequent time periods. In
the next lemma, we formalize this idea. Throughout the rest of this section, we use
µ = maxi∈N, j∈N\{i}, t∈T γti,j/βti and β¯ = maxi∈N, t∈T βti/mini∈N, t∈T βti . Note that the
low influence regime is defined as the setting where µ < (1/M)− 1.
Lemma 10. Fixing the prices pˆ1 charged by the firms at the first time period, let
the prices {pˆt : t ∈ T \ {1}} form the equilibrium without recourse in the remaining
portion of the selling horizon. Define the prices p˜1 at the first time period as p˜1i = pˆ1i +δ
and p˜1j = pˆj for all j ∈ N\{i} for some δ ≥ 0. Fixing the prices p˜1 charged by the firms
at the first time period, let the prices {p˜t : t ∈ T \ {1}} form the equilibrium without
recourse in the remaining portion of the selling horizon. If we have µ < (1/M)− 1,
then maxj 6=i, t∈T\{1} |pˆtj − p˜tj| ≤ 2µ β¯ δ1−M−Mµ .
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Consider the problem over the time periods κ, . . . , τ when the inventories of the
firms at time period κ are given by x = (x1, . . . , xn). We use pN,ti (κ,x) to denote
the price charged by firm i at time period t in the equilibrium without recourse.
We consider the following strategy with recourse for firm i. If the inventories of
the firms at time period t is given by x, then firm i charges the price pN,ti (t,x). In
other words, letting PR,ti (·) be the strategy function of firm i under this strategy with
recourse, we have PR,ti (x) = p
N,t
i (t,x). Using PR,t = (P
R,t
1 (·), . . . , PR,tn (·)) to capture
the strategies of all of the firms at time period t and c = (c1, . . . , cn) to denote the
inventories of the firms at the first time period, note that if all firms use the strategies
{PR,t : t ∈ T} over the selling horizon, then the price charged by each firm i at each
time period t is given by pN,ti (1, c), which is precisely the prices corresponding to the
equilibrium without recourse when we consider the problem over the time periods T
with the inventories of the firms at the first time period given by c. However, if one of
the firms deviates from the strategies {PR,t : t ∈ T} at a time period, then the prices
charged by the firms will be different from those in the equilibrium without recourse.
Therefore, it is not generally true that the strategies {PR,t : t ∈ T} correspond to
an equilibrium with recourse. In the remainder of this section, we show that the
strategies {PR,t : t ∈ T} correspond to an -equilibrium with recourse in the low
influence regime. In the next lemma, we show that if firm i unilaterally deviates from
the strategy {PR,ti (·) : t ∈ T}, but the other firms use the strategies {PR,t : t ∈ T},
then firm i does not increase its revenue by more than a simple function of µ.
Lemma 11. Assume that the strategies of all of the firms are {PR,t : t ∈ T}. Let
ΠNi be the revenue of firm i under these strategies. Also, assume that the strategies
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of the firms other than firm i are {PR,t−i : t ∈ T}, but firm i deviates to charge an
arbitrary price at the first time period and uses the strategy {PR,ti (·) : t ∈ T \ {1}} at
the other time periods. Let ΠDi be the revenue of firm i under this strategy. Letting
βmax = maxi∈N,t∈T βti , we have for µ < (1/M)− 1,
ΠDi − ΠNi ≤
2 β¯ Mβmax P 2max (τ − 1)µ
1−M −Mµ .
In the next theorem, we show that the strategy {PR,t : t ∈ T} is an -equilibrium
with recourse, when the number of firms is large so that µ is small.
Theorem 10. Assume that the strategies of all of the firms are {PR,t : t ∈ T}. Let
ΠNi be the revenue of firm i under these strategies. Also, assume that the strategy of
the firms other than firm i are {PR,t−i : t ∈ T}, but firm i uses an arbitrary strategy
over the whole selling horizon. Let ΠAi be the revenue of firm i under these strategies.
Letting Γµ = β¯ Mβmax P 2max/(1−M −Mµ), we have, for µ < (1/M)− 1,
ΠAi − ΠNi ≤ Γµ τ (τ − 1)µ.
Thus, {PR,t : t ∈ T} is an -equilibrium with recourse, with  = Γµ τ (τ − 1)µ.
Proof Outline. We use induction to prove the result. The result trivially holds for
τ = 1, as there is no difference between equilibrium with and without recourse for
τ = 1. Assume the result is true for τ = k. Let all firms other than i use the strategy
{PR,t−i : t ∈ T}. We use {Qti : t ∈ T} to denote the arbitrary strategy of firm i. Let
ΠNi and ΠAi be firm i’s revenue when it uses strategy {PR,ti : t ∈ T} and {Qti : t ∈ T},
respectively. Let ΠDi be firm i’s revenue when it uses strategy {PR,1i , Qti : t ∈ T/{1}}.
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We use Lemma 11 to bound the difference between ΠDi and ΠAi . Similarly, we use the
induction hypothesis at τ = k to bound the difference between ΠDi and ΠNi . Summing
up the two bounds gives us the result for τ = k + 1. The details are in Appendix B.1.

We observe that as µ approaches zero, Γµ τ (τ − 1)µ approaches zero as well.
Therefore, by the theorem above, if we are in the low influence regime, then no firm
can improve its revenue significantly by deviating from the policy {PR,t : t ∈ T},
which implies that {PR,t : t ∈ T} is an -equilibrium with recourse. As discussed
earlier, the price trajectory realized under the strategy {PR,t : t ∈ T} is same as that
in the unique equilibrium without recourse.
3.4 Future Research
A natural research direction is to extend our contraction properties to more general
demand models. Also, it would be useful to define an analogue of equilibrium without
recourse under stochastic demand and check whether it uniquely exists.
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CHAPTER 4
PERSONALIZED ASSORTMENT RECOMMENDATION AFTER
PURCHASE
4.1 Introduction
Many online sellers have the opportunity to recommend an assortment of items to a
customer after she makes a purchase or engages in an activity. The recommended
assortment is often personalized to the customer in one of the following two ways.
One type of personalization is based on the customer’s entire profile, which may
include her purchase history, demographic or other interaction-specific information
such as device type and browser, etc. For example, Walmart.com recommends a
list of sponsored products on the first page after a customer logs-in, based on her
purchase history. Another type of personalization is only based on the item that is
purchased during the current visit. For example, when a customer makes a hotel
reservation on Priceline.com, she is given rental car deals in the confirmation email
she receives. Similarly, after a customer makes a purchase on Amazon.com, the
confirmation email she receives shows two products as “recommended based on the
item purchased”. While the second type of personalization can be seen as a special
case of the first type, we consider it as a separate type because of the difference
in analysis. To be more precise, the product-based nature of the second type of
personalization allows us to decompose the analysis by product, while the analysis of
the first type of personalization requires decomposition by customer segments.
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Both types of personalization are widely used in the web-based industry, and each
one has its own advantages. Personalization based on entire profile accounts for more
information, thus tend to be more accurate. On the other hand, personalization based
on the item purchased is simpler and less costly for the seller because it requires and
analyzes much less information. So it is good for sellers who do not have the ability
to collect or process complicated customer data. It also tends to be more applicable
in industries where customers’ interests change fast over time. For example, in the
travel industry, a customer is more likely to be interested in a rental car deal in the
city which she just booked a flight to, than in a city she has visited in the past.
In this chapter, we focus on the second type of personalization. In Section 4.9, we
discuss how our work can be extended to incorporate the first type. We consider a
firm selling finite inventories of multiple products over a finite selling horizon. One
customer arrives at each period in the selling horizon, and each period has two stages.
In stage 1, a customer arrives and chooses to purchase one item, or to leave without
a purchase, based on the assortment offered to her. If she makes a purchase in stage
1, she enters stage 2 in which she is offered another assortment, from which she
may again choose to purchase an item, or to leave without a purchase. Customers’
behavior is modeled using general choice models. The firm chooses an assortment to
offer at each stage of each period, based on the remaining inventory and time. The
choice of stage 2 assortment is customized to the customer’s purchase decision in
stage 1 of the same period. The firm’s goal is to maximize its expected total revenue.
Although our focus is on the online setting where customer behavior is stochastic,
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we begin by analyzing the oﬄine version of the problem. This oﬄine version is
obtained via a “fluid approximation”, in which customer demands are deterministic
and they can take fractional values. We formulate the oﬄine problem as an LP, using
the probability of offering each assortment at each stage as a decision variable. This
LP is exponential in the number of products, but it can be solved efficiently using the
column generation method (see [16]). We show that the optimal LP revenue is an
upper bound on the optimal revenue in the original online problem. We also present
an example, under which the expected online revenue under optimal policy is 47%
of the optimal oﬄine policy. This suggests that when we do analysis by comparison
with the oﬄine LP, the constant performance guarantee cannot exceed 47% for any
algorithm.
Using the solution to the oﬄine LP, we propose a novel algorithm, namely the
balancing algorithm, for the original online problem. The balancing algorithm solves
the oﬄine LP only once at the beginning of the selling horizon, and updates the
variables in each period to keep them feasible for the oﬄine LP with updated time
and inventory information. In each period, the algorithm offers a random assortment
suggested by the current feasible solution to the LP, where the support of the random
assortment grows as O(n2) when there are n products.
We show that the balancing algorithm attains an expected revenue of at least 1/3
of the optimal LP revenue. In a limiting regime in which the number of time periods
and initial inventory level increase proportionally and both tend to infinity, we prove
that the balancing algorithm is asymptotically optimal. In particular, the revenue
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under the balancing algorithm converges in probability to the LP revenue.
The balancing algorithm solves the oﬄine LP only once at the beginning of the
selling horizon, thus may not be able to adjust fully to stochastic realization of sales.
As a remedy, we also propose a resolving algorithm as a natural extension of the
balancing algorithm. The resolving algorithm mimics the balancing algorithm, except
for that it occasionally resolves the oﬄine LP using updated inventory and time
information. We prove that the performance guarantees we have for the balancing
algorithm also hold for the resolving algorithm. Namely, it attains an expected
revenue of at least 1/3 of the optimal oﬄine revenue, and when the number of resolves
is small, the revenue under the resolving algorithm converges in probability to the
optimal oﬄine revenue.
Finally, we numerically test the performance of the balancing and the resolving
algorithms under different settings. On average, the balancing algorithm attains
84.9% of the optimal oﬄine revenue. The resolving algorithm with different number of
resolves attains from 86.5% to 89.5% of the optimal oﬄine revenue. Both algorithms
perform better when the inventory is abundant, when the probability of leaving
without a purchase is low, or when the number of time periods in the selling horizon
is large. We also observe that resolving once in the middle of the selling horizon may
lead to significant improvement in revenue, compared with the balancing algorithm.
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4.1.1 Literature Review
The problem studied in this chapter is an online assortment customization problem
with inventory constraints, and with recommendation opportunity at checkout.
Some recent papers consider assortment customization. Those papers assume that
customers form different segments, and that the seller can observe each customer’s
segment. Thus, the seller’s assortment decision does not only depend on the remaining
inventory and time, but is also personalized based on customer characteristics. [31]
proposes a family of index-based policies with competitive ratio 1 − 1/e, which
it proves is the best constant ratio. [9] considers assortment customization with
identically priced, substitutable products. It proves that it is optimal to follow a
threshold policy in some settings. [24] considers an assortment customization problem
when each product is composed from a bundle of resources with limited inventories.
It proposes an algorithm that achieves a performance guarantee 1/2, which is the
best possible constant ratio.
Similar to this chapter, [13] studies an online assortment customization problem,
with opportunity for recommendation at checkout. It minimizes the competitive ratio,
assuming an adversary chooses the total number of customers, their arrival sequence,
and their type. The algorithm proposed in that paper attains a competitive ratio of
1/4. On the other hand, we maximize the firm’s expected revenue, assuming customer
behavior follows a stochastic model. We propose an algorithm with performance
guarantee of 1/3.
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We formulate a linear program for the oﬄine problem in which demand is de-
terministic and can be fractional, and use its solution to develop an algorithm for
the online stochastic problem in which customers’ purchase behavior is random. In
assortment optimization literature, such approach was first used by [23]. It considers
settings where there are multiple alternative products serving the same market, and
a customer who purchases a “flexible product” in a market is assigned in later dates
to one of the products in that market. The paper formulates a choice-based linear
program (CDLP) as a deterministic approximation of the original stochastic problem
with random demand. The CDLP has exponentially many variables, but it can by
solved efficiently using column generation. [42] extends the CDLP formulation to
more general settings, and proposes a dynamic control policy based on the CDLP
solution. [11] extends the CDLP method to the case when customers belong to
overlapping segments. It shows that the associated column generation subproblem is
NP-hard, and propose a heuristic to overcome the complexity.
The linear program we formulate for the oﬄine problem has exponentially many
variables. But the column generation subproblem can be solved by solving linearly
many one-shot static assortment optimization problems. The static assortment
optimization problem assumes that there is only one period in the selling horizon, and
it chooses an assortment to offer in order to maximize the firm’s expected revenue. It
is studied in the literature under various settings. [37] provides a literature review in
this area. [62] analyzes this problem when customer choice follows the multinomial
logit (MNL) model. It assumes that all products have the same price but different
attributes, and that there is an inventory cost for each product offered. It shows
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that the optimal assortment has a simple structure. [65] shows that under the MNL
model and the independent demand model, the optimal policy is to offer products
with the largest prices. The optimization problem can thus be solved in linear time
by comparing n nested assortments containing the most expensive products when
there are n products. [61] studies the problem under the mixed multinomial logit
model, under which there are multiple classes of customers, each following a MNL
demand model with class-dependent parameters. It shows that the problem is NP-
complete even when there are only two customer classes, and proposes a polynomial
time approximation scheme. For the same problem, [48] proposes a branch-and-cut
algorithm which leads to the nearly-optimal solution very fast. [15] studies the
problem under the nested logit model. It shows that the problem is polynomially
solvable if the nest dissimilarity parameters are small and the customers always make
a purchase. It then proposes an algorithm to deal with the NP-hard cases with worst
case performance guarantee. [25] and [18] propose algorithms to solve the problem
under nested logit model with various constraints on the offered assortments. [40]
studies the problem under a d-level nested logit model in which each product is
described by a list of d features, and proposes a polynomial algorithm to solve for
the optimal assortment.
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4.2 Model
Consider a firm selling n items through a selling horizon with T periods. Each item i
has limited inventory denoted by ci, and we assume ci is a non-negative integer for
all i. The price of item i is pi, and any inventory left after the selling horizon has
zero value. Although we assume each item can be sold at a single exogenous price in
this chapter, our analysis can be extended to the case in which the firm can choose
from different candidate prices for each item.
Each period is split into two stages. In stage 1, a single customer arrives, and
either chooses to purchase one item from the assortment offered to her, or decides to
leave without a purchase. If she makes a purchase, she enters stage 2 of this period,
in which she is offered another assortment, and she may choose to purchase an item
from that assortment, or to leave without a purchase. There is no stage 2 for this
period, if the customer does not make purchase in stage 1. Use N and M to denote
the set of candidate items for stage 1 and 2, respectively. In this chapter, we assume
that N and M are disjoint. This is true when the items recommended in second
stage are of different type as the first stage purchase (for example, consider the case
when Priceline recommends rental cars in the second stage, to customers who reserve
hotels in the first stage). In Section 4.9, we briefly discuss how our results can be
extended to the case where N and M may not be disjoint.
We assume that the customers are homogeneous upon arrival, and we model
their behavior through choice models. We use Πi(S) to denote the probability of
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purchasing item i in stage 1, when assortment S ⊂ N is offered. We use the item
purchased in stage 1 to define the type of the customer, and use Φij(S) to denote the
probability of a type i customer purchasing item j when she sees assortment S ⊂M
in stage 2. Note that although we assume each customer only purchases at most one
item in each stage, the analysis in this chapter can be extended to allow purchasing
of multiple items in each stage. The type of a customer is then defined as the set of
items purchased in stage 1.
The only assumption we make on the choice probabilities is as follows. Intuitively,
it requires that when one of the items is removed from an assortment, the purchase
probability of any other item does not decrease.
Assumption 3 (Substitution Assumption). For any assortment T ⊂ S, we have
Πi(T ) ≥ Πi(S) ∀i ∈ N
Φji (T ) ≥ Φji (S) ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M.
This is a standard assumption that is satisfied by many widely studied choice
models, including multinomial logit model, nested logit mode, Markov chain choice
model, and ranking-based choice model. This assumption is true when all items are
substitutes. Thus we call it the “substitution assumption”.
The firm maximizes its expected revenue by dynamically offering assortments
to customers. More specifically, let ct be the vector of remaining inventory where
there are t time periods left. Note that throughout this chapter, we count time t
backwards. We use St1(ct) to denote the assortment offered in stage 1 of period t,
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when there are ct inventory left. We use St2(ct, i) to denote the assortment offered
in stage 2 of period t, when item i is sold in stage 1 and the remaining inventory at
the beginning of period t is ct. The firm’s strategy at period t can be represented
by St = {St1(·), St2(·, ·)}. The firm’s optimal strategy can be found by solving the
following dynamic program:
V t(ct) = max
St1,S
t
2(·)
∑
i∈St1
Πi(St1)
pi + ∑
j∈St2(i)
Φji (St2(i))
(
pj + V t−1(ct − ei − ej)
)
+(1− ∑
j∈St2(i)
Φji )V t−1(ct − ei)
+ (1− ∑
i∈St1
Πi(St1))V t−1(ct) (4.1)
subject to cti ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ St1,
ctj ≥ 1, ∀j ∈ ∪i∈St1St2(i),
with the boundary condition that V 0(·) = 0. Then the firm’s expected revenue
under optimal policy is V T (c).
4.3 LP formulation for the oﬄine problem
In this section, we consider a deterministic oﬄine relaxation of the original problem
(4.1). The solutions to the oﬄine problem is used later in Section 4.4, in which we
propose an algorithm for the original online problem. The oﬄine problem is obtained
through a “fluid approximation” where we think of Π and Φ to be deterministic
fractional demand. Namely, we let Πi(S) be the demand of item i in stage 1, when
assortment S is offered, and let Φij(S) be the demand of item j from a type i customer
when she sees assortment S in stage 2. The firm solves an oﬄine optimization problem
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to maximize its total revenue, subject to inventory constraints. We formulate the
firm’s problem using linear programming, and show that it can be solved efficiently
using column generation.
With its deterministic nature, the oﬄine problem can be reduced to a “single
period” problem with initial inventory ρ , c/T . Let αS be the probability to offer
assortment S ⊂ N in stage 1, and let βiS be the probability of seeing a type i customer
and offering assortment S ⊂ N in stage 2. Consider the following linear program:
L(ρ) = max
α,β
∑
i∈N
pi
[∑
S⊂N
αSΠi(S)
]
+
∑
j∈M
pj
 ∑
i∈N,S⊂M
βiSΦij(S)
 (4.2)
s.t.,
∑
S⊂N
αSΠi(S) ≤ρi,∀i ∈ N [ui]
∑
i∈N,S⊂M
βiSΦij(S) ≤ρj, ∀j ∈M [uj] (4.3)
∑
S⊂N
αS =1, [v] (4.4)
∑
S⊂M
βiS =
∑
S⊂N
αSΠi(S),∀i ∈ N [zi] (4.5)
α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0.
The objective function is the firm’s oﬄine revenue in a single period. Thus
L(ρ)T is the firm’s total oﬄine revenue. Constraint (4.3) is the inventory constraint.
Constraint (4.4) requires that the probability of offering one of the assortments in
stage 1 sums up to 1. Constraint (4.5) makes sure the probability that the firm shows
an assortment to type i customers in stage 2 is equal to the probability that a type
i customers arriving to the system. We associate dual variables u, v, z with these
constraints.
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In the rest of this chapter, we slightly abuse notation and let L(ρ) to denote the
LP objective at optimality, as well as the linear program itself with input ρ.
Lemma 12. The firm’s optimal oﬄine revenue L(ρ)T is an upper bound on the
firm’s expected revenue under optimal strategy, in the original online problem (4.1).
Proof. This lemma follows immediately from the fact that the optimal strategy can
be converted into a feasible solution to this linear program. More specifically, given
an optimal strategy to the original online problem (4.1), let αST (or βiST ) be the
expected number of periods offering assortment S in stage 1 (or stage 2 to type i
customers), under that strategy. One can verify that α and β satisfy all constraints
in the linear program. 
The linear program (4.2) has exponentially many random variables. We now
present the column generation formulation to this LP. An introduction to the column
generation method can be found in [16]. Let RC(·) to denote the reduced cost for
each variable. The column generation subproblem seeks a variable with the maximum
reduced cost, which can be found by solving maxS RC(αS), and maxS RC(βiS) for
each i. Note that
arg max
S
RC(αS) = arg max
S
∑
i∈N
Πi(S) [piT − ui + zi]
arg max
S
RC(βiS) = arg max
S
∑
j∈M
Φij(S) [pjT − uj]
which implies that maxS RC(αS) and maxS RC(βiS) are equivalent to one-shot
assortment problems. Thus, the column generation subproblem can be solved by
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solving n+ 1 one-shot assortment problems. There are many choice models under
which the one-shot assortment problem can be solved efficiently. See the literature
review section for details.
4.4 The balancing algorithm
In this section, we present an algorithm for the online problem (4.1), which uses the
LP solutions obtained in Section 4.3, and guarantees an expected revenue of at least
1/3 of the upper bound given in Lemma 12.
4.4.1 The algorithm
Let L(ρt) be the linear program associated with the oﬄine problem when there are t
periods left, and remaining inventory per period is ρt , ct/t. Let αt, βt be a feasible
solution to L(ρt). A randomized policy for period t suggested by this feasible solution
is given by the following.
One period randomized policy given αt, βt:
In Stage 1, offer assortment S with probability αtS.
In stage 2, offer assortment S with probability β
i,t
S∑
S′ β
i,t
S′
.
Our algorithm applies the one period randomized policy at each time period, given
a feasible solution to the LP at the corresponding period. Namely, the algorithm
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solves the oﬄine LP once at the beginning of the selling horizon, and updates α and
β in each period so that they are always feasible for the oﬄine LP with updated
inventory and time left. Then it uses the one period randomized policy given αt and
βt, for any time period t. Thus, the key step in the algorithm is to update α and β
to keep them feasible for the oﬄine LP. The following algorithm constructs αt−1 and
βt−1 feasible for L(ρt−1), using αt and βt feasible for L(ρt).
Input: αt, βt, ρt−1, items sold in period t;
αt−1 ← αt;
βt−1 ← βt;
if item i sold in Stage 1 of period t then
if ∑S αt−1S Πi(S) > ρt−1i then
Balance item i according to Algorithm 3 so that ∑S αt−1S Πi(S) = ρt−1i ;
end
if item j sold in Stage 2 of period t then
if ∑S,k∈N βk,t−1S Φkj (S) > ρt−1j then
Balance item j according to Algorithm 4 so that∑
S,k∈N β
k,t−1
S Φkj (S) = ρt−1j ;
end
end
end
Output: αt−1, βt−1;
Algorithm 1: Construct a feasible solution to L(ρt−1)
Note that ∑S αSΠi(S) is the probability of selling item i ∈ N when the probability
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of offering assortment S is αS. We call this quantity the “selling probability” of
item i ∈ N under α. The selling probability of item j ∈ M is similarly defined
as ∑S,k βkSΦkj (S). In Algorithm 1, an item is balanced when its selling probability
exceeds the remaining inventory per period, so that the inventory constraint in the
LP (4.2) is violated. In those cases, the balancing step updates α and β to re-satisfy
the violated inventory constraints, while keeping the sales probability of all other
same-period items the same. The balancing step is the most important piece in this
algorithm, and we discuss it in the next subsection.
4.4.2 The balancing step
In this subsection, we present the balancing step. It is used in Algorithm 1 when
there exists an item, whose sales probability under the current values of α and β
exceeds the remaining inventory per period. In order to keep α and β feasible for
the oﬄine LP (4.2), we use the balancing step to decrease the sales probability of
this item, while keeping the sales probability of all other same-period items the same.
Mathematically, the goal of balancing item i ∈ N is to construct αt−1, βt−1 from
αt, βt and αT , βT , such that∑
S
αt−1S Πi(S) = ρt−1i <
∑
S
αtSΠi(S),
∑
S
αt−1S Πk(S) =
∑
S
αtSΠk(S),∀k 6= i ∈ N.
The objective for balancing a stage 2 item j ∈M can be similarly defined. Due
to the structure of the choice probabilities, removing an item from an assortment
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may increase the purchasing probability of some other items. Thus, decreasing the
sales probability of one item while keeping that of all other items the same is not a
trivial task. The following Algorithm presents a method to do this when the purchase
probability Π satisfy the substitution assumption. More precisely, given any α, under
which the sales probability is x, and any 0 ≤ xˆ ≤ x, Algorithm 2 constructs αˆ under
which the sales probability is xˆ.
function IncreaseAlphaSingleS(yˆ, y, S, β, αˆ):
if |S| = 0 then
αˆ∅ ← αˆ∅ + β;
else
Let k and m be minimizer and minimum value of yˆi/yi for i ∈ S;
αˆS ← αˆS + βm;
αˆ= IncreaseAlphaSingleS(yˆ − βm, β(1−m)Π(S/{k}), S/{k}, β(1−m), αˆ);
end
return αˆ
Input: α, x, xˆ,Π, N ;
αˆS ← 0,∀S ⊂ N ;
γi ← xˆixi ,∀i ∈ N ;
for S such that αS > 0 do
αˆ= IncreaseAlphaSingleS(αSΠ(S)γ, αSΠ(S), S, αS, αˆ);
end
Output: αˆ;
Algorithm 2: Decreasing sales probability
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Lemma 13. Given a set of items N with choice probabilities Π that satisfy the
substitution assumption, and a vector α ≥ 0, let xi = ∑S αSΠi(S) for all i ∈ N .
Then for any vector xˆ ≥ 0 such that xˆi ≤ xi for all i ∈ N , there exists a vector αˆ
given by the output of Algorithm 2, such that∑
S⊂N
αˆS =
∑
S⊂N
αS,
∑
S⊂N
αˆSΠi(S) = xˆi ∀i ∈ N
|{S : αˆS > 0}| ≤
∑
S:αS>0
(|S|+ 1)
αˆS ≥ 0 ∀S ⊂ N.
Proof. To show the first equation, observe that for any S such that αS > 0, the
operations within the for loop increases ∑S′ αˆS′ by αS. Sum over all S, we conclude
that the total increase in ∑S′ αˆS′ is ∑S αS. Thus the first equation holds.
The third inequality follows from the observation that each execution of the
IncreaseAlphaSingleS() function increases |S : αˆS > 0| by at most 1, and that the
IncreaseAlphaSingleS() function is executed for |S|+ 1 times for each S.
The last inequality holds because the initial value of αˆ is zero, and it never
decreases in the course of the algorithm.
We now show the second equation. To show this, we first show that start-
ing with any y, yˆ, β, S such that 0 ≤ yˆ ≤ y and yi = βΠi(S), executing
IncreaseAlphaSingleS(yˆ, y, S, β, αˆ) increases ∑U αˆS′Πi(S ′) by yˆi, for any i ∈ S. With-
out loss of generality, we assume the initial value of αˆ is zero. Then we only need to
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show that after executing the function, ∑S′ αˆS′Πi(S ′) = yˆi for any i ∈ S.
We prove this statement by induction on |S|.
When |S| = 1, without loss of generality assume S = {1}. The the function is
executed only once, and we have
αˆS = β
yˆ1
y1
αˆ∅ = β − αˆS.
Then the statement follows because∑
S′
αˆS′Π1(S ′) = αˆSΠ1(S) = β
yˆ1
y1
Π1(S) = yˆ1.
Suppose when |S| = k, the statement is true. Consider the case when |S| = k + 1.
Without loss of generality assume S = {1, . . . , k + 1} and that k + 1 = arg minj yˆjyj .
We let y(k), yˆ(k), β(k), S(k) be the variables when calling the function for the k + 1th
time. Before calling the function for the second time, we have
αˆS = β
yˆk+1
yk+1
β(1) = β − β yˆk+1
yk+1
yˆ
(1)
i = yˆi − β
yˆk+1
yk+1
Πi(S)
y
(1)
i = β(1)Πi(S/{k + 1}).
Thus the increase in ∑S αˆSΠi(S) before calling the function for the second time
is β yˆk+1
yk+1
Πi(S). We now calculate the increase in
∑
S αˆSΠi(S) from the second call of
the function till its termination, using the induction hypothesis on y(1), yˆ1, β(1) and
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S/{k + 1}.
We have yˆ(1)i ≥ 0 because
yˆ
(1)
i = yˆi − β
yˆk+1
yk+1
Πi(S) = yˆi − yˆk+1
yk+1
yi ≥ 0.
We have y(1)i ≥ yˆ(1)i for all i because
yˆ
(1)
i = yˆi − β
yˆk+1
yk+1
Πi(S) ≤ βΠi(S)− β yˆk+1
yk+1
Πi(S) ≤
[
βΠi(S)− β yˆk+1
yk+1
]
Πi(S/{k + 1}) = y(1)i .
Thus using the induction hypothesis on y(1), yˆ(1), β(1) and S/{k + 1}, the increase
in ∑S αˆSΠi(S) from the second call of the function till termination is yˆ1i . Recall
that the increase in ∑S αˆSΠi(S) in the first execution is β yˆk+1yk+1Πi(S). The statement
follows because yˆ(1)i + β
yˆk+1
yk+1
Πi(S) = yˆi. .
Thus, for any S such that αS > 0, IncreaseAlphaSingleS(yˆ, y, S, β, αˆ) increases∑
S′ αˆS′Πi(S ′) by αSΠi(S)γi. Summing up over all S such that αS > 0 and noting
that the initial value for ∑S′ αˆS′Πi(S ′) is zero, we get for all i,∑
S′
αˆS′Πi(S ′) =
∑
S
αSΠi(S)γi = xi
xˆi
xi
= xˆi,
as desired. 
Note that although Lemma 13 is stated in the context of stage 1 choice probability
Π and the set of items N , it holds for general choice probability and set of items, as
long as all assumptions of the lemma are satisfied. In particular, It holds for stage
two items M and choice probability Φi, for any i.
Using Algorithm 2, we present the balancing step. Algorithm 3 balances stage
1 item i ∈ N . It uses the initial LP solution αT to construct αt−1, such that the
92
sales probability of item i is equal to the remaining inventory per period, and the
sales probability of all other stage 1 items are the same as period t. Finally, βi,t−1 is
decreased in proportion to the sales probability of item i, so that constraint (4.5) is
satisfied. Algorithm 4 balances stage 2 item j ∈M . The idea is similar to Algorithm 3.
The only difference is that, since different types of customers share stage 2 inventory,
we have to proportionally decrease the sales probability of item j to each type i ∈ N .
Input: αT , βT , αt, βt, ρt−1i ;
Let xk be the sales probability of item k under αT . Namely xk ← ∑S αTSΠk(S)
for all k;
Let xˆi be the remaining inventory per period for item i, and xˆj be the sales
probability of item j in period t for any other item j. Namely xˆi ← ρt−1i and
xˆj ← ∑S αtSΠj(S) for all j 6= i ∈ N ;
Construct αt−1 from αT , x, xˆ,Π, N , according to Algorithm 2 so that∑
S α
t−1
S Πk(S) = xˆk for any k;
Update βi,t−1 so that constraint (4.5) is satisfied. Namely for every S,
βi,t−1S ← xˆi β
i,t
S∑
S′ β
i,t
S′
;
Output: αt−1, βt−1;
Algorithm 3: Balancing step for i ∈ N
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Input: αT , βT , αt−1, βt−1, ρt−1j ;
Let ykl be the probability of selling item l to type k customer under βT . Namely
ykl ←
∑
S β
k,T
S Φkl (S) for all l ∈M and k ∈ N ;
for i ∈ N do
Let yˆij be the remaining inventory per period for item j, times the
probability of selling item j to type i customer under the current values of
β. Namely yˆij ←
∑
S β
i,t−1
S Φij(S)
ρt−1j∑
S,k∈N β
k,t−1
S Φ
k
j (S)
;
Let yˆil be the probability of selling item l 6= j to type i customer under the
current values of β. Namely, yˆil ←
∑
S β
i,t−1
S Φil(S) for all l 6= j ∈M ;
end
for i ∈ N do
Construct βi,t−1 from βi,T
∑
S
αt−1S Πi(S)∑
S
αTSΠi(S)
, yi
∑
S
αt−1S Πi(S)∑
S
αTSΠi(S)
, yˆi,Φi,M according to
Algorithm 2 so that ∑S βi,t−1S Φil(S) = yˆil for any l ∈M ;
end
Output: βt−1;
Algorithm 4: Balancing step for j ∈M
4.4.3 Algorithm complexity
Putting together algorithms 1 - 4, and using the one period randomized policy at
each time period, we get the balancing algorithm. The following theorem discusses
the complexity of the algorithm.
Theorem 11. The balancing algorithm randomizes over at most O(n2) assortments
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at each time period.
Proof. Since the linear program L(c/T ) has 2n+1 constraints, there exists an optimal
solution αT , βT with 2n+ 1 positive elements. By Lemma 13, and note the fact that
the inputs to the balance algorithm only has 2n+ 1 positive elements, we have for
any t
|{S : αtS + βtS > 0}| ≤
∑
S:αTS+β
T
S>0
(|S|+ 1) ≤ (2n+ 1)(n+ 1).
Thus, the algorithm randomizes over at most O(n2) assortments at each time period.

4.5 Feasibility and performance analysis
In this section, we prove that the algorithms proposed in Section 4.4 are feasible.
We then proceed to analyzing the algorithm performance. Namely, we show that
the balancing algorithm achieves an expected revenue of at least 1/3 of the optimal
oﬄine revenue.
4.5.1 Feasibility of Algorithms
Lemma 14. At the end of period t, αt−1, βt−1 produced by Algorithm 1 is feasible for
the LP L(ρt−1).
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Proof. We prove the statement by induction. First, observe that αT , βT is feasible for
L(ρT ) at the beginning of period T by definition. Now assume that αt, βt is feasible
for L(ρt) at the beginning of period t, we prove that αt−1, βt−1 is feasible for the LP
L(ρt−1) at the end of period t.
Since αt, βt is feasible for L(ρt), we have∑
S
αtS = 1
∑
S
βi,tS =
∑
S
αtSΠi(S).
If there is no balancing operation in period t, we have αt = αt−1 and βt = βt−1.
So constraints (4.4) and (4.5) are satisfied. We now show that these two constraints
are satisfied after the balancing operations.
Suppose item i ∈ N is balanced according to Algorithm 3. Since αt−1 is constructed
from α(T ) using Algorithm 2, it follows that ∑S αt−1S = ∑S αTS = 1. Thus constraint
(4.4) is satisfied after performing Algorithm 3. For item k 6= i ∈ N , we have∑
S α
t−1
S Πk(S) =
∑
S α
t
SΠk(S) and βk,t−1 = βk,t after balancing item i. Thus (4.5) is
satisfied for k 6= i ∈ N . For item i, (4.5) is satisfied because∑
S
βi,t−1S =
∑
S
xˆi
βi,tS∑
S′ β
i,t
S′
= xˆi =
∑
S
αt−1S Πi(S).
Therefore, constraints (4.4) and (4.5) are satisfied after balancing item i ∈ N . Similar
argument shows that both constraints are satisfied after balancing item j ∈M .
Now we show that the inventory constraints are satisfied. Note that if item i ∈ N
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is not sold in period t, we have∑
S
αt−1S Πi(S) =
∑
S
αtSΠi(S) ≤
cti
t
= c
t−1
i
t
≤ c
t−1
i
t− 1 .
Similar arguments shows that if item j ∈ M is not sold in period t, its inventory
constraint is satisfied. For an item with positive sales in period t, Algorithm 1 tests
whether the inventory constraint is satisfied or not, and balances that item to satisfy
the constraint if its violated. Thus the inventory constraints (4.3) are satisfied for all
items.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that the non-negativity constraints are always
satisfied. Thus αt−1, βt−1 is feasible for L(ρt−1) at the beginning of period t− 1. The
statement of this lemma thus follows by induction. 
Lemma 15. When Algorithm 2 is used in Algorithms 3 and 4, the inputs to that
algorithm satisfy all assumptions in Lemma 13.
Proof. We first consider balancing i ∈ N using Algorithm 3. By definition of x, we
have
xk =
∑
S
αTSΠk(S) ∀k ∈ N,
thus the first assumption of Lemma 13 is satisfied. It is also straightforward to
verify that xˆ ≥ 0. We only need to show that xk ≥ xˆk for all k. Note that when
we do balance in period t, we have xˆk ≤ ∑S αtSΠk(S). It is straightforward to show
by induction that ∑S αtSΠk(S) ≤ ∑S αTSΠk(S). Thus, xk ≥ xˆk for all k, and the
inputs satisfy all assumptions of Lemma 13 when the algorithm balances item i using
Algorithm 3.
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We now consider balancing j ∈M using Algorithm 4. By definition of y, we have
for any k ∈ N and l ∈M ,
ykl
∑
S α
t−1
S Πk(S)∑
S α
T
SΠk(S)
=
∑
S
βk,TS
∑
S α
t−1
S Πk(S)∑
S α
T
SΠk(S)
Φkl (S),
thus the first assumption of Lemma 13 is satisfied. It is also straightforward to
verify that yˆ ≥ 0. We only need show that ykl
∑
S
αt−1S Πk(S)∑
S
αTSΠk(S)
≥ yˆkl . Note that yˆkl ≤∑
S β
k,t−1
S Φkl (S). We thus try to bound
∑
S β
k,t−1
S Φkl (S).
First, assume no balance is required in stage 1 of period t, then αt = αt−1, and
we have ∑
S
βk,t−1S Φkl (S) =
∑
S
βkS(t)Φkl (S)
∑
S α
t−1
S Πk(S)∑
S α
t
SΠk(S)
.
Now, assume in stage 1 of period t, item i ∈ N is sold and balanced. Note that for
any item k 6= i, Algorithm 3 does not change the value of βk. And while it changes
the values of αS, it does not change the values of
∑
S αSΠk(S) for k 6= i, by definition
of xˆk. Thus the equation above still holds for item k 6= i. For item i which is balanced
in stage 1, we have∑
S
βi,t−1S Φil(S) =
∑
S
βi,tS
xˆi∑
S′ β
i,t
S′
Φil(S) =
∑
S
βi,tS
∑
S α
t−1
S Πi(S)∑
S α
t
SΠi(S)
Φil(S),
by assignment in Algorithm 3, and by feasibility of βt which guarantees ∑S′ βi,tS′ =∑
S α
t
SΠi(S).
Therefore, for any k ∈ N, l ∈M and t, we have∑
S
βk,t−1S Φkl (S) =
∑
S
βkS(t)Φkl (S)
∑
S α
t−1
S Πk(S)∑
S α
t
SΠk(S)
.
and thus
yˆkl ≤
∑
S
βk,t−1S Φkl (S) = ykl
∑
S α
t−1
S Πk(S)∑
S α
t
SΠk(S)
,
as desired. Therefore, when called in Algorithm 4, the inputs to Algorithm 2 satisfy
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all assumptions of Lemma 13. 
4.5.2 Performance guarantee
In this subsection, we provide a performance guarantee of the balancing algorithm.
Let Rb be a random variable representing the revenue from the balancing algorithm.
Recall that the optimal oﬄine revenue is L(c/T )T . We have the following theorem.
Theorem 12. The balancing algorithm attains the revenue ratio E[Rb]
L(c/T )T ≥ 13 .
Proof. Let xti =
∑
S α
t
SΠi(S), and let ytj =
∑
S,i β
i,t
S Φij(S). Let Et(·) and Pt(·) denote
the expectation and probability conditioning on all information at the beginning of
period t. Let Bti denote the event that item i is balanced in period t, and Ati denote
the event that item i is sold in period t. We use ¬A to denote that event A does not
happen.
Observe that
L(c/T )T =
∑
i∈N
Tpix
T
i +
∑
j∈M
TyTi .
Thus by telescoping sum
L(c/T )T =
∑
i∈N
pi
T∑
t=1
ET
[
txti − (t− 1)xt−1i
]
+
∑
j∈M
pj
T∑
t=1
ET
[
tytj − (t− 1)yt−1j
]
=
∑
i∈N
pi
T∑
t=1
ET
[
txti − (t− 1)Etxt−1i
]
+
∑
j∈M
pj
T∑
t=1
ET
[
tytj − (t− 1)Etyt−1j
]
,
where the second equation holds by tower property.
We first bound txti − (t− 1)Etxt−1i . By the randomized policy, item i ∈ N is sold
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in period t with probability xti. If item i is not sold, or if it is sold but no balance is
needed, then xt−1i = xti by Algorithm 1. If item i is balanced in period t, we have
(t− 1)xt−1i = ct−1i = cti − 1 ≥ txti − 1.
Thus,
txti − (t− 1)Et[xt−1i ]
≤ Pt(Bti)
[
txti − (txti − 1)
]
+ (1−Pt(Bti)
[
txti − (t− 1)xti
]
≤ Pt(Ati) + xti
= 2Pt(Ati). (4.6)
We now bound tytj − (t− 1)Etyt−1j . Similarly, if no balance is needed in stage 1
and item j is not balanced in stage 2, we have yt−1j = ytj. If item j is balanced, we
have (t−1)yt−1j ≥ tytj−1. We now consider the situation that item i ∈ N is balanced,
which changes the value of yt−1j , but item j itself is not balanced. In this case, we
have
(t− 1)yt−1j = (t− 1)
∑
S,k 6=i∈N
βk,t−1S Φkj (S) + (t− 1)
∑
S
βi,t−1S Φij(S)
= (t− 1) ∑
S,k 6=i∈N
βk,tS Φkj (S) + (t− 1)
∑
S
ct−1i
t− 1
βi,tS∑
S′ β
i,t
S′
Φij(S)
= (t− 1) ∑
S,k 6=i∈N
βk,tS Φkj (S) +
∑
S
cti − 1∑
S′ β
i,t
S′
βi,tS Φij(S)
≥ (t− 1) ∑
S,k 6=i∈N
βk,tS Φkj (S) +
∑
S
txti − 1
xti
βi,tS Φij(S)
≥ (t− 1)ytj −
1
xti
∑
S
βi,tS Φij(S),
which implies that tytj − (t− 1)ytj ≤ ytj + 1xti
∑
S β
i,t
S Φij(S) when item i ∈ N is balanced
but item j is not balanced.
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Thus we have
tytj − (t− 1)Et[yt−1j ]
≤∑
i∈N
Pt(Bti ,¬Btj)
[
ytj +
1
xti
∑
S
βi,tS Φij(S)
]
+ Pt(Btj)
[
tytj − (tytj − 1)
]
+
∑
i∈N
Pt(¬Bti ,¬Btj)
[
tytj − (t− 1)ytj
]
≤ ytj +
∑
i∈N
Pt(Ati)
1
xti
∑
S
βi,tS Φij(S) + Pt(Atj)
= 2Pt(Atj) +
∑
S,i
βi,tS Φij(S)
= 3Pt(Atj). (4.7)
By inequalities (4.6) and (4.7), we have
L(c/T )T =
∑
i∈N
pi
T∑
t=1
ET
[
txti − (t− 1)Etxt−1i
]
+
∑
j∈M
pj
T∑
t=1
ET
[
tytj − (t− 1)Etyt−1j
]
≤ 2 ∑
i∈N
pi
T∑
t=1
ETPt(Ati) + 3
∑
j∈M
pj
T∑
t=1
ETPt(Atj)
= 2
∑
i∈N
pi
T∑
t=1
PT (Ati) + 3
∑
j∈M
pj
T∑
t=1
PT (Atj)
≤ 3ET [Rb],
as desired. 
4.6 Asymptotic Optimality
In this section, we study the asymptotic regime in which the time and the initial
inventory grow proportionally and both tend to infinity. Namely, we consider the
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limiting regime where T →∞, with c = ρT , for some fixed vector ρ ≥ 0. We study
the performance of the balancing algorithm in this asymptotic regime, and have the
following theorem on asymptotic path-wise optimality of the algorithm.
Theorem 13. As T goes to infinity with c = ρT , we have
P
(
Rb
L(ρ)T ≥ 1−Θ(T
−1/4)
)
≥ 1− n2T 1/22−T 1/2+T 1/4+1.
We prove Theorem 13 by first showing that the sales of each item in the balancing
algorithm converges in probability to its inventory. In particular, let Si be the total
sales of item i in the balancing algorithm. Let xi be the probability of selling stage
1 item i according to the oﬄine LP. Let yij be the probability of selling stage 2
item j conditioning on seeing a type i customer according to the oﬄine LP. It is
straightforward from the LP that x and y only depend on ρ, thus does not change as
T grows. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 16. As T goes to infinity with c = ρT , we have
P( Si
xiT
> 1−Θ(T−1/4)) ≥ 1− T 1/22−T 1/2+T 1/4+1 ∀i ∈ N (4.8)
P( Sj∑
i xiy
i
jT
> 1−Θ(T−1/4)) ≥ 1− nT 1/22−T 1/2+T 1/4+1 ∀j ∈M. (4.9)
To prove this lemma for an item i, we first divide the selling horizon into several
long-enough epochs, and show that with large probability, the realized sales of item i
in each epoch is not too different from its expectation. Therefore for large enough t,
with large probability, the trajectory of the algorithm selling probability is not too
different from xi. Convergence in probability then follows from some algebra. The
details is in Appendix C.
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We now use Lemma 16 to prove Theorem 13.
Proof of Theorem 13: Recall that L(ρ) = ∑i∈N pixi + ∑j∈M pj (∑i∈N xiyij).
By Lemma 16, we have
P
(
Rb > (1−Θ(T−1/4))L(ρ)T
)
= P
 ∑
i∈N∪M
piSi >
(
1−Θ(T−1/4)
)∑
i∈N
pixi +
∑
j∈M
pj
∑
i∈N
xiy
i
j
T

≥ P
(
Si > (1−Θ(T−1/4))xiT,∀i ∈ N, and Sj > (1−Θ(T−1/4))
∑
i∈N
xiy
i
jT,∀j ∈M
)
≥ 1−∑
i∈N
P
(
Si < (1−Θ(T−1/4))xiT
)
− ∑
j∈M
P
(
Sj < (1−Θ(T−1/4))
∑
i∈N
xiy
i
jT
)
≥ 1− n2T 1/22−T 1/2+T 1/4+1,
as desired. 
4.7 The resolving algorithm
As a straightforward extension of the balancing algorithm, we consider occasionally
resolving the oﬄine LP using updated inventory and time information. This helps
the algorithm to adjust according to stochastic realization of sales. In particular, we
divide the selling horizon into k equally spaces subintervals, and solve the LP using
updated inventory and time information at the beginning of each subinterval. We
then perform the balancing algorithm using the updated LP solutions until the next
resolve of LP. We call this the resolving algorithm with parameter k. Note that the
resolving algorithm with parameter 1 is equivalent to the balancing algorithm. Let
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Rr(k) be a random variable representing the revenue under resolving algorithm with
parameter k.
We now show that the revenue ratio guarantee and the asymptotic optimality
results of the balancing algorithm continue to hold for the resolving algorithm.
Corollary 1. The resolving algorithm attains the revenue ratio E[Rr(k)]
L(ρ)T ≥ 13 , for any
parameters k = 1, . . . , T .
Proof. Let x and y be defined as in the proof of Theorem 12. By a similar telescoping
sum argument, we have
L(ρ)T =
T∑
t=1
ETEt
t∑
i∈N
pix
t
i + t
∑
j∈N
pjy
t
j − (t− 1)
∑
i∈N
pix
t−1
i − (t− 1)
∑
j∈N
pjy
t−1
j
 .
Thus we only need to show that for any t,
Et
t∑
i∈N
pix
t
i + t
∑
j∈N
pjy
t
j − (t− 1)
∑
i∈N
pix
t−1
i − (t− 1)
∑
j∈N
pjy
t−1
j

≤ 3Et[Revenue at time t]. (4.10)
If the LP is not resolved at the end of period t, inequality (4.10) follows directly
from inequalities (4.6) and (4.7). We now consider the case when the LP is resolved
at the end of period t.
Note that after resolve,
(t− 1) ∑
i∈N
pix
t−1
i − (t− 1)
∑
j∈N
pjy
t−1
j = L(ct−1/(t− 1)).
Let xˆt−1 and yˆt−1 be the values of xt−1 and yt−1 if the LP was not resolved at the
end of period t. By Lemma 14, xˆt−1 and yˆt−1 corresponds to a feasible solution to
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L(ct−1/(t− 1)). Thus, we have
L(ct−1/(t− 1)) ≥ (t− 1) ∑
i∈N
pixˆ
t−1
i − (t− 1)
∑
j∈N
pj yˆ
t−1
j .
By inequalities (4.6) and (4.7), we have
Et
t∑
i∈N
pix
t
i + t
∑
j∈N
pjy
t
j − (t− 1)
∑
i∈N
pixˆ
t−1
i − (t− 1)
∑
j∈N
pj yˆ
t−1
j

≤ 3Et[Revenue at time t].
Combine the three inequalities above, we get inequality (4.10).

The following theorem establishes the asymptotic optimality of a resolving algo-
rithm with number of resolves k = o(T−1/4).
Theorem 14. For resolving algorithm with number of resolves k, we have
P
[
Rr(k) > (1−Θ(kT−1/4))L(ρ)T
]
> 1− n2T 1/2k1/22−(T/k)1/2+(T/k)1/4+2 − nk2−T/k,
where Θ(kT−1/4)→ 0 and n2T 1/2k1/22−(T/k)1/2+(T/k)1/4+2 + nk2−T/k → 0 as T →∞
with c = ρT , when k = o(T−1/4).
Proof. By Theorem 13, we have
P
(
Rb ≥ (1−Θ(T−1/4)L(ρ)T
)
≥ 1− n2T 1/22−T 1/2+T 1/4+1. (4.11)
On the other hand, note that the probability of selling item i in the balancing
algorithm is at most xi. Using Hoeffding’s inequality, and using the same argument
as in the proof of Theorem 13, we have
P
[
Rb < (1 + Θ(T−1/2))L(c/T )T
]
≥ 1− n2−T . (4.12)
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Consider the resolving algorithm with k resolves of the LP. Let τ be the number
of periods between two consecutive resolves. Assume we can show that
P
[
Rr(k) > (1− (
k−1∑
l=1
l−1/4)Θ(τ−1/4))Rb
]
> 1− n2τ 1/2k2−τ1/2+τ1/4+1 − nk2−τ .
(4.13)
Then this theorem follows from inequalities (4.11) and (4.13), as well as the facts
that τ = T/k and ∑kl=1 l−1/4 = Θ(k3/4).
It is only left to show inequality (4.13). We show it using induction on k, for fixed
τ . When k = 1, the balancing algorithm and the resolving algorithm are the same.
So Rr(1) = Rb, and inequality (4.13) is trivially true.
Now we assume that inequality (4.13) holds for k− 1, and prove that it also holds
for k. Consider a dummy algorithm which resolves the LP only once at time period
(k− 1)τ , and performs balance steps at all other time periods. Let Rd be the revenue
under the dummy algorithm. Also, use Rrt1(k), Rbt1 and Rdt1 to denote the revenue
from period t1 to period 1, under the resolving, balancing, and dummy algorithms,
respectively. Use Pt(·) to denote the probability conditioning on all information
before time period t.
By induction hypothesis, and note that after period (k−1)τ the dummy algorithm
only performs balancing steps, we have
P(k−1)τ
[
Rr(k−1)τ (k) > (1− (
k−2∑
l=1
l−1/4)Θ(τ−1/4))Rd(k−1)τ
]
> 1− n2τ 1/2(k − 1)2−τ1/2+τ1/4+1 − n(k − 1)2−τ .
On the other hand, let L(k−1)τ denote the optimal LP objective value at time
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period (k − 1)τ . We have
P(k−1)τ
[
Rd(k−1)τ > (1−Θ((k − 1)−1/4τ−1/4))L(k−1)τ
]
≥ 1− n2 [(k − 1)τ ]1/2 2−[(k−1)τ ]1/2+[(k−1)τ ]1/4)+1
≥ 1− n2τ 1/22τ1/2+τ1/4+1,
where the first inequality follows from (4.11), and the second inequality follows from
the fact that n2τ 1/22τ1/2+τ1/4+1 is decreasing in τ .
Combine the previous two inequalities, we get
P(k−1)τ
[
Rr(k−1)τ (k) > (1− (
k−1∑
l=1
l−1/4)Θ(τ−1/4))L(k−1)τ
]
> 1− n2τ 1/2k2−τ1/2+τ1/4+1 − n(k − 1)2−τ .
Then combine the inequality above with (4.12), we have
P(k−1)τ
[
Rr(k−1)τ (k) > (1− (
k−1∑
l=1
l−1/4)Θ(τ−1/4))Rb(k−1)τ
]
> 1− n2τ 1/2k2−τ1/2+τ1/4+1 − nk2−τ .
Finally, note that the resolving algorithm and the balancing algorithm are the
same before time period (k − 1)τ . Therefore we have
P(k−1)τ
[
Rr(k) > (1− (
k−1∑
l=1
l−1/4)Θ(τ−1/4))Rb
]
> 1− n2τ 1/2k2−τ1/2+τ1/4+1 − nk2−τ .
So we proved (4.13) as desired.

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4.8 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we provide numerical analysis on the balancing and the resolving
algorithms. In subsection 4.8.1, we simulate the algorithms under various settings,
and calculate the ratio between average algorithm revenue and the optimal oﬄine
revenue. In subsection 4.8.2, we provide an example in which the expected revenue
under the optimal online policy is 47% of the optimal oﬄine revenue.
4.8.1 Algorithm performance under simulation
In this subsection, we simulate the balancing and the resolving algorithms, and test
their performance under different settings. We simulate the algorithm revenue under
each setting using the average revenue of 10000 iterations, and calculate the ratio of
the simulated algorithm revenue over the optimal oﬄine revenue.
In all of our numerical examples, we assume that the customer choice follows
the multinomial logit model for both stages. In particular, we assume that the
attractiveness of no purchase option in stage 1 is v0, and the attractiveness of item
i in stage 1 is vi. Then the purchase probability of item i in stage 1 when offering
assortment S ⊂ N is
Πi(S) =
vi
v0 +
∑
j∈S vj
1(i ∈ S).
Similarly, we use wi0 to denote the no purchase attractiveness in stage 2, for a type i
customer, and we use wij to denote the attractiveness of item j in stage 2 for such
108
customer. Then the purchase probability of item j in stage 2 when offering assortment
S ⊂M to type i customer is
Φij(S) =
wij
wi0 +
∑
k∈S wik
1(j ∈ S).
We generate examples with different number of time periods, inventory levels,
no purchase probabilities, and consider the cases when prices and attractiveness
are negatively correlated or independent. In particular, we assume that there are
20 products in each stage. We generate their prices independently from uniform
[0, 1] distribution, and we generate their attractiveness independently from uniform
[0, 10] distribution. We sort the price array from smallest to largest in each stage,
and sort the attractiveness array (of stage 1 items, or stage 2 items for each type
of customer) from largest to smallest, and pair them to get the parameters when
price and attractiveness are negatively correlated. We pair without sorting to get the
parameters when they are independent. We consider the cases when the number of
periods T = 100 or T = 500, and when the no purchase attractiveness v0 and wi0 are
10, 100 or 1000, which corresponds to high, medium, and low purchase probabilities.
To get the initial inventory levels, we solve the linear program (4.2) without the
inventory constraint, and let c∗ be the total sales under the optimal LP solution. We
then consider the case when inventory is a fraction of c∗, namely c = dγc∗e, with
γ = 0.6, 0.8, 1, 1.2, corresponding to inventory levels from scarce to abundant.
We use Rb to denote the average revenue under the balancing algorithm, and use
Rr(k) to denote the average revenue under the resolving algorithm with parameter k.
The results are summarized in the following tables.
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T v0 γ correlation of price
and attractiveness
Rb
L(ρ)T
Rr(2)
L(ρ)T
Rr(5)
L(ρ)T
Rr(10)
L(ρ)T
Rr(T )
L(ρ)T
100 10 0.6 independent 0.826 0.873 0.911 0.925 0.935
100 10 0.6 negatively correlated 0.852 0.873 0.911 0.923 0.980
100 10 0.8 independent 0.896 0.895 0.909 0.916 0.940
100 10 0.8 negatively correlated 0.872 0.890 0.909 0.917 0.925
100 10 1 independent 0.939 0.937 0.941 0.947 0.957
100 10 1 negatively correlated 0.933 0.938 0.944 0.944 0.947
100 10 1.2 independent 0.972 0.977 0.979 0.977 0.985
100 10 1.2 negatively correlated 0.974 0.975 0.978 0.978 0.979
100 100 0.6 independent 0.714 0.771 0.804 0.808 0.811
100 100 0.6 negatively correlated 0.735 0.780 0.798 0.809 0.815
100 100 0.8 independent 0.778 0.785 0.795 0.797 0.820
100 100 0.8 negatively correlated 0.763 0.781 0.796 0.797 0.802
100 100 1 independent 0.821 0.829 0.829 0.836 0.856
100 100 1 negatively correlated 0.808 0.825 0.833 0.830 0.831
100 100 1.2 independent 0.888 0.901 0.906 0.908 0.911
100 100 1.2 negatively correlated 0.896 0.897 0.905 0.909 0.911
100 1000 0.6 independent 0.758 0.771 0.791 0.798 0.807
100 1000 0.6 negatively correlated 0.789 0.793 0.795 0.798 0.806
100 1000 0.8 independent 0.768 0.771 0.783 0.786 0.795
100 1000 0.8 negatively correlated 0.794 0.799 0.804 0.809 0.813
100 1000 1 independent 0.771 0.798 0.806 0.805 0.809
100 1000 1 negatively correlated 0.792 0.802 0.803 0.805 0.809
100 1000 1.2 independent 0.803 0.808 0.811 0.822 0.826
100 1000 1.2 negatively correlated 0.809 0.812 0.817 0.821 0.844
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T v0 γ correlation of price
and attractiveness
Rb
L(ρ)T
Rr(2)
L(ρ)T
Rr(5)
L(ρ)T
Rr(10)
L(ρ)T
Rr(T )
L(ρ)T
500 10 0.6 independent 0.924 0.932 0.948 0.960 0.986
500 10 0.6 negatively correlated 0.896 0.923 0.948 0.960 0.977
500 10 0.8 independent 0.943 0.942 0.958 0.966 0.983
500 10 0.8 negatively correlated 0.928 0.942 0.958 0.966 0.977
500 10 1 independent 0.957 0.956 0.961 0.963 0.975
500 10 1 negatively correlated 0.958 0.958 0.961 0.964 0.971
500 10 1.2 independent 0.994 0.995 0.996 0.995 0.996
500 10 1.2 negatively correlated 0.993 0.995 0.994 0.997 0.995
500 100 0.6 independent 0.835 0.859 0.901 0.917 0.936
500 100 0.6 negatively correlated 0.824 0.857 0.901 0.917 0.934
500 100 0.8 independent 0.847 0.869 0.897 0.907 0.927
500 100 0.8 negatively correlated 0.828 0.870 0.895 0.907 0.922
500 100 1 independent 0.872 0.880 0.893 0.897 0.913
500 100 1 negatively correlated 0.870 0.879 0.892 0.897 0.906
500 100 1.2 independent 0.955 0.957 0.961 0.966 0.979
500 100 1.2 negatively correlated 0.948 0.958 0.961 0.962 0.969
500 1000 0.6 independent 0.706 0.761 0.788 0.796 0.818
500 1000 0.6 negatively correlated 0.718 0.764 0.792 0.792 0.800
500 1000 0.8 independent 0.732 0.768 0.793 0.793 0.823
500 1000 0.8 negatively correlated 0.739 0.770 0.787 0.796 0.798
500 1000 1 independent 0.802 0.824 0.828 0.837 0.840
500 1000 1 negatively correlated 0.817 0.831 0.831 0.835 0.846
500 1000 1.2 independent 0.871 0.874 0.878 0.878 0.887
500 1000 1.2 negatively correlated 0.858 0.879 0.876 0.877 0.871
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For all 48 test cases, the balancing algorithm attains at least 70.6% of the optimal
oﬄine revenue, and the resolving algorithm with parameters 2, 5, 10, T attain at
least 76.1%, 78.3%, 78.6% and 79.5% of the optimal oﬄine revenue, respectively. The
average ratios are 84.9% for the balancing algorithm, and 86.5%, 87.7%, 88.4% and
89.5% for the resolving algorithm with parameters 2, 5, 10, T , respectively.
Comparing the performance of the balancing algorithm and the resolving algorithm
with parameter 2, we notice that resolving the LP only once in the middle of the
selling horizon may significantly improve revenue. The average improvement is 1.6%.
This improvement is more significant when γ is small (i.e., when inventory is scarce).
When γ = 0.6, the average improvement in performance from resolving the LP once
is 3.2%, and it can be as large as 5.5%.
From this table, we also observe that both our algorithms perform significantly
better when the inventory scarcity factor γ is large (i.e., when there is abundant
amount of inventory). For example, the average ratio of the balancing algorithm is
79.8%, 82.4%, 86.2% and 91.4% for γ = 0.6, 0.8, 1 and 1.2. The average ratio of the
resolving algorithm with parameter 2 is 83.0%, 84.0%, 87.2% and 91.9%, respectively.
We also observe that the algorithms perform better as the no purchase attrac-
tiveness v0 decreases, or as the number of total time periods T increases. We do
not observe significant difference in performance by comparing different correlation
between price and attractiveness.
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4.8.2 An upper bound on the performance guarantee
In this subsection, we give an example where the optimal oﬄine revenue is a loose
upper bound on the online revenue under optimal policy. This gives an upper bound
on the performance guarantee ratio Ralg
L(ρ)T under any policy.
We consider an example with T periods, and T items in the first stage, and 1 item
in the second stage. Each item has one unit of inventory. The purchase probability
in stage 1 given by
Πi(S) =
1
T
1(i ∈ S),∀i ∈ N.
The purchase probability in stage 2 is 1/T , when the item is shown to a customer,
and is independent of the customer’s type. We assume that all items in stage 1 have
price 0, and the item in stage 2 has price 1.
Since the purchase probabilities for each item only depends on whether it is offered
in the assortment, but is independent of all other items, the optimal policy is trivially
offering all items that still have inventory left. Let V be the number of items sold in
stage 1 under the optimal policy, then the distribution of V is given by
P(V = k) =
(
T
k
)
k∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
k
j
)(
k − j
T
)T
,∀k = 0, 1, . . . , T.
We obtain this expression by equivalence to the birthday problem. Note that T
in our setting corresponds to the number of people in the birthday problem, 1/T
corresponds to the probability of having one of the birthdays, and V corresponds to
the number of different birthdays in this group. See [63] for more information on the
birthday problem.
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Note that each item sold in stage 1 gives the seller one chance to show the
revenue-generating stage 2 item to the buyer, who makes a purchase with probability
1/T . Thus conditioning on V = k, the probability of selling the stage 2 item is
1− (1− 1/T )k. Therefore, the expected revenue of the seller under this policy is given
by
Ropt =
T∑
k=1
(
T
k
)
k∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
k
j
)(
k − j
T
)T (
1− (1− 1
T
)k
)
.
On the other hand, it is straightforward to see that αN = 1, βiM = 1/T for all
i ∈ N is the solution to the linear program (4.2). The corresponding optimal oﬄine
revenue is 1. Thus the ratio between revenue from the optimal online policy and
optimal oﬄine revenue is given by Ropt. When T = 2, Ropt = 0.63. When T = 3,
Ropt = 0.56, and when T = 50, Ropt = 0.47. Therefore, any constant performance
guarantee may not exceed 47%.
4.9 Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter, we study an online assortment customization problem with inventory
constraints, and with recommendation opportunity at checkout. We propose a
balancing algorithm which is based on the solution to the oﬄine problem, and a
resolving algorithm as its extension. Both of them attain performance guarantee of
1/3, and both of them are asymptotically optimal when inventory and time scales
proportionally and both tend to infinity.
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Our analysis is applicable to more general and complicated settings by easy
extensions in various directions. We briefly discuss each possible direction of extension
below. Many of the following extensions are based on treating a combination of an
item and a feature (for example, price, customer class, or stage) as a “product”, and
use the number of that item sold with that feature in the oﬄine optimal solution as
the inventory of that product. Then we can reproduce the two algorithms for the
products. However, in the optimal oﬄine solution, the number of each item sold
may be fractional, which results in fractional inventories. Thus, we need to “protect”
one unit of inventory for each product. To do this, we reduce the inventory for
each item by the number of features associated with that item when calculating the
optimal oﬄine solution. We then round up each fractional inventory to the nearest
integer. This incurs a loss in the performance guarantee, and the loss is increasing
in the number of features, but decreasing in the initial inventory levels. Thus, these
extensions works well when the inventory levels of all items are large compared with
the number of features.
Pricing: In this chapter, each item only has one fixed price. However, the
algorithms can be extended to incorporate the firm’s pricing problem. We assume
that there are h potential price levels for each item. When the firm chooses an
assortment, it also chooses a price for each item in the assortment. Our algorithm can
be reproduced in this setting, with minor modification. We treat each item and price
combination as a product, and define inventory of that product using the number
of corresponding item sold at the corresponding price in the optimal oﬄine solution.
As discussed above, we need to protect 1 unit of inventory for each price level. The
115
resulting performance guarantee is thus 13(1− hmini ci ).
Overlapping sets of candidate items for the two stages: In this chapter,
we assume that the sets of candidate items for the two stages are disjoint. This
assumption can be removed to allow overlapping sets of candidate items for the two
stages. To do this, we define the combination of an item and a stage as a product,
and follow the discussion above. Similarly, we need to protect 1 unit of inventory for
each stage, and the performance guarantee is 13(1− 2mini ci ).
Different customer classes in the first stage: In the beginning of this chapter,
we discussed the two types of personalization, which are personalization based on
entire profile, and personalization based on item purchased. In this chapter, we focus
on the latter. However, we can also incorporate the former into our model. To do this,
we assume that a customer arriving to stage 1 has an observable “class” based on her
profile, which the offered assortment is personalized to. Similar to previous extensions,
we define the combination of an item and a customer class as a product, and protect
1 unit of inventory for each class. The performance guarantee is 13(1− hmini ci ), with h
classes of customers upon arrival.
Purchasing multiple items at a time: In this chapter, each customer only
purchases at most one item in each stage. This model can be extended to allow
multiple purchase in each stage, as long as the Assumption 3 on purchase probabilities
is satisfied. To do this, define customer type as the set of items they purchase in the
first stage, and perform balancing if necessary for all items that are sold in the current
stage. None of the other parts of the analysis in this chapter use the assumption
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that at most one item is sold in each stage. The performance guarantee is still 1/3.
However, note that by defining a customer’s type as the set of items she purchases,
the number of types is exponentially large in the number of items. Thus solving the
oﬄine LP may become difficult.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Strategic behavior is present in many practical settings where dynamic pricing and
assortment optimization is required. Modeling strategic behavior in those settings
may help firms to better understand their customers and competitors, which is an
essential step in making better operational decisions. All three problems studied in
this thesis can be extended in various directions, as discussed in the corresponding
chapters. We now point out some interesting directions not considered in this thesis.
5.1 Strategic and forward looking customers
In the problems studied in this thesis, we either assume customers are myopic, or
assume that they are strategic but live for only one period. However, in practice
many customers are strategic and forward looking. This may lead to huge difference
in the customers’ decision making, thus influences the firm’s problem.
For example, a strategic and forward looking customer may predict future prices
of products, and may decide to wait for a price cut, even if she would gain a positive
utility when making a purchase in the current period. In the context of Chapter 3,
with the presence of such customers, demand does not only depend on the prices
in the current period, but also depend on the (perceived) future prices. With this
change in demand model, the firms’ problem is dramatically different.
118
Another example appears when customers are recurring, and are recognized and
differentiated by the firm upon on their return. A strategic and forward looking
customer in this setting may choose to act suboptimally to “disguise” their type, for
potential future benefits. In the context of Chapter 4, such customer may choose a
stage 1 item that is different from the one that maximizes her stage 1 utility, in the
hope that she will be shown a potentially more rewarding stage 2 assortment. As a
result, with the presence of such customers, the choice probabilities in stage 1 is a
function of the firm’s strategy to recommend stage 2 assortment. This results in a
game between the firm and the customers.
5.2 The role of information
In this thesis, we do not consider what information the firm should make available to
the public. However in practice, choosing the correct amount of information to reveal
to public and the correct time to do so, may make a difference. The firm’s problem
can also change significantly based on the amount of information revealed.
In the context of Chapter 2, the bid-based firm may consider whether to reveal
information about current queue length and the bids submitted by customers in the
queue. The current model does not reveal any of such information. In the setting
where such information is available, the analysis is more difficult due to a much larger
state space, and whether or not equilibrium exists (or is unique) is an open question.
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In the context of Chapter 3, in the game with recourse and assuming stochastic
demand, a firm may consider whether or not to reveal its real-time inventory levels.
When such information is not available, a firm has to maintain Bayesian beliefs on
other firms’ current inventory levels, and update these beliefs based on the prices
they set. The analysis of the game is thus very different from our Chapter 3, and it
is an interesting direction for future research.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 Extensions to general distribution F
All our results in Sections 2.3–2.4, except uniqueness, can be extended to the case
where the distribution of the unit waiting cost is any bounded continuously differen-
tiable distribution F . Since we use the intermediate value theorem and monotonicity
with respect to c for the proof of existence of equilibrium, our proof can be extended
in a straightforward manner to general distribution F , on replacing c1, c2 with F (c1),
F (c2) respectively, and replacing α with F (c2)− F (c1). This argument would show
the existence of equilibrium strategies with thresholds in the values of F (c), which
translates to the thresholds in values of c. For uniqueness, we need the additional
requirement that the density of F is strictly positive on its support. This is a reason-
able requirement, since otherwise there may exist multiple values of thresholds for
which effectively the same set of customers obtain service from each firm.
A.2 Proofs of the results in Section 2.3
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix a symmetric equilibrium (x, b). Consider two customers, with
unit waiting costs c and c′ > c, such that both choose to obtain service. The total
expected cost of the customer with unit waiting cost c is given by b(c) + cw(c|x, b).
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(Here, we adopt the convention that if x(c) = FIX, then b(c) , P .) If this customer
deviates, and chooses the service decision x(c′) with bid b(c′), her total expected
cost would be b(c′) + cw(c′|x, b). As (x, b) is an equilibrium, we must have that the
customer’s total expected cost on following her equilibrium action should be at most
as that from deviating to the action (x(c′), b(c′)). This implies that
b(c) + cw(c|x, b) ≤ b(c′) + cw(c′|x, b). (A.1)
Similarly for customer with unit waiting cost c′ cannot become better off from
deviating to the action (x(c), b(c)). This implies that
b(c′) + c′w(c′|x, b) ≤ b(c) + c′w(c|x, b). (A.2)
Adding the two inequalities above, we obtain that (c′ − c) (w(c′|x, b)− w(c|x, b)) ≤ 0.
Since c′ > c, we have w(c|x, b) ≥ w(c′|x, b), thereby proving that the expected waiting
cost in equilibrium is non-increasing in the unit waiting cost.
Using the fact that w(c|x, b) ≥ w(c′|x, b) in (A.1), we obtain that b(c) ≤ b(c′),
thus proving that the expected payment in equilibrium is non-decreasing in the unit
waiting cost.
Moreover, using c′ > c and w(c′|x, b) > 0, we get b(c′) + cw(c′|x, b) < b(c′) +
c′w(c′|x, b). Combining this with equation (A.1), we obtain that b(c) + cw(c|x, b) <
b(c′) + c′w(c′|x, b). Thus, the total expected cost is strictly increasing in the unit
waiting cost.
Now we only need to show that the bids in bid-based firm b(c) is uniquely
determined by and strictly increasing in the fraction of customers in the bid-based
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firm with unit waiting cost less than c, which we denote by B(c) =
∫ c
0 I{x(cˆ)=BID}dcˆ∫ 1
0 I{x(cˆ)=BID}dcˆ
.
We first show that for any c′ > c, B(c′) = B(c) implies b(c′) = b(c). Earlier in the
proof, we show that the bids are non-decreasing in unit waiting cost, so b(c′) ≥ b(c).
Suppose b(c′) > b(c), then if the customer with unit waiting cost c′ decreases her
bid from b(c′) to b(c), her priority decreases. And the set of unit waiting costs with
higher priority than the customer when she bids b(c) while having lower priority when
she bids b(c′) is a subset of {cˆ : B(cˆ) = B(c′)}. As a result, the expected waiting
time increases by at most the expected time waiting for customers with unit waiting
cost in the set {cˆ : B(cˆ) = B(c′)}. Since the set has measure zero, the increase in
expected waiting time is zero. So the customer with unit waiting cost c′ is strictly
better off submitting a bid b(c), which contradicts the fact that (x, b) is a symmetric
equilibrium. Thus, B(c′) = B(c) implies b(c′) = b(c), and the bidding function is
uniquely determined by B(·).
Now we want to show that for any c′ > c, B(c′) > B(c) implies b(c′) > b(c).
Since bids are non-decreasing in unit waiting cost, we have b(c′) ≥ b(c). Suppose
b(c′) = b(c), then every customer with unit waiting cost between c and c′ has the
same bid. If the customer with unit waiting cost c′ increases her bid to b(c′) + , then
she can get service before anyone in the set {cˆ : B(c) ≤ B(cˆ) < B(c′), x(cˆ) = BID},
and her expected waiting time decreases by at least the expected time she had to
spend waiting for customers in the set {cˆ : B(c) ≤ B(cˆ) < B(c′), x(cˆ) = BID} when
her bid was b(c′). Since the set has measure B(c′)−B(c) > 0 and we break the ties
among the customers in this set uniformly at random, the expected time one has to
spend waiting for these customers to complete their service is positive (and bounded
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below). Thus for small enough , the customer with unit waiting cost c′ is better off
using bid b(c′) + , which again contradicts the fact that (x, b) is an equilibrium. So
in equilibrium, B(c′) > B(c) implies b(c′) > b(c), i.e., the bidding function is strictly
increasing in B(·). 
Proof of Lemma 2. Fix a symmetric equilibrium (x, b). For those customers that
choose not to obtain service, the expected payment, the expected waiting time, and
the bid are all zero by definition. Hence, we focus only on those customers that
choose to obtain service.
For a customer choosing to obtain service in the bid-based firm, by Lemma 1,
the bid is strictly increasing in B(c), the fraction of customers in the bid-based firm
with unit waiting cost less than c. Since the priority of service is determined in
the descending order of the bids (with ties broken uniformly at random), service is
provided in the decreasing order of B(·) and thus, the expected waiting time in the
bid-based firm depends only on B(·). Similarly, since the service discipline in the
fixed-price firm is first-in-first-out, the expected waiting time in the fixed-price firm
depends only on the arrival rate of the customers into the fixed-price firm, which
is again determined by the service decision x(·). This argument proves that the
expected waiting cost in equilibrium is completely specified by the service decision
x(·). Henceforth, we denote the expected waiting time of a customer with unit waiting
cost c in the symmetric equilibrium (x, c) by w(c|x).
Next, we show that the bidding function is uniquely determined by service decision
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in equilibrium. Fix a symmetric equilibrium (x, b), and consider a customer with
unit waiting cost c with x(c) 6= LEAVE. Suppose, for some cˆ with x(cˆ) 6= LEAVE, the
customer deviates to the service decision x(cˆ), with the corresponding bid b(cˆ). Her
total expected cost is given by pi(cˆ, c) = cw(cˆ|x) + b(cˆ). (Here, recall our convention
that b(cˆ) = P if x(cˆ) = FIX.) By the fact that (x, b) is a symmetric equilibrium, we
obtain
pi(c, c) = max
cˆ:x(cˆ)6=LEAVE
pi(cˆ, c),
for all c ∈ [0, 1] with x(c) 6= LEAVE, with the maximum being attained at cˆ = c.
We use the Mirrlees trick [51] to compute pi(c, c) in equilibrium. Towards that goal,
observe that by the envelope theorem, we obtain
dpi(c, c)
dc
= ∂pi(cˆ, c)
∂c
∣∣∣∣∣
cˆ=c
= w(c|x),
for all c such that x(c) 6= LEAVE. Now, note that if x(c) 6= LEAVE, then from
Lemma 1, we obtain that x(c′) 6= LEAVE for all c′ ≤ c. This, combined with the fact
that pi(0, 0) = 0, we obtain by integrating
pi(c, c) =
∫ c
0
w(t|x)dt.
Finally, since pi(c, c) = cw(c|x) + b(c), we get
b(c) =
∫ c
0
w(t|x)dt− cw(c|x),
for all c such that x(c) 6= LEAVE. Thus, the bidding function is completely determined
from the expected waiting time w(·|x), which in turn depends only on the service
decision x. 
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A.3 Proofs of auxiliary results in Section 2.4
Proof of Lemma 3. The first two statements follow directly from a straightforward
stochastic coupling argument. We provide a brief sketch of the continuity and
monotonicity of Γ for completeness. To show that Γ(a) < Γ(b) for 0 ≤ a < b < k,
consider two coupled copies Qa, Qb of the preemptive bid-based priority queue with
arrival rate λ ∈ (b, k). Suppose two customers, one per queue, arrive at time 0 with
identical service requirement, with the only difference being that the customer to the
copy Qi has a priority level such that the arrival rate of customers to Qi with higher
priority is exactly equal to i, for each i ∈ {a, b}. Through this coupling, it follows
directly that the waiting time of the customer to the queue Qa is almost surely less
than the waiting time of the customer to the queue Qb. Taking expectations, we
obtain from the definition of Γ that Γ(a) ≤ Γ(b). The strict inequality and continuity
follow from the fact that the arrival rate of customers with intermediate priority
between a and b is positive, and decreases to zero as a approaches b.
The third statement follows directly from the fact that the expected service time
is one.
Since
∫ y
0 Γ(t)dt/y is the average waiting time in the system when there are k
servers and the arrival rate is y, it is no less than the average waiting time in a work
conserving system with the same number of servers and the same arrival rate. Since
the latter tends to infinity as y approaches k, we have∫ y
0
Γ(t)dt→∞, as y → k.
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Proof of Proposition 1. We prove a more general statement, which will be useful later
when we prove Lemma 4 and Lemma 5. The statement we prove here is that suppose
for some c` ≤ 1, service is mandatory for anyone with cost c ≤ c`, and service is
forbidden for anyone with cost c > c`, then c¯ = (c1, c2, c`), with 0 < c1 < c2 < c` ≤ 1
is a symmetric equilibrium if and only if (ContT-P) and (ContW-P) are satisfied.
We split the proof into two steps showing first the necessity and then the sufficiency
of the conditions for equilibrium.
Necessity of (ContT-P) and (ContW-P): Suppose c¯ = (c1, c2, c`), with 0 <
c1 < c2 < c` ≤ 1 is a symmetric equilibrium. We begin by showing that the condition
(ContT-P) holds.
Consider a customer with unit waiting cost c1 +  for some  ∈ (0, c2 − c1), who
obtains service from the fixed-price firm, and incurs a total expected cost equal to
(c1 + )wF (c¯) + P . If such a customer decides instead to obtain service from the
bid-based firm and submit the same bid as a customer with unit waiting cost c1, then
her total expected cost is given by
(c1 + )w(c1|c¯) + b(c1|c¯) =
∫ c1
0
w(t|c¯)dt+ w(c1|c¯),
where the right hand side follows from (2.2). In equilibrium such a unilateral
deviation must be non-preferable. Since this is true for any  ∈ (0, c2− c1), we obtain∫ c1
0 w(t|c¯)dt ≥ c1wF (c¯) + P . On the other hand, since a customer with unit waiting
cost c1 prefers to obtain service from the bid-based firm instead of the fixed-price firm,
127
we have
∫ c1
0 w(t|c¯)dt ≤ c1wF (c¯) + P . Together, these inequalities yield (ContT-P).
We now show that condition (ContW-P) holds. As the expected waiting time is
non-increasing in c, we have wB(c1|c¯) ≥ wF (c¯) ≥ wB(c2|c¯). Since customers in the
bid-based firm are served in the decreasing order of their waiting costs, by the fact
that F is continuous and hence has no atom, it follows that the expected waiting
time for a customer with unit waiting cost c1 and c2 must be equal. From this, we
obtain (ContW-P).
Sufficiency of (ContT-P) and (ContW-P): Suppose all customers adopt a
strategy c¯ = (c1, c2, c`) with 0 < c1 < c2 < c` ≤ 1 satisfying the conditions (ContT-P)
and (ContW-P). We begin by obtaining the expression for the expected waiting time
and the expected total cost under this strategy profile.
Observe that since the expected waiting times in the bid-based firm and the
fixed-price firm satisfy the condition (ContW-P), the expected waiting time function
defined by
w(t|c¯) =

wB(t|c¯), for t ∈ [0, c1] ∪ [c2, c`];
wF (c¯), for t ∈ (c1, c2)
(A.3)
is continuous and non-increasing over t ∈ [0, c`].
Next, note that for a customer with unit waiting cost c obtaining service in the
bid-based firm, by (2.2), her total expected cost is given by
∫ c
0 w(t|c¯)dt. We show
that this expression holds for all customers, even those obtaining service from the
fixed-price firm. To see this, note that for such a customer with unit waiting cost
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c ∈ (c1, c2), the total expected cost is given by
cwF (c¯) + P = c1wF (c¯) + P + (c− c1)wF (c¯)
=
∫ c1
0
wB(t|c¯)dt+ (c− c1)wF (c¯) =
∫ c
0
w(t|c¯)dt,
where the second equality follows (ContT-P), and the third from (A.3).
Next, consider a customer with unit waiting cost c ≤ 1. If she adopts the actions
of a customer with unit waiting cost c′ 6= c, then her total expected cost, using (2.2),
is given by
cw(c′|c¯) + b(c′|c¯) =
∫ c′
0
w(t|c¯)dt+ (c− c′)w(c′|c¯)
=
∫ c
0
w(t|c¯)dt+
∫ c′
c
w(t|c¯)dt+ (c− c′)w(c′|c¯)
≥
∫ c
0
w(t|c¯)dt+ (c′ − c)w(c′|c¯) + (c− c′)w(c′|c¯)
=
∫ c
0
w(t|c¯)dt.
Here, the inequality follows from the fact that the expected waiting time w(·|c¯) is
non-increasing. Since the right hand side denotes the total expected cost for the
customer under strategy c¯, this implies that a best response of a customer with unit
waiting cost c is the action suggested by the strategy c¯.
Taken together, this implies that the strategy c¯ is a best response, assuming all
others follow c¯, and hence it is a symmetric equilibrium. 
Proof of Lemma 4. We already proved the necessity of condition (IND) in the begin-
ning of Subsection 2.4.2. It is left to show the sufficiency of condition (IND). Suppose
condition (IND) holds, we show that c¯(u) is an equilibrium for SYSop(λu , Pu, V ).
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First consider the case when 0 < c1 < c2 < 1. By Proposition 1, since c¯ = (c1, c2, 1)
is a symmetric equilibrium for SYSman(λ, P ), it satisfies (ContT-P) and (ContW-P).
First, we prove that c¯(u) satisfies conditions (ContT-P) and (ContW-P). To prove
this observe that∫ c1u
0
wB(t|c¯(u))dt =
∫ c1u
0
Γ
(
λ
u
u− λ
u
(c2u− c1u)− λ
u
t
)
dt
= u
∫ c1
0
Γ(λ− λ(c2 − c1)− λt)dt = u
∫ c1
0
wB(t|c¯)dt.
Here, the first equality follows from the definition of wB(t|c¯(u)), the second equality
follows from a change of variable and the third follows from the definition of wB(t|c¯).
Now, since c¯ satisfies (ContT-P), we obtain
u
∫ c1
0
wB(t|c¯)dt = u (c1wF (c¯) + P ) = u (c1Φ(λ(c2 − c1)) + P )
= c1uΦ
(
λ
u
(c2u− c1u)
)
+ Pu = (c1u)wF (c¯(u)) + Pu.
Here, the second and the fourth equalities follow from the definition of wF (c¯) and
wF (c¯(u)) respectively. From this, we obtain that condition (ContT-P) holds for c¯(u).
Through a similar argument, we can show that condition (ContW-P) holds for c¯(u).
As we discussed in the proof of Proposition 1, since c¯(u) satisfies conditions
(ContT-P) and (ContW-P), the action suggested by c¯(u) is optimal for customers
with cost c ≤ u when the choice of LEAVE is not available. It is only left to show that
LEAVE is not optimal for anyone with c ≤ u, and it is optimal for anyone with c > u.
Now we show LEAVE is not optimal for anyone with c ≤ u. Note that the expected
total cost for a customer with unit cost c < u is
∫ c
0 w(t|c¯(u))dt, which is less than∫ u
0 w(t|c¯(u))dt, the expected total cost for a customer with unit cost u. By condition
(IND),
∫ u
0 w(t|c¯(u))dt ≤ V , thus the expected total cost for customer with unit cost
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c ≤ u is also no more than V , and LEAVE is not optimal for such a customer.
Finally we show LEAVE is optimal for anyone with c > u, when u < 1. Suppose
there exists c > u such that customers with unit cost c have an action that strictly
dominates LEAVE. Such an action has expected total cost strictly less than V when
the unit cost is c. Consider a customer with unit cost u using this action, and her
expected total cost is also strictly less than V . This contradicts with (IND), which
suggests that when u < 1, customer with a unit cost u has expected total cost of V ,
and we have a contradiction. Thus, LEAVE is optimal for any customer with c > u.
Thus we proved when 0 < c1 < c2 < 1, all customers do not want to deviate from
the action suggested by c¯(u). Thus c¯(u) is an equilibrium for SYSop(λu , Pu, V ).
On the other hand, suppose c1 = c2 = 1. By the same argument used in the proof
of Theorem 2, the action suggested by c¯(u) is optimal for customers with cost c ≤ u
when the choice of LEAVE if not available. We can also use the same argument as for
the case with 0 < c1 < c2 < 1, to show that LEAVE is not optimal for anyone with
c ≤ u, and it is optimal for anyone with c > u. Thus it follows that c¯(u) is also an
equilibrium for SYSop(λu , Pu, V ) in this case. 
Proof of Lemma 5. If 0 < c1 < c2 < u ≤ 1, by Proposition 1, (c1, c2, u) satisfies
conditions (ContT-P) and (ContW-P). Use the same argument as in the proof
of Lemma 4, we can show that ( c1
u
, c2
u
, 1) also satisfies conditions (ContT-P) and
(ContW-P), thus ( c1
u
, c2
u
, 1) is an equilibrium for SYSman(λu, Pu ).
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If c1 = c2 = u, by the same argument as used in the proof of Theorem 2, (c1, c2, u)
satisfies condition (Pref-BID). We can show that ( c1
u
, c2
u
, 1) also satisfies the same
condition and thus is an equilibrium for SYSman(λu, Pu ). 
A.4 Proofs of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3
Define ν = min{n, λ} and κ = min{k, λ}. Let ξ be defined as
ξ , sup{λ− κ < x < ν : Γ(λ− x) > Φ(x)}.
As x ↓ λ− κ, we have Γ(λ− x)→ Γ(κ) > 1 if κ < k and Γ(λ− x)→∞ if κ = k.
On the other hand, Φ(λ−κ) = Φ(0) = 1 if κ < k, and Φ(λ−κ) < Φ(n) =∞ if κ = k.
Hence, ξ ∈ (λ− κ, ν]. By continuity and strict monotonicity of Γ and Φ, we obtain
that for all x ∈ [λ− κ, ξ), Γ(λ− x) > Φ(x), and Γ(ξ) ≥ Φ(ξ), with equality if ξ < ν.
Define the function s as follows: for x ∈ (λ− κ, ν), and z ∈ [0, λ− x],
s(z, x) ,
∫ z+x
x
Γ(λ− t)dt− zΦ(x).
First observe that from Assumption 1, we obtain that s(z, x) is twice-differentiable
in z and x (almost everywhere). Note that we have ∂2s(z,x)
∂z2 = −Γ′(λ − z − x) < 0.
Thus s(z, x) is strictly concave in z for each x ∈ (λ − κ, ν). Thus, there exists a
unique maximizer of s(z, x) over z ∈ [0, λ− x] for all x ∈ (λ− κ, ν). Define zmax(x)
to be this unique maximizer for x ∈ (λ− κ, ν):
zmax(x) = arg maxz∈[0,λ−x]s(z, x).
We have the following properties of zmax(x).
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Lemma 17. The function zmax(x) is continuous over x ∈ (λ−κ, ν). Further, zmax(·)
is strictly decreasing over (λ − κ, ξ) and zmax(x) = 0 for all x ∈ [ξ, ν). Moreover,
zmax(x) = λ− x− Γ−1(Φ(x)) ∈ (0, λ− x) for x ∈ (λ− κ, ξ), and if κ = λ < k, then
zmax(0) , limx↓0 zmax(x) = λ.
Proof. The continuity of zmax(x) follows from the application of Berge’s maximum
theorem [5] to the function s(z, x), which is strictly concave in z for each x ∈ (λ−κ, ν).
Next, observe that for all x ∈ (λ− κ, ν), we have
∂s(z, x)
∂z
∣∣∣∣∣
z=0
= Γ(λ− x)− Φ(x),
which is positive for all x ∈ (λ− κ, ξ), equals zero for x = ξ if ξ < ν, and is negative
for x ∈ (ξ, ν). Moreover, we have
∂s(z, x)
∂z
∣∣∣∣∣
z=λ−x
= Γ(0)− Φ(x),
which is negative for all x ∈ (λ−κ, ν). From this, it follows that the unique maximizer
zmax(x) of s(z, x) over z ∈ [0, λ− x] must lie in (0, λ− x) for all x ∈ (λ− κ, ξ), and
equals zero for x ∈ [ξ, ν).
Since zmax(x) ∈ (0, λ− x) for all x ∈ (λ− κ, ξ), we have by first order necessary
conditions,
∂s(z, x)
∂z
∣∣∣∣∣
z=zmax(x)
= Γ(λ− zmax(x)− x)− Φ(x) = 0, for all x ∈ (λ− κ, ξ).
Thus, we obtain zmax(x) = λ − x − Γ−1(Φ(x)) for all x ∈ (λ − κ, ξ). Since Γ
and Φ are strictly increasing, this implies that zmax(x) is strictly decreasing over
x ∈ (λ − κ, ξ). Finally, suppose κ = λ < k. Then, for all small enough  > 0,
we have zmax() = λ −  − Γ−1(Φ()). Taking limits as  → 0, and observing that
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Γ(0) = Φ(0) = 1, we obtain that zmax(0) = λ. 
Lemma 18. The function s(zmax(x), x) is continuous over (λ − κ, ν) and strictly
decreasing over (λ− κ, ξ). Further, we have s(zmax(x), x) = 0 for all x ∈ [ξ, ν).
Proof. The continuity follows trivially from the continuity of s(z, x) and Lemma 17.
For x ∈ [ξ, ν), the result follows directly from zmax(x) = 0 and the definition of s(z, x).
For x ∈ (λ− k, ξ), we have, by the envelope theorem,
ds(zmax(x), x)
dx
= Γ(λ− zmax(x)− x)− Γ(λ− x)− zmax(x)Φ′(x) < 0,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that Γ is strictly increasing, Φ is strictly
increasing, and zmax(x) > 0. 
Lemma 19. We have
lim
x↓λ−κ
s(zmax(x), x) = λPmax(λ) =

∫ λ
0 Γ(t)dt− λ if κ = λ < k;
∞ if κ = k.
Proof. If κ = λ < k, then λ− κ = 0. Then, by continuity of s(z, x) and zmax(x), we
obtain
lim
x↓λ−κ
s(zmax(x), x) = s(zmax(0), 0)
= s(λ, 0)
=
∫ λ
0
Γ(λ− t)dt− λΦ(0)
=
∫ λ
0
Γ(t)dt− λ,
where we use that fact that zmax(0) = λ if κ = λ < k, and that Φ(0) = 1.
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Next, for κ = k ≤ λ, we have for λ− κ < x < ξ,
s(zmax(x), x) ≥ s(λ− x, x)
=
∫ λ
x
Γ(λ− t)dt− (λ− x)Φ(x)
=
∫ λ−x
0
Γ(t)dt− (λ− x)Φ(x)
≥
∫ λ−x
0
Γ(t)dt− κΦ(ξ).
For κ = k, by Assumption 1, limx↓λ−κ s(zmax(x), x) =∞.

Lemma 20. Suppose P ≥ Pmax(λ). Then, for all x ∈ (λ − κ, ν) and for all z ∈
[0, λ− x], we have s(z, x) < λP .
Proof. The result follows directly from Lemma 18 and Lemma 19. 
For any 0 < P < Pmax(λ), define z(P ) as follows:
z(P ) = sup{λ− κ < x < ν : s(zmax(x), x) > λP}
From Lemma 18 and Lemma 19, we have z(P ) ∈ (λ− κ, ξ) for all P ∈ (0, Pmax(λ)).
Note that for P ∈ (0, Pmax(λ)), and for each x ∈ (λ− κ,z(P )], we have s(0, x) =
0 < λP . Also, by continuity of s(zmax(x), x), we have s(zmax(x), x) > λP for all
x ∈ (λ− k,z(P )). Thus, there exists a unique solution z = v1(x, P ) ∈ (0, zmax(x)) to
the equation s(z, x) = λP for each x ∈ (λ− k,z(P )) and 0 < P < Pmax(λ). (Here
uniqueness follows from the strict concavity of s(z, x) in z). For x ∈ [z(P ), ν), define
v1(x, P ) = zmax(z(P )). (It is straightforward to show that v1(x, P ) is continuous at
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x = z(P ).)
Define
v2(x, P ) ,

v1(x, P ) + x if x ∈ (λ− κ,z(P )];
v1(z(P ), P ) +z(P ) if x ∈ (z(P ), ν).
Note that for all 0 < P < Pmax(λ), and x ∈ (λ − κ,z(P )], we have v2(x, P ) =
v1(x, P ) + x < zmax(x) + x ≤ λ. Hence, v2(x, P ) < λ. Define Ψ(x, P ) , Φ−1(Γ(λ−
v2(x, P ))) for all x ∈ (λ− κ, ν) and 0 < P < Pmax(λ).
Lemma 21. For all P ∈ (0, Pmax(λ)), Ψ(x, P ) is strictly decreasing in x over
(λ− κ,z(P )].
Proof. It suffices to show that v1(x, P ) is strictly increasing in x over (λ− κ,z(P )].
This is because, then so is v2(x, P ) = v1(x, P )+x, and the proof follows from observing
that both Γ and Φ are strictly increasing.
Note that for P ∈ (0, Pmax(λ)), we have by definition, s(v1(x, P ), x) = λP for all
x ∈ (λ− κ,z(P )]. This implies, on differentiating with respect to x,
∂v1(x, P )
∂x
∂s(z, x)
∂z
∣∣∣∣∣
z=v1(x,P )
+ ∂s(z, x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
z=v1(x,P )
= 0.
Observe that, for x ∈ (λ− κ,z(P )),
∂s(z, x)
∂z
∣∣∣∣∣
z=v1(x,P )
= Γ(λ− v1(x, P )− x)− Φ(x) > 0,
and
∂s(z, x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
z=v1(x,P )
= Γ(λ− v1(x, P )− x)− Γ(λ− x)− v1(x, P )Φ′(x) < 0.
This implies that ∂v1(x,P )
∂x
> 0, and hence we are done. 
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Finally, we have the following characterization of the fixed point of Ψ(·, P ) for all
P ∈ [0, Pmax(λ)).
Lemma 22. For each P ∈ (0, Pmax(λ)), the equation Ψ(x, P ) = x with x ∈ (λ−κ, ν)
has a unique solution given by z(P ) ∈ (λ− κ, ξ).
Proof. Since z(P ) ∈ (λ− κ, ξ), from Lemma 17 we obtain that zmax(z(P )) = λ−
z(P )−Γ−1(Φ(z(P ))). By continuity of s(zmax(x), x), we have s(zmax(z(P )),z(P )) =
λP . This implies that v1(z(P ), P ) = zmax(z(P )) = λ − z(P ) − Γ−1(Φ(z(P ))).
Substituting the expression for v1(z(P ), P ), we obtain
Ψ(z(P ), P ) = Φ−1(Γ(λ− v2(z(P ), P ))) = Φ−1(Γ(λ− v1(z(P ), P )−z(P ))) = z(P ).
Finally, from Lemma 21, we obtain that Ψ(x) is strictly decreasing in (λ− κ,z(P )].
Since Ψ(x, P ) = z(P ) < x for x ∈ (z(P ), ν), we obtain that z(P ) is the only solution
to Ψ(x, P ) = x in (λ− κ, ν) for all P ∈ (0, Pmax(λ)). 
The following theorem relates the fixed points of Ψ(·, P ) to symmetric equilibria.
Theorem 15. 1. Suppose for some P > 0, there exists a symmetric equilibrium
c¯ = (c1, c2, 1) with 0 < c1 < c2 < 1. Then, P < Pmax(λ), and x , λ(c2 − c1) ∈
(λ− κ, ν) satisfies Ψ(x, P ) = x, with λc1 = v1(x, P ).
2. Conversely, suppose for some x ∈ (λ − κ, ν) and P ∈ (0, Pmax(λ)), we have
Ψ(x, P ) = x. Then, c¯ = (c1, c2, 1) with c1 = v1(x,P )λ > 0 and c2 =
v2(x,P )
λ
∈ (c1, 1),
constitutes a symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. We provide the proof in two steps correponding to the two statements.
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Step 1. Suppose c¯ = (c1, c2, 1) is a symmetric equilibrium with 0 < c1 < c2 < 1.
Let x = λ(c2 − c1). By stability of the fixed-price firm in equilibrium, we have
x < min{n, λ} = ν. By stability of the bid-based firm in equilibrium, we have
λ− x < min{k, λ}, implying x > λ− κ. Thus, x ∈ (λ− κ, ν).
Now, in the symmetric equilibrium c¯ = (c1, c2, 1), we obtain, from (2.3) and (2.4),
that
wF (c¯) = Φ(x)
wB(t|c¯) =

Γ(λ− λt) t ∈ [c2, 1];
Γ(λ− x− λt) t ∈ [0, c1],
where we have used the fact that x = λ(c2 − c1).
Recall, from Theorem 1, that the necessary conditions for c¯ to be an equilibrium
are ∫ c1
0
wB(t|c¯)dt = c1wF (c¯) + P,
wB(c1|c¯) = wB(c2|c¯) = wF (c¯).
Using the expressions for wF (c¯) and wB(t|c¯), we obtain∫ c1
0
Γ(λ− x− λt)dt = c1Φ(x) + P
Γ(λ− x− λc1) = Φ(x).
On substituting u = x+ λt in the integral in the first equation and rearranging, we
obtain ∫ x+λc1
x
Γ(λ− u)du− λc1Φ(x) = λP
Note that, by definition, the left hand side is equal to s(λc1, x). Thus, we obtain
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s(λc1, x) = λP . Now, x ∈ (λ− κ, ν) and λc1 = λc2 − x < λ− x. Hence, the equation
s(λc1, x) = λP , together with Lemma 20, implies that P < Pmax(λ).
Next, from the second necessary condition, Γ(λ − λc1 − x) = Φ(x), we obtain
that Γ(λ − x) > Φ(x), which yields x ∈ (λ − κ, ξ). This, along with Lemma 17,
yields zmax(x) = λc1. Hence, s(zmax(x), x) = λP . By Lemma 18, we know that
s(zmax(t), t) is strictly decreasing in t over (λ− κ, ξ). Further, by definition of z(P ),
we obtain s(zmax(z(P )),z(P )) = λP . Taken together, we obtain x = z(P ), and
hence Ψ(x, P ) = x. Moreover, we have λc1 = zmax(x) = zmax(z(P )) = v1(z(P ), P ) =
v1(x, P ).
Step 2. Suppose for some x ∈ (λ−κ, ν) and P ∈ (0, Pmax(λ)), we have Ψ(x, P ) =
P . By Lemma 22, we obtain that x = z(P ) ∈ (λ− κ, ξ). Let c1 = v1(x, P )/λ > 0,
and c2 = v2(x, P )/λ > c1. Note that λc2 = v2(x, P ) < λ, and hence c2 < 1.
Since x = z(P ), we obtain zmax(x) = v1(x, P ) = λc1 and s(λc1, x) =
s(zmax(x), x) = λP . Thus, we obtain∫ x+λc1
x
Γ(λ− t)dt− λc1Φ(x) = λP.
Now, observe that for c¯ = (c1, c2, 1), we have
wF (c¯) = Φ(x)
wB(t|c¯) =

Γ(λ− λt) t ∈ [c2, 1];
Γ(λ− x− λt) t ∈ [0, c1].
Substituting these expressions, and making a change of variables, yields,
P = 1
λ
(∫ x+λc1
x
Γ(λ− t)dt− λc1Φ(x)
)
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= 1
λ
(∫ λc1
0
Γ(λ− x− t)dt− λc1Φ(x)
)
=
∫ c1
0
Γ(λ− x− λt)dt− c1Φ(x)
=
∫ c1
0
wB(t|c¯)dt− c1wF (c¯).
Thus, we obtain, ∫ c1
0
wB(t|c¯)dt = c1wF (c¯) + P.
Finally, since Ψ(x, P ) = x, we obtain
Φ(x) = Γ(λ− v2(x, P )) = Γ(λ− x− v1(x, P )) = Γ(λ− x− λc1).
This implies that wF (c¯) = wB(c1|c¯) = wB(c2|c¯). Taken together, this implies that
(c1, c2, 1) satisfies the sufficient conditions in Theorem 1 for being a symmetric
equilibrium. 
Proof of Theorem 2. For c¯ = (1, 1, 1) to be a symmetric equilibrium, a necessary
condition is that the customer with unit waiting cost c = 1 must prefer to obtain
service from the bid-based firm over the fixed-price firm. Using the expression for
the total expected cost from (2.2), this yields∫ 1
0
wB(t|c¯)dt ≤ wF (c¯) + P.
Note that wF (c¯) = 1, whereas, from (2.4), we have wB(t|c¯) = Γ(λ−λt) for all t ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, a necessary condition for c¯ = (1, 1, 1) to be a symmetric equilibrium is
P ≥
∫ 1
0
Γ(λ− λt)dt− 1 = 1
λ
(∫ λ
0
Γ(t)dt− λ
)
= Pmax(λ).
Next, suppose P ≥ Pmax(λ) with κ = λ < k. From Lemma 20, we obtain s(z, x) < λP
for all x ∈ (λ− κ, ν) and z ∈ [0, λ− x]. (Note that λ− κ = 0.) This implies
zΦ(x) + λP >
∫ z+x
x
Γ(λ− t)dt, for all x ∈ (0, ν), and z ∈ [0, λ− x].
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Taking limits as x ↓ 0, and letting c = z/λ, we obtain
cΦ(0) + λP ≥
∫ c
0
Γ(λ− λt)dt, for all c ∈ [0, 1].
For c¯ = (1, 1, 1), we have Φ(0) = wF (c¯), and Γ(λ − λt) = wB(t|c¯) for all t ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, the preceding equation implies
cwF (c¯) + λP ≥
∫ c
0
wB(t|c¯)dt, for all c ∈ [0, 1].
This implies that if all other customers follow the strategy c¯, then it is preferable
for a customer with unit waiting cost c ∈ [0, 1] to obtain service from the bid-based
firm over the fixed-price firm. Thus, c¯ = (1, 1, 1) is a symmetric equilibrium. To
obtain uniqueness, observe that if there exists another equilibrium (c1, c2, 1) with
0 < c1 < c2 < 1, then from the first statement of Theorem 15, we obtain that
P < Pmax(λ), which contradicts our assumption on P . 
Proof of Theorem 3. From Lemma 22, we know that for each P ∈ (0, Pmax(λ)), there
exists a unique solution x∗ to the equation Ψ(x, P ) = x with x ∈ (λ−κ, ν). From the
second statement of Theorem 15, we obtain that there exists a symmetric equilibrium
c¯ = (c1, c2, 1) with 0 < c1 < c2 < 1, and λc1 = v1(x∗, P ).
To obtain uniqueness, observe that for an equilibrium C¯ = (C1, C2, 1) with
0 < C1 < C2 < 1, by the first part of Theorem 15, we obtain that X = λ(C2 − C1) ∈
(λ − κ, ν) satisfies Ψ(X,P ) = X with λC1 = v1(X,P ). But since x∗ is the unique
solution, we have X = x, and hence λC1 = v1(X,P ) = v1(x∗, P ) = c1. Finally, note
that since P < Pmax(λ), from Theorem 2, there cannot be an equilibrium of the form
c¯ = (1, 1, 1). This proves the uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium. 
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A.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Let Uλ = (0, 1] ∩ (0, n+kλ ). Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, together with Theorem 2 and
Theorem 3, imply that there exist functions Ci : Uλ → [0, 1] for i = 1, 2, such that for
each u ∈ Uλ, we have C1(u) ≤ C2(u) ≤ u, and the strategy
(C1(u)
u
, C2(u)
u
, 1
)
is the unique
symmetric equilibrium of the system SYSman(λu, Pu ). Define A(u) = C2(u) − C1(u).
We have the following lemma:
Lemma 23. The function A(u) is non-decreasing and continuous in u over Uλ.
Further, u−A(u) is non-decreasing in u over Uλ.
Proof. First, we consider the set of values of u ∈ Uλ for which Pu ≥ Pmax(λu). Note
that since Pmax(λ) is non-decreasing in λ, we obtain that this set is an interval (0, u0]
for some u0 ∈ Uλ. Since
(C1(u)
u
, C2(u)
u
, 1
)
is the unique symmetric equilibrium of the
system SYSman(λu, Pu ), we obtain from Theorem 2, that C1(u) = C2(u) = u for all
u ∈ (0, u0], and hence A(u) = 0 for u ∈ (0, u0].
Now consider u ∈ Uλ with u > u0. Again, applying Theorem 3 to the system
SYSman(λu, Pu ), we obtain that 0 < C1(u) < C2(u) < u, and hence A(u) > 0, for all
u ∈ Uλ with u > u0. From the necessary condition (ContT-P) for equilibrium for this
system, we obtain for all u ∈ Uλ with u > u0,
P =
∫ C1(u)
0
Γ(λu− λC2(u) + λC1(u)− λt)dt− C1(u)Φ(λ (C2(u)− C1(u)))
=
∫ C1(u)
0
Γ(λu− λA(u)− λt)dt− C1(u)Φ(λA(u))
=
∫ u−A(u)
u−A(u)−C1(u)
Γ(λt)dt− C1(u)Φ(λA(u)). (A.4)
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Similarly, from the necessary condition (ContW-P), we obtain for all u ∈ Uλ with
u > u0,
Φ(λA(u)) = Γ(λ(u− C2(u))) = Γ (λ (u−A(u)− C1(u))) . (A.5)
We begin with the proof of the first statement in lemma. Suppose, for the sake of
arriving at a contradiction, we have A(u1) > A(u2) for u1, u2 ∈ Uλ with u2 > u1 > u0.
Since Γ and Φ are strictly increasing, from (A.5), we obtain u1 −A(u1)− C1(u1) >
u2 − A(u2) − C1(u2). Since u2 − A(u2) > u1 − A(u1), we obtain C1(u2) > C1(u1).
From this, we have∫ u2−A(u2)
u2−A(u2)−C1(u1)
Γ(λt)dt− C1(u1)Φ(λA(u2))
>
∫ u1−A(u1)
u1−A(u1)−C1(u1)
Γ(λt)dt− C1(u1)Φ(λA(u1)) = P,
which yields, ∫ u2−A(u2)
u2−A(u2)−C1(u1)
Γ(λt)dt > C1(u1)Φ(λA(u2)) + P. (A.6)
Now, note that since C1(u2) > C1(u1), under the symmetric equilibrium strategy(C1(u2)
u2
, C2(u2)
u2
, 1
)
for the system SYSman
(
λu2,
P
u2
)
, the customer with unit waiting cost
C1(u1)
u2
prefers to obtain service from the bid-based firm as opposed to the fixed-price
firm. Using (2.2) and (2.4), the expected total cost of this customer in equilibrium is
given by ∫ C1(u1)
u2
0
Γ(λu2 − λA(u2)− λu2t)dt = 1
u2
∫ u2−A(u2)
u2−A(u2)−C1(u1)
Γ(λt)dt.
On the other hand, the expected total cost of this customer if she obtains service
from the fixed-price firm is given by C1(u1)
u2
Φ(λA(u2)) + Pu2 . Thus, in equilibrium for
the system SYSman
(
λu2,
P
u2
)
, we obtain
1
u2
∫ u2−A(u2)
u2−A(u2)−C1(u1)
Γ(λt)dt ≤ C1(u1)
u2
Φ(λA(u2)) + P
u2
.
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This contradicts (A.6), and hence, we must have A(u2) ≥ A(u1) > 0 for all u2 >
u1 > u0. Since A(u) = 0 for u ∈ Uλ with u ≤ u0, this completes the proof of the
statement A(u) is non-decreasing over Uλ.
Next, we show that u − A(u) is non-decreasing over Uλ. Since A(u) = 0 for
u ∈ (0, u0], the statement holds trivially over (0, u0]. If u0 = 1, we are done. Hence,
suppose u0 < 1. Then, by continuity of Pmax(·), we obtain that u0Pmax(λu0) = P .
Using the expression for Pmax(·) from (2.5), we obtain
P = 1
λ
∫ λu0
0
Γ(t)dt− u0
=
∫ u0
0
Γ(λt)dt− u0
=
∫ u0−A(u0)
u0−A(u0)−C1(u0)
Γ(λt)dt− C1(u0)Φ(λA(u0)),
where, in the last equality we use the fact that A(u0) = 0, C1(u0) = u0, and Φ(0) = 1.
This implies that (A.4) holds for all u ∈ Uλ with u ≥ u0, when u0 < 1. Similarly, it
is straightforward to verify that (A.5) also holds for all u ∈ Uλ with u ≥ u0. Thus,
for all u1, u2 ∈ Uλ with u2 > u1 ≥ u0, we have
0 =
(∫ u2−A(u2)
u2−A(u2)−C1(u2)
Γ(λt)dt− C1(u2)Φ(λA(u2))
)
−
(∫ u1−A(u1)
u1−A(u1)−C1(u1)
Γ(λt)dt− C1(u1)Φ(λA(u1))
)
=
∫ u2−A(u2)
u1−A(u1)
Γ(λt)dt−
∫ u2−A(u2)−C1(u2)
u1−A(u1)−C1(u1)
Γ(λt)dt
− C1(u2)Φ(λA(u2)) + C1(u1)Φ(λA(u1))
=
∫ u2−A(u2)
u1−A(u1)
Γ(λt)dt−
∫ u2−A(u2)−C1(u1)
u1−A(u1)−C1(u1)
Γ(λt)dt−
∫ u2−A(u2)−C1(u2)
u2−A(u2)−C1(u1)
Γ(λt)dt
− (C1(u2)− C1(u1)) Φ(λA(u2))− C1(u1) (Φ(λA(u2))− Φ(λA(u1))) .
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This implies,∫ u2−A(u2)
u1−A(u1)
Γ(λt)dt−
∫ u2−A(u2)−C1(u1)
u1−A(u1)−C1(u1)
Γ(λt)dt =
∫ u2−A(u2)−C1(u2)
u2−A(u2)−C1(u1)
Γ(λt)dt
+ (C1(u2)− C1(u1)) Φ(λA(u2))
+ C1(u1) (Φ(λA(u2))− Φ(λA(u1))) .
After some algebra and rearranging, we obtain∫ u2−A(u2)
u1−A(u1)
(Γ(λt)− Γ(λt− C1(u1))) dt =
∫ u2−A(u2)−C1(u2)
u2−A(u2)−C1(u1)
Γ(λt)− Φ(λA(u2))dt
+ C1(u2) (Φ(λA(u2))− Φ(λA(u1))) .
Now note that since Γ(·) is increasing, from (A.5), we obtain that Γ(λt) > Φ(λA(u2))
for t > u2 − A(u2) − C1(u2), and Γ(λt) < Φ(λA(u2)) for t < u2 − A(u2) − C1(u2).
Thus the integral on the right hand side is non-negative. Further, since A(u) is
non-decreasing and Φ is strictly increasing, the second term on the right hand side
is also non-negative. This implies that the left hand side is non-negative. Since
Γ(λt)−Γ(λt−C1(u1)) ≥ 0, this implies that u2−A(u2) ≥ u1−A(u1) for u2 > u1 ≥ u0.
Hence u−A(u) is non-decreasing over all u ∈ Uλ with u ≥ u0. Since A(u) = 0 for
u ∈ Uλ with u ≤ u0, the statement extends to all u ∈ (0, 1].
Finally, we show thatA(u) is continuous over u ∈ Uλ. For each u ∈ Uλ with u ≥ u0,
we obtain that A(u) and C1(u) satisfy (A.4) and (A.5). By continuity of both sides of
these equations in u, we obtain that for a sequence un → u∞ ∈ Uλ with u∞ ≥ u0, the
limits limn→∞A(un) and limn→∞ C1(un) (along a subsequence if necessary for existence
of the limits) also satisfy the same equations for u = u∞. However, since (A.4) and
(A.5) also constitute the sufficient conditions for equilibrium (from Theorem 1), we
obtain that A(u∞) = limn→∞A(un) and C1(u∞) = limn→∞ C1(un). This implies that
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A(u) is continuous over u ∈ Uλ with u ≥ u0. Observe that A(u) = 0 for u ∈ (0, u0].
Taken together, this implies that A(u) is continuous over u ∈ Uλ. 
Proof of Theorem 4. From Lemma 4, we obtain that to show the existence of a
symmetric equilibrium for the system SYSop(λ, P, V ), it suffices to show that there
exists a u ∈ Uλ such that the condition (IND) holds for the strategy (C1(u), C2(u), u).
For u ∈ Uλ, observe that the total expected cost of a customer with unit waiting
cost u under the strategy C¯(u) = (C1(u), C2(u), u) is given by
TC(u) =
∫ C1(u)
0
Γ(λu− λA(u)− λt)dt+ Φ(λA(u)) (C2(u)− C1(u)) +
∫ u
C2(u)
Γ(λu− λt)dt
=
∫ u−A(u)
0
Γ(λt)dt+A(u)Φ(λA(u)).
Now, from Lemma 23, we obtain that both A(u) and u−A(u) are non-decreasing
and continuous over Uλ. Since one of these two functions must strictly increase at
any u, we obtain that TC(u) is strictly increasing and continuous over u ∈ Uλ. Thus,
for all V ≥ 0, there exists a unique u = u(λ, P, V ) ∈ Uλ such that either TC(u) = V
with u ≤ 1, or TC(u) ≤ V and u = 1. Note that this is exactly the condition
(IND) for the system SYSop(λ, P, V ). Thus, we obtain that the strategy C¯(u) for
u = u(λ, P, V ) satisfies the (necessary and) sufficient equilibrium conditions for the
system SYSop(λ, P, V ), and hence constitutes the unique symmetric equilibrium for
the system.
Define ∆λ(u) =
∫ u
0 Γ(λt)dt. Observe that ∆λ is a strictly increasing function
in u over (0, 1] ∩ (0, k/λ). Let uλ = uλ(V ) , min{∆−1λ (V ), 1} > 0 for V > 0 and
P (λ, V ) = ∆λ(uλ(V )) − uλ(V ) = uλ(V )Pmax(λuλ(V )). Now, if P ≥ P (λ, V ) =
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uλPmax(λuλ), then from Theorem 2, we obtain that (1, 1, 1) is the unique symmetric
equilibrium for the system SYSman(λuλ, Puλ ). Observe that uλ ≤ ∆−1(V ) ≤ k/λ, and
hence λuλ < k < n+ k. Furthermore, using the definition of uλ, it is straightforward
to verify that for this strategy, we have ∆λ(uλ) = TC(uλ) and that the condition
(IND) also holds. Hence, from Lemma 4, we obtain that (uλ, uλ, uλ) constitutes the
unique symmetric equilibrium for the system SYSop(λ, P, V ) for P ≥ P (λ, V ). This
implies that the arrival rate of the customers to the fixed-price firm is zero.
Conversely, if (u, u, u) is a symmetric equilibrium for the system SYSop(λ, P, V ),
then we have ∆λ(u) = TC(u) for this strategy, and condition (IND) implies u = uλ.
Also, from Lemma 5, we obtain that (1, 1, 1) is a symmetric equilibrium for the system
SYSman(λu, Pu ), and hence from Theorem 2, we obtain P ≥ uPmax(λu) = P (λ, V ). 
A.6 Proofs in Section 2.5
Proof of Theorem 6. Since the strategy space is compact, we only need to show that
the revenue of each operator is continuous in both P and r. Then the existence of a
mixed strategy equilibrium follows from Glicksberg’s theorem [30].
To show the continuity of firms’ revenue, observe that both firms’ revenue is
continuous in the equilibrium thresholds c¯ = (c1, c2, c`). Thus it suffices to show that
c¯ is continuous in P and r. We show this for P > r, and the case with P ≤ r can be
shown using the same argument.
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By the discussion in subsection 2.4.3, a system with positive r can be mapped to
a system with r = 0, fixed price P − r, and value V − r. Thus, it suffices to show
that in any system with zero reserve price, c¯ is continuous in P and V .
First, consider SYSman(λ, P ). Note that by Lemma 18, s(zmax(x), x) is continuous
and strictly decreasing, thus z(P ) = sup{λ − κ < x < ν : s(zmax(x), x) > λP}
is continuous in P . Then by Lemma 15, α in SYSman(λ, P ) is given by z(P ) for
P < Pmax(λ), and zero otherwise. Thus α is continuous in P in SYSman(λ, P ), for
fixed λ. It then follows from condition (ContW-P) that c1 is continuous in P in
SYSman(λ, P ).
Now consider SYSop(λ, P, V ). Recall from the proof of Theorem 4, TC(u), which
is the total expected cost of a customer with unit waiting cost u under the strategy
C¯(u) = (C1(u), C2(u), u), is continuous and strictly increasing in u. Thus, u(λ, P, V )
that satisfies condition (IND) (TC(u) = V with u ≤ 1, or TC(u) ≤ V with u = 1 ) is
continuous in V for fixed λ and P . On the other hand, since c1 and α are continuous
in P in SYSman(λ, P ), it follows that A(u) is continuous in P for fixed u. Thus, TC(u)
is continuous in P . It then follows from monotonicity of TC(u) in u that u(λ, P, V )
that satisfies condition (IND) is continuous in both P and V . The result then follows
immediately from the observation that C1(u), C2(u) are continuous in both u and P .

The rest of the results in this section use the assumption on the expected waiting
time expressions, under which we can simplify the conditions (ContW-P), (ContT-P),
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and (IND). In particular, with the expected waiting time expressions and under the
assumption that r = 0, the conditions (ContW-P), (ContT-P) become
1
1− ρB −
1
1− ρB + ρB c11−α
− 1
qB
c1
(1− ρB + ρB c11−α)2
= λP, (ContT-P’)
1
qB(1− ρB + ρB c11−α)2
− 1
qB
= ρF1− ρF
1
qF
, (ContW-P’)
where ρs = (1− α)/(qB), and ρF = α/(qF ). Condition (Pref-BID) can be obtained
similarly. And the expected total cost of the customer with unit waiting cost c` is
given by∫ c`
0
w(t; c¯)dt = 1
λ− c`−α
qB
λ
− 1
λ
+ c`(1− 1
k
) + α
k
+ ( 11− ρF − 1)
α
n
, (A.7)
which is used in condition (IND).
Proof of Lemma 6. We prove the first case here, and the other cases can be shown
using the same analysis.
We start by computing the limiting thresholds in SYSman(λ, P ) as λ approaches
infinity, when r = 0. Note that as λ approaches infinity, the right hand side
of condition (ContT-P’) tends to infinity, thus the left hand side also tends to
infinity. As a result, 11−ρB tends to infinity and thus α
λ tends to 1 − qB, as λ
approaches infinity. Substituting the limiting value of αλ into (ContW-P’), we
obtain that cλ1 tends to
√
qB/
(
1
qF+qB−1 − 1qF + 1qB
)
as λ approaches infinity. Thus,
using equation (A.7) with c` = 1, the expected total cost of the customer with
unit waiting cost 1 is given by P + 1. Using the mapping considered in Section
2.4.2, we can show that in the system SYSop(λ, P, V ) (with r = 0), the expected
total cost of the customer with unit cost u when all customers follows the strategy
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given by C¯(u) = (C1(u), C2(u), u) is P + c`. Thus, we obtain from condition (IND)
that c∞` (P, r) = min{V − P, 1}. It immediately follows from the mapping that
c1 tends to c∞1 (P, r) = c∞` (P, r)
√
qB/
(
1
qF+qB−c∞` (P,r)
− 1
qF
+ 1
qB
)
, and α tends to
α∞(P, r) = c∞` (P, r)− qB, as λ approaches infinity.
The limiting revenue of the fixed-price firm per arrival rate can be obtained
immediately by multiplying P and the proportion of the customers obtaining service
in the fixed-price firm. Thus R∞F (P, r) = (c∞` (P, r)− qB)P . To compute the limiting
revenue of the bid-based firm, we consider the expected total revenue of the two firms
in the SYSman(λ, P ), which is
∫ 1
0
[∫ c
0
w(t)dt
]
dc−
∫ 1
0
cw(c)dc
=− 2αλP + 1
λ
 αλ(1− αλ)
qB(1− 1−αλqB +
cλ1
qB
)2
+ 1 + 1 + 2α
λ
1− 1−αλ
qB
+ 2qB log(1− 1− α
λ
qB
)
 (A.8)
Note that by the limit of α and c1, α
λ(1−αλ)
qB(1− 1−αλqB
+ 1 is finite in the limit, and thus the
limit of 1
λ
 αλ(1−αλ)
qB(1− 1−αλqB +
cλ1
qB
)2
+ 1
 is zero. On the other hand, by condition (ContT-P’),
we have
1
λ
1
1− 1−αλ
qB
= P + 1
λ
[ 1
1− ρB + ρB c
λ
1
1−αλ
+ 1
qB
cλ1
(1− ρB + ρB c
λ
1
1−αλ )2
],
which tends to P in the limit, as the term in the square bracket has a finite limit.
And since ρB → 1, the limit of [log(1− ρB)] / 11−ρB is zero.
Therefore, the limit of (A.8) is P , and in SYSman(λ, P ), the limiting revenue of
the bid-based firm is qBP . By the mapping considered in Section 2.4.2, its limiting
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revenue in SYSop(λ, P, V ) (with r = 0) is also qBP .
Thus we proved the first case when r = 0. The first case when r > 0 then
immediately follows from the mapping discussed in subsection 2.4.3. The other three
cases can be shown using the same techniques. 
Proof of Theorem 7. We only need to show that the firms’ revenue is continuous in
λ. This proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 6, so we only briefly outline the
argument here.
As shown in the proof of Lemma 6, the thresholds c1, c2 that solves SYSman(λ, P )
is continuous in P . Also observe that conditions (ContT-P’) and (ContW-P’) only
depend on λ and P through λP , thus the thresholds that solves SYSman(λ, P ) is also
continuous in λ. Moreover, from equation (A.7) we observe that the expected total
cost of the customer with unit waiting cost u when all customers follows the strategy
C¯(u) is continuous and strictly decreasing in λ. Recall that it is also continuous and
strictly monotone in u. Thus, u(λ, P, V ) that satisfies condition (IND) is continuous
in λ. So far we have shown that the equilibrium thresholds are continuous in λ, and
thus the revenues are also continuous in λ. 
Proof of Lemma 7. Lemma 6 gives the payoffs in the limiting game R∞F and R∞B as
functions of (P, r), from which we can calculate the best response functions PBR(r)
and rBR(P ). In particular, if V ≥ 2−qB, the best response of the fixed-price operator
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to the reserve price set by the bid-based firm is given by
PBR(r) =

V − 1 if r ≤ (V − 1)1−qB
qF
r if r > (V − 1)1−qB
qF
.
And when V ≥ 2− qB the best response of the bid-based firm to the fixed-price
firm’s fixed price is given by
rBR(P ) ∈

V − 1 if P ≤ (V − 1)1−qF
qB
[0, P ) if P > (V − 1)1−qF
qB
.
Finding the fixed point of the best response functions, we prove the first case of
this lemma. The second case can be shown using the same approach. 
Proof of Theorem 8. We first consider the optimization problem under collusion. The
firms choose (P, r) to maximize the total payoff, which is given by
R∞F (P, r) +R∞B (P, r) =

P if P ≤ V − 1, r < P
(V − P )P if V > P ≥ V − 1, r < P
PqF + r(1− qF ) if P ≤ r ≤ V − 1
PqF + r(V − r − qF ) if r > V − 1, r ≥ P.
Maximizing the quantity above, we get the policy under collusion given by
(P, r) ∈

{(P, r) : P = V − 1, r ≤ P} if V ≥ 2
{(P, r) : P = V/2, r ≤ P} if V < 2.
And the total payoff under collusion is V − 1 if V ≥ 2, and V 2/4 if V < 2.
By Lemmas 6 and 7, the total payoff in Nash equilibrium of the limiting game is
152
V − 1 if V ≥ 2− qB, and V
2−q2B
4 if V < 2− qB. Thus, the price of stability is given by
V−1
V−1 = 1 if V ≥ 2
V 2/4
V−1 if 2− qB ≤ V < 2
V 2/4
(V 2−q2B)/4
= 11−q2B/V 2 if V < 2− qB.
It is easy to verify that the price of stability is non-increasing in V . Moreover, when
qB ≥ 0.5, the price of stability at V = 1.5 is given by (V 2)/4(V − 1) = 9/8. When
qB < 0.5, the price of stability at V = 1.5 is 1/(1− q2B/V 2) < 1/(1− 1.52/V 2) = 9/8.
The theorem follows from this.

A.7 Extension to non-preemptive queues for the bid-based
firm
To extend our analysis in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 to the case where the bid-based firm
operates a non-preemptive queue, we need to change our assumptions of Γ(·), so that
it not only depends on the arrival rate of the customers with higher bids, but also
depends on the arrival rate of all customers to the bid-based queue. More specifically,
we let Γy(x) to be the expected waiting time in the bid-based firm when the arrival
rate of the customers with higher bids is x, and the arrival rate of all customers to
the bid-based firm is y. Similar to our previous assumptions, we assume that Γy(x) is
continuous and strictly increasing in both x and y for x ≤ y < k, and that Γy(0) > 1.
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It is straightforward to verify that any G/M/k non-preemptive queues satisfy these
assumptions.
In Section 2.3: Almost all analysis in Section 2.3 follow in this non-preemptive
case. The only change is that in Theorem 1, the strict inequality in 0 < c1 < c2 <
c` ≤ 1 has to be changed to a less than or equal to as in 0 < c1 < c2 ≤ c` ≤ 1. In
other words, it is possible that in equilibrium, the fixed-price firm is non-empty yet
there is no customer bidding higher than P in the bid-based firm. This is because
when queues are non-preemptive, Γy(0) > 1, and thus there exists some 0 such that
Γy(0) = Φ(0). Thus there may exist an equilibrium in which the fixed-price firm has
arrival rate less than 0 and c2 = c`.
In Section 2.4: Multiple changes need to be made to Section 2.4. The idea is
to add appropriate subscripts to all occurrence of Γ(·) to represent the total arrival
rate to the bid-based firm. Some proofs need to be carefully modified, especially
when there are inequalities comparing the Γ functions under different total arrival
rates. Moreover, the possibility of an equilibrium in which 0 < c1 < c2 = c` ≤ 1 as
discussed above leads to modification of condition (ContW-P’), as in such equilibrium
the expected waiting time of the highest priority customer in the bid-based firm can
be strictly larger than the expected waiting time in fixed-price firm. We discuss the
changes in the main text and the appendix separately, as follows.
In the main text of Section 2.4: In equation (2.4) which connects wB(·) with
Γ(·), the subscript λ− αλ needs to be added to both occurrences. In equation (2.5)
where we define Pmax(λ), the subscript λ needs to be added to Γ. In Theorem 3, we
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need to change 0 < c1 < c2 < 1 to 0 < c1 < c2 ≤ 1. In equation (2.6), the subscript
λ− αλ needs to be added to Γ. And in all occurrences of Γ in subsection 2.4.2, the
subscript λu−A(u) needs to be added.
Moreover, condition (ContW-P’) needs to be changed to
c2 < c`, wB(c2|c¯) = wB(c1|c¯) = wF (c¯), OR c2 = c`, wB(c1|c¯) ≥ wF (c¯).
In Appendix A.3: Almost all analysis in Appendix A.3 follow without modifi-
cation. We only need to add appropriate subscripts to the equation in the proof of
Lemma 4 involving Γ, and it becomes∫ c1u
0
wB(t|c¯(u))dt =
∫ c1u
0
Γλ
u
u−λ
u
(c2u−c1u)
(
λ
u
u− λ
u
(c2u− c1u)− λ
u
t
)
dt
= u
∫ c1
0
Γλ−λ(c2−c1)(λ− λ(c2 − c1)− λt)dt = u
∫ c1
0
wB(t|c¯)dt.
In Appendix A.4: First, define η as
η , sup{λ− κ < x < ν : Γλ−x(0) > Φ(x)}.
Add subscript λ− x to Γ in the definition of ξ and s(z, x).
The statement in Lemma 17 becomes “The function zmax(x) is continuous over
x ∈ (λ − κ, ν). Further, zmax(·) = λ − x for all x ∈ (λ − κ, η), zmax(·) is strictly
decreasing over (η, ξ) and zmax(x) = 0 for all x ∈ [ξ, ν). Moreover, zmax(x) =
λ− x−Γ−1λ−x(Φ(x)) ∈ (0, λ− x) for x ∈ (η, ξ), and zmax(η) = limx↓η zmax(x) = λ− η.”
The proof can be done using the same argument as the original proof.
In the proof of Lemma 18, the derivative needs to be changed to
ds(zmax(x), x)
dx
= Γλ−x(λ− zmax(x)− x)− Γλ−x(λ− x)− zmax(x)Φ′(x)
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+
∫ zmax(x)+x
x
∂Γλ−x(λ− t)
∂x
dt.
By monotonicity of Γ, ∂Γλ−x(λ−t)
∂x
< 0. Thus the original result still follows.
Lemma 19 and its proof hold after adding subscript λ to Γ in the first two displayed
equations, and adding subscript λ− x to Γ in the last displayed equation.
Lemmas 20, 21, Theorem 15 and their proofs hold after adding subscript λ− x to
all occurrences of Γ.
In the proof of Lemma 22, add subscript λ−z(P ). More importantly, note that
Γ−1λ−z(P )(Φ(z(P ))) may not be well defined when Φ(z(P )) < Γλ−z(P )(0). In those
cases, we let v1(z(P ), P ) = λ−z(P ), and it corresponds to an equilibrium in which
c1 < c2 = c`. We can verify that all other statements in the proof hold after we make
this change.
The proof of Theorem 2 holds after adding subscript λ.
In Appendix A.5: The proof of Theorem 4 holds after adding the subscript
λu− λA(u) to all occurrences of Γ, and changing the definition of ∆λ(u) to ∆λ(u) =∫ u
0 Γuλ(λt)dt.
The first part of the proof of Lemma 23 holds after adding the subscripts λu−
λA(u), λu1 − λA(u1), λu2 − λA(u2) or λu0 (which one to add should be clear given
context). However, to show that u − A(u) is non-decreasing in u, we need a new
proof as follows. For all u1, u2 ∈ Uλ with u2 > u1 ≥ u0, we have
0 =
(∫ u2−A(u2)
u2−A(u2)−C1(u2)
Γλu2−λA(u2)(λt)dt− C1(u2)Φ(λA(u2))
)
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−
(∫ u1−A(u1)
u1−A(u1)−C1(u1)
Γλu1−λA(u1)(λt)dt− C1(u1)Φ(λA(u1))
)
=
∫ u2−A(u2)
u2−A(u2)−C1(u2)
Γλu2−λA(u2)(λt)dt−
∫ u1−A(u1)
u1−A(u1)−C1(u1)
Γλu1−λA(u1)(λt)dt
− (C1(u2)− C1(u1)) Φ(λA(u2))− C1(u1) (Φ(λA(u2))− Φ(λA(u1))) .
This implies,∫ u2−A(u2)
u2−A(u2)−C1(u1)
Γλu2−λA(u2)(λt)dt−
∫ u1−A(u1)
u1−A(u1)−C1(u1)
Γλu1−λA(u1)(λt)dt
=
∫ u2−A(u2)−C1(u2)
u2−A(u2)−C1(u1)
Γλu2−λA(u2)(λt)dt+ (C1(u2)− C1(u1)) Φ(λA(u2))
+ C1(u1) (Φ(λA(u2))− Φ(λA(u1))) .
Using the same argument as in the original proof, we can show that the right hand side
of the equation above is non-negative. Thus, the left hand side is also non-negative.
After rearranging the left hand side, we have∫ u1−A(u1)
u1−A(u1)−C1(u1)
Γλu2−λA(u2)(λt+ (u2 −A(u2))− (u1 −A(u1)))− Γλu1−λA(u1)(λt)dt ≥ 0.
Suppose u2 −A(u2)) < u1 −A(u1), we have by monotonicity of Γy(x) in both x
and y, that
Γλu2−λA(u2)(λt+ (u2 −A(u2))− (u1 −A(u1))) < Γλu2−λA(u2)(λt) < Γλu1−λA(u1)(λt).
Thus,
∫ u1−A(u1)
u1−A(u1)−C1(u1) Γλu2−λA(u2)(λt+(u2−A(u2))−(u1−A(u1)))−Γλu1−λA(u1)(λt)dt <
0, which contradicts with the previous inequality.
Therefore u2 −A(u2)) ≥ u1 −A(u1), as desired.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
B.1 Omitted Results
In the following lemma, we show elementary properties for the function Gi(·,p−i).
We use these properties throughout the paper.
Lemma 24. For fixed p−i, let ν∗ = inf{ν ∈ <+ : Ti(ν,p−i) = ∅}. The function
Gi(·,p−i) satisfies the following properties.
(a) The function Gi(ν,p−i) is continuous in ν ∈ (0,∞).
(b) The function Gi(ν,p−i) is strictly decreasing in ν ∈ [0, ν∗) and constant in
ν ∈ [ν∗,∞) satisfying Gi(ν,p−i) = −2 ci for all ν ∈ [ν∗,∞).
(c) There exists a unique νˆ ∈ [0,∞) satisfying Gi(νˆ,p−i) = 0.
Proof. First, we show Part a. Fix ν > 0 and  > 0 small enough that ν −  > 0.
The definition of Ti(ν,p−i) implies that Ti(ν − ,p−i) ⊇ Ti(ν,p−i). Also, if
t ∈ Ti(ν − ,p−i) \ Ti(ν,p−i), then we have ν ≥ α
t
i+
∑
j 6=i γ
t
i,j p
t
j
βti
> ν − , which
implies that we have 0 ≥ αti−βti ν+
∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j > −βti . For notational brevity, we let
T +i = Ti(ν,p−i), T −i = Ti(ν−,p−i) and Ui = T −i \T +i so that T −i = T +i ∪ Ui. Noting
the definition of Gi(ν,p−i), we have
Gi(ν,p−i)−Gi(ν − ,p−i)
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=
 ∑
t∈T +i
(
αti − βti ν +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p
t
j
)
− 2 ci
−
 ∑
t∈T −i
(
αti − βti (ν − ) +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p
t
j
)
− 2 ci

= −∑
t∈Ui
(
αti − βti ν +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p
t
j
)
−∑
t∈T +i ∪ Ui
βti ,
Since 0 ≥ αti − βti ν +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j > −βti  for all t ∈ Ui, the equality above yields
−∑t∈T +i ∪ Ui βti  ≤ Gi(ν,p−i) − Gi(ν − ,p−i) ≤ −∑t∈T +i βti , so that Gi(ν,p−i) is
continuous in ν ∈ (0,∞).
Second, we show Part b. Fix ν ∈ (0, ν∗), in which case, by the definition of ν∗, we
have Ti(ν,p−i) 6= ∅. In the proof of Part a, we show that Gi(ν,p−i)−Gi(ν−,p−i) ≤
−∑t∈Ti(ν,p−i) βti  for all  > 0 small enough that ν −  > 0. Since βti > 0 for all
t ∈ T and Ti(ν,p−i) 6= ∅, the last inequality implies that Gi(ν − ,p−i) > Gi(ν,p−i)
for all ν ∈ (0, ν∗) and  > 0 small enough that ν −  > 0. Also, noting that
αti > 0 and βti > 0, by the definition of Ti(ν,p−i), we have Ti(,p−i) = T for small
enough  > 0. In this case, by the definition of Gi(ν,p−i), we obtain Gi(0,p−i) ≥∑
t∈T (αti +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j) − 2 ci >
∑
t∈T (αti − βti  +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j) − 2 ci = Gi(,p−i),
which implies that Gi(0,p−i) > Gi(,p−i) for small enough  > 0. Therefore, we
have Gi(ν − ,p−i) > Gi(ν,p−i) for all ν ∈ (0, ν∗) and  > 0 small enough that
ν −  > 0. Also, we have Gi(0,p−i) > Gi(,p−i) for small enough  > 0. The last two
statements establish that Gi(ν,p−i) is strictly decreasing in ν ∈ [0, ν∗). Lastly, fix
ν ∈ (ν∗,∞). By the definition of ν∗, we have Ti(ν,p−i) = ∅, in which case, by the
definition of Gi(ν,p−i), we obtain Gi(ν,p−i) = −2 ci. Since Gi(ν,p−i) = −2 ci for
all ν ∈ (ν∗,∞) and Gi(ν,p−i) is continuous in ν ∈ (0,∞), it must be the case that
Gi(ν∗,p−i) = −2 ci as well. Therefore, we have Gi(ν,p−i) = −2 ci for all ν ∈ [ν∗,∞).
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Third, we show Part c. Assume that Gi(0,p−i) > 0. Since αti > 0 and βti > 0,
we have Ti(0,p−i) = T by the definition of Ti(ν,p−i). In this case, by the definition
of Gi(ν,p−i), we get Gi(0,p−i) =
∑
t∈T (αti +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j)− 2 ci > 0. Similarly, since
αti > 0 and βti > 0, we have Ti(,p−i) = T for small enough  > 0. In this case,
by the definition of Gi(ν,p−i), we have Gi(,p−i) =
∑
t∈T (αti − βti +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j)−
2 ci. Therefore, we have lim→0Gi(,p−i) = Gi(0,p−i), indicating that Gi(ν,p−i)
is continuous at ν = 0. Noting Part a, it follows that Gi(ν,p−i) is continuous in
ν ∈ [0,∞). Since Gi(ν,p−i) is strictly decreasing in ν ∈ [0, ν∗) and Gi(v,p−i) < 0 for
all ν ∈ [ν∗,∞) by Part b andGi(ν,p−i) is continuous in ν ∈ [0,∞) withGi(0,p−i) > 0,
there exists a unique νˆ such that Gi(νˆ,p−i) = 0. Next, assume that Gi(0,p−i) = 0.
Clearly νˆ = 0 satisfies Gi(νˆ,p−i) = 0. Also, since Gi(ν,p−i) is strictly decreasing in
ν ∈ [0, ν∗) and constant at a negative value for ν ∈ [ν∗,∞) by Part b, there cannot
be another νˆ such that Gi(νˆ,p−i) = 0. 
In the next lemma, we show that if we fix the price trajectories of the firms other
than firm i, then the best response of firm i, when viewed as a function of its initial
inventory, is Lipschitz.
Lemma 25. Fix the prices p−i charged by the firms other than firm i and let
{pti(ci) : t ∈ T} be the optimal solution to problem (3.1) as a function of the initial
inventory of firm i. Letting βmin = mini∈N, t∈T βti , for any two initial inventory levels
cˆi and c˜i, we have
max
t∈T
{
|pti(cˆi)− pti(c˜i)|
}
≤ 1
βmin
|cˆi − c˜i|.
Proof. Since the prices p−i charged by the firms other than firm i are fixed and
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we work with two different initial inventory levels, we drop the argument p−i from
Gi(ν,p−i) and make the dependence of Gi(ν,p−i) on ci explicit. Thus, we use Gi(ν, ci)
to denote Gi(ν,p−i) throughout the proof. For notational brevity, we let pˆti = pti(cˆi)
and p˜ti = pti(c˜i). Noting Lemma 9, we let vˆi and v˜i be such that Gi(vˆi, cˆi) = 0 and
Gi(v˜i, c˜i) = 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that vˆi ≥ v˜i. Since Gi(ν, ci) is
non-increasing in ν ∈ [0,∞) by Lemma 24 and Gi(v˜i, c˜i) = 0, we have Gi(vˆi, c˜i) ≤ 0.
Repeating the same argument in the first paragraph of the proof of Theorem 9, we
also get |pˆti− p˜ti| ≤ 12(vˆi− v˜i) for all t ∈ T . The only difference is that we have Mi = 0
in this context since the prices charged by the firms other than firm i are fixed. If
vˆi ≤ 2 |cˆi − c˜i|/βmin, then the last inequality implies that |pˆti − p˜ti| ≤ |cˆi − c˜i|/βmin,
which is the result that we want to show! In the rest of the proof, we proceed under
the assumption that vˆi > 2 |cˆi − c˜i|/βmin.
Noting that Gi(vˆi, cˆi) = 0 and Gi(ν, cˆi) < 0 for all ν ∈ [ν∗,∞) by Lemma 24, the
definition of ν∗ implies that Ti(vˆi,p−i) 6= ∅. If, otherwise, Ti(vˆi,p−i) = ∅, then we
obtain ν∗ ≤ vˆi by the definition of ν∗, which contradicts the fact that Gi(vˆi, cˆi) = 0,
Gi(ν∗, cˆi) < 0 and Gi(·, cˆi) is decreasing. Also, since vˆi > 2 |cˆi − c˜i|/βmin ≥ 0, by the
definition of Gi(ν, ci), we obtain Gi(vˆi, c˜i) − Gi(vˆi, cˆi) = −2 (c˜i − cˆi). Noting that
Gi(vˆi, cˆi) = 0, the last equality yields Gi(vˆi, c˜i) = −2 (c˜i− cˆi). In the proof of Part a of
Lemma 24, we show that Gi(ν, ci)−Gi(ν− , ci) ≤ −∑t∈Ti(ν,p−i) βti  for all ν ∈ (0,∞)
and  > 0 small enough that ν −  > 0. Using this inequality with ν = vˆi and ci = c˜i,
we obtain Gi(vˆi − , c˜i) ≥ Gi(vˆi, c˜i) +∑t∈Ti(vˆi,p−i) βti . Using the last inequality with
 = 2 |cˆi − c˜i|/βmin, since Ti(vˆi,p−i) 6= ∅ and Gi(vˆi, c˜i) = −2 (c˜i − cˆi), we get
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Gi
(
vˆi − 2
βmin
|cˆi − c˜i|, c˜i
)
≥ −2 (c˜i − cˆi) + βmin 2
βmin
|cˆi − c˜i| ≥ 0 = Gi(v˜i, c˜i).
Noting that Gi(ν, ci) is strictly decreasing in ν ∈ [0, ν∗) and constant at a negative
value for ν ∈ [ν∗,∞) by Part b of Lemma 24, having Gi(vˆi − 2βmin |cˆi − c˜i|, c˜i) ≥ 0 =
Gi(v˜i, c˜i) implies that vˆi − 2βmin |cˆi − c˜i| ≤ v˜i. So, we obtain |pˆti − p˜ti| ≤ 12(vˆi − v˜i) ≤
1
βmin
|cˆi − c˜i| for all t ∈ T . 
B.2 Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 8. Since the solution {pti : t ∈ T}, along with the dual multipliers
vi and {uti : t ∈ T}, satisfies the KKT conditions in (3.2), solving for uti in the third
KKT condition, we have
uti =
αti +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j
βti
− 2 pti + vi. (B.1)
For notational brevity, we let ∆ti = (αti +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j)/βti . Therefore, we can write
(B.1) as uti = ∆ti − 2 pti + vi. Furthermore, noting that βti > 0 and dividing the
second KKT condition in (3.2) by βti , we observe that (∆ti − pti)uti = 0 for all t ∈ T .
Consider any t ∈ Ti(vi,p−i). By the definition of Ti(vi,p−i), we have ∆ti > vi. In
this case, by (B.1), it follows that uti = ∆ti − 2 pti + vi < 2 (∆ti − pti). Multiplying the
last chain of inequalities by uti and noting that (∆ti − pti)uti = 0, we get (uti)2 ≤ 0,
which implies that uti = 0. Using this value of uti in (B.1) and solving for pti, we have
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pti = ∆ti/2 + vi/2. Therefore, the desired result holds for any t ∈ Ti(vi,p−i). Consider
any t 6∈ Ti(vi,p−i). By the definition of Ti(vi,p−i), we have ∆ti ≤ vi. In this case,
using (B.1), it follows that uti = ∆ti−2 pti+vi ≥ 2 (∆ti−pti). Multiplying the last chain
of inequalities by ∆ti − pti and noting that (∆ti − pti)uti = 0, we have (∆ti − pti)2 ≤ 0,
which implies that pti = ∆ti. Using this value of pti in (B.1) and noting the definition of
∆ti, we get uti = vi −∆ti. Therefore, the desired result holds for any t 6∈ Ti(vi,p−i). 
Proof of Lemma 9. As in the proof of Lemma 8, we let ∆ti = (αti +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j)/βti for
notational brevity. By Lemma 8, we have pti = (∆ti + vi)/2 for all t ∈ Ti(vi,p−i) and
pti = ∆ti for all t 6∈ Ti(vi,p−i). First, we assume that vi = 0. Since αti > 0, we have
Ti(vi,p−i) = T by the definition of Ti(vi,p−i), which implies that pti = (∆ti + vi)/2 =
∆ti/2 for all t ∈ T . In this case, we obtain 12
∑
t∈T βti ∆ti =
∑
t∈T βti(∆ti−pti) =
∑
t∈T (αti−
βti p
t
i +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j) ≤ ci, where the second equality uses the definition of ∆ti and the
inequality follows from the fact that {pti : t ∈ T} is a feasible solution to problem (3.1).
The last chain of inequalities imply that ∑t∈T βti ∆ti−2 ci ≤ 0. Noting the definition of
∆ti and the fact that Ti(vi,p−i) = T , we obtain
∑
t∈Ti(vi,p−i)(αti+
∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j)−2 ci ≤ 0,
which implies that Gi(vi,p−i) = Gi(0,p−i) = 0. Therefore, the desired result holds
when vi = 0. Second, we assume that vi > 0. Using the fact that pti = (∆ti + vi)/2
for all t ∈ Ti(vi,p−i) and pti = ∆ti for all t 6∈ Ti(vi,p−i), we have
∑
t∈T (αti − βti pti +∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j) =
∑
t∈T βti (∆ti − pti) =
∑
t∈Ti(vi,p−i) β
t
i (∆ti − vi)/2. Since vi > 0, by the
first KKT condition in (3.2), we also have ci =
∑
t∈T (αti − βti pti +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j). In this
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case, by the last chain of equalities, we get
ci =
1
2
∑
t∈Ti(vi,p−i)
βti (∆ti − vi).
By the definition of ∆ti, the equality above is equivalent to
∑
t∈Ti(vi,p−i)(αti − βivi +∑
j 6=i γti,j p
t
j) − 2 ci = 0, which implies that Gi(vi,p−i) = 0. Therefore, the desired
result holds when vi > 0. 
Proof of Theorem 9. For notational brevity, we let pˆti = pti(pˆ−i) and p˜ti = pti(p˜−i). In
other words, {pˆti : t ∈ T} is the optimal solution to problem (3.1) when we solve this
problem after replacing p−i with pˆ−i. Similarly, {p˜ti : t ∈ T} is the optimal solution
to problem (3.1) when we solve this problem after replacing p−i with p˜−i. Also,
we let vˆi and v˜i be such that Gi(vˆi, pˆ−i) = 0 and Gi(v˜i, p˜−i) = 0. Without loss of
generality, we assume that vˆi ≥ v˜i. Otherwise, we interchange the roles of vˆi and
v˜i. Finally, we let ∆ˆti = (αti +
∑
j 6=i γti,j pˆ
t
j)/βti and ∆˜ti = (αti +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p˜
t
j)/βti for
notational brevity. Note that |∆ˆti − ∆˜ti| ≤
∑
j 6=i γti,j |pˆtj − p˜tj|/βti . In this case, using
Mi = maxt∈T{∑j 6=i γti,j |pˆtj − p˜tj|/βti}, we have |∆ˆti − ∆˜ti| ≤ Mi for all t ∈ T . We
proceed to examining four cases to show that |pˆti − p˜ti| ≤ 12Mi + 12 max{Mi, vˆi − v˜i}
for all t ∈ T . First, we assume that t ∈ Ti(vˆi, pˆ−i) and t ∈ Ti(v˜i, p˜−i). Using
Lemma 8, we have |pˆti − p˜ti| = 12 |∆ˆti + vˆi − ∆˜ti − v˜ti | ≤ 12 |∆ˆti − ∆˜ti| + 12(vˆi − v˜i) ≤
1
2Mi +
1
2(vˆi − v˜i) ≤ 12Mi + 12 max{Mi, vˆi − v˜i}, as desired. Second, we assume that
t 6∈ Ti(vˆi, pˆ−i) and t 6∈ Ti(v˜i, p˜−i). Using Lemma 8 once more, we have |pˆti − p˜ti| =
|∆ˆti − ∆˜ti| ≤ Mi ≤ 12Mi + 12 max{Mi, vˆi − v˜i}, as desired. Third, we assume that
t ∈ Ti(vˆi, pˆ−i) and t 6∈ Ti(v˜i, p˜−i). Since t ∈ Ti(vˆi, pˆ−i), we have ∆ˆti > vˆi, which
implies vˆi − ∆˜ti < ∆ˆti − ∆˜ti ≤ Mi. Also, since t 6∈ Ti(v˜i, p˜−i), we have ∆˜ti ≤ v˜i,
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which implies vˆi − ∆˜ti ≥ vˆi − v˜i. Noting the last two inequalities, it follows that
|vˆi − ∆˜ti| ≤ max{Mi, vˆi − v˜i}. In this case, using Lemma 8 one last time and using
the fact that |vˆi − ∆˜ti| ≤ max{Mi, vˆi − v˜i}, we obtain |pˆti − p˜ti| = |12∆ˆti + 12 vˆi − ∆˜ti| ≤
1
2 |∆ˆti− ∆˜ti|+ 12 |vˆi− ∆˜ti| ≤ 12 Mi + 12 |vˆi− ∆˜ti| ≤ 12 Mi + 12 max{Mi, vˆi− v˜i}, as desired.
Fourth, we assume that t 6∈ Ti(vˆi, pˆ−i) and t ∈ Ti(v˜i, p˜−i), in which case, we can follow
the same argument in the third case to obtain |pˆti − p˜ti| ≤ 12 Mi + 12 max{Mi, vˆi − v˜i}.
The preceding discussion shows that |pˆti− p˜ti| ≤ 12 Mi+ 12 max{Mi, vˆi− v˜i}. If vˆi ≤Mi,
then noting that v˜i ≥ 0, the last inequality implies that |pˆti − p˜ti| ≤Mi, which is the
result we want to show! In the rest of the proof, we proceed under the assumption
that vˆi > Mi.
Consider the function Gi(·, p˜−i). By Lemma 24 in the Appendix A, the function
Gi(·, p˜−i) is strictly decreasing over the interval [0, ν∗) for some ν∗ and constant over
the interval [ν∗,∞). By the same lemma, we also have Gi(ν∗, p˜−i) = −2 ci < 0. In the
rest of the proof, we show that Gi(vˆi−Mi, p˜−i) ≥ 0. Also, we have Gi(v˜i, p˜−i) = 0 by
Lemma 9. In this case, since Gi(ν∗, p˜−i) < 0 and Gi(·, p˜−i) is strictly decreasing over
the interval [0, ν∗) and constant over the interval [ν∗,∞), having Gi(vˆi−Mi, p˜−i) ≥ 0
and Gi(v˜i, p˜−i) = 0 implies that vˆi −Mi ≤ v˜i. Therefore, we have vˆi − v˜i ≤ Mi, so
that we get |pˆti − p˜ti| ≤ 12 Mi + 12 max{Mi, vˆi − v˜i} = Mi, which is the result we want
to show. It remains to show that Gi(vˆi −Mi, p˜−i) ≥ 0. Using 1(·) to denote the
indicator function, since vˆi > Mi, by the definition of Gi(·, p˜−i), we have
Gi(vˆi −Mi, p˜−i) =
∑
t∈Ti(vˆi−Mi,p˜−i)
(
αti − βti (vˆi −Mi) +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p˜
t
j
)
− 2 ci
=
∑
t∈Ti(vˆi,pˆ−i)
(
αti − βti (vˆi −Mi) +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p˜
t
j
)
− 2 ci
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+
∑
t∈T
1(t ∈ Ti(vˆi −Mi, p˜−i) \ Ti(vˆi, pˆ−i))
(
αti − βti (vˆi −Mi) +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p˜
t
j
)
−∑
t∈T
1(t ∈ Ti(vˆi, pˆ−i) \ Ti(vˆi −Mi, p˜−i))
(
αti − βti (vˆi −Mi) +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p˜
t
j
)
.
(B.2)
We consider each one of the three terms on the right side above one by one. For the
first term, by Lemma 9, we have Gi(vˆi, pˆ−i) = 0. By the definition of Mi, we also
have ∑j 6=i γti,j |pˆtj − p˜tj|/βti ≤Mi for all t ∈ T , so that ∑t∈Ti(vˆi,pˆ−i)∑j 6=i γti,j |pˆtj − p˜tj| ≤
Mi
∑
t∈Ti(vˆi,pˆ−i) β
t
i . Thus, we get∑
t∈Ti(vˆi,pˆ−i)
(
αti − βti (vˆi −Mi) +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j p˜
t
j
)
− 2 ci
=
∑
t∈Ti(vˆi,pˆ−i)
(
αti − βti vˆi +
∑
j 6=i
γti,j pˆ
t
j
)
− 2 ci +
∑
t∈Ti(vˆi,pˆ−i)
∑
j 6=i
γti,j (p˜tj − pˆtj) +Mi
∑
t∈Ti(vˆi,pˆ−i)
βti
= Gi(vˆi, pˆ−i) +
∑
t∈Ti(vˆi,pˆ−i)
∑
j 6=i
γti,j (p˜tj − pˆtj) +Mi
∑
t∈Ti(vˆi,pˆ−i)
βti
≥ Gi(vˆi, pˆ−i)−
∑
t∈Ti(vˆi,pˆ−i)
∑
j 6=i
γti,j |p˜tj − pˆtj|+Mi
∑
t∈Ti(vˆi,pˆ−i)
βti ≥ 0,
where the second equality uses the fact that vˆi > Mi ≥ 0 so that we have Gi(vˆi, pˆ−i) =∑
t∈Ti(vˆi,pˆ−i)(αti − βti vˆi +
∑
j 6=i γti,j pˆ
t
j)− 2 ci. Therefore, the first term on the right side
of (B.2) is non-negative. For the second term, by the definition of Ti(vˆi −Mi, p˜−i),
we have αti +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p˜
t
j > β
t
i (vˆi −Mi) for all t ∈ Ti(vˆi −Mi, p˜−i). Therefore, we
have 1(t ∈ Ti(vˆi −Mi, p˜−i) \ Ti(vˆi, pˆ−i)) (αti − βti (vˆi −Mi) +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p˜
t
j) ≥ 0, which
implies that the second term on the right side of (B.2) is non-negative. For the third
term, we have αti +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p˜
t
j ≤ βti (vˆi −Mi) for all t 6∈ Ti(vˆi −Mi, p˜−i). Therefore,
we have 1(t ∈ Ti(vˆi, pˆ−i) \ Ti(vˆi −Mi, p˜−i)) × (αti − βti (vˆi −Mi) +
∑
j 6=i γti,j p˜
t
j) ≤ 0,
indicating that the third term on the right side of (B.2) is non-positive. So, the first
and second terms on the right side of (B.2) are non-negative, whereas the third term
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is non-positive, in which case, we have Gi(vˆi −Mi, p˜−i) ≥ 0. 
Proof of Lemma 10. We consider the problem over the time periods T \ {1} where the
inventory for each firm ` at the second time period is given by [c` −D1` (p˜1)]+. By the
discussion that follows Theorem 9, if we start with any set of prices for the firms at
the initial iteration and iteratively compute the best response of each firm to prices
at the previous iteration, then we reach the equilibrium without recourse. Therefore,
to compute {p˜t : t ∈ T \ {1}}, we consider the problem over the time periods T \ {1}
with the inventory of each firm ` at the second time period given by [c` −D1` (p˜1)]+
and starting with the prices {pˆt : t ∈ T \ {1}} at the initial iteration, we iteratively
compute the best response of each firm to the prices at the previous iteration. Letting
{p˜t,k : t ∈ T \ {1}} be the price trajectories for the firms at iteration k, we know that
limk→∞ p˜t,k` = p˜t` for all ` ∈ N , t ∈ T \ {1}. Therefore, for all t ∈ T \ {1} and ` ∈ N ,
we have |pˆt` − p˜t`| = |pˆt` − p˜t,1` +
∑∞
k=1(p˜
t,k
` − p˜t,k+1` )| ≤
∑∞
k=1 |p˜t,k` − p˜t,k+1` |, where the
inequality uses the fact that p˜t,1` = pˆt`. In this case, to bound |pˆt` − p˜t`|, we can bound
|p˜t,k` − p˜t,k+1` | for all k = 1, 2, . . . and add up the bounds on the latter quantity. We pro-
ceed to bounding |p˜t,k` − p˜t,k+1` |. By definition, the price trajectory {p˜t,k+1` : t ∈ T \{1}}
of firm ` at iteration k + 1 is the best response of firm ` to the price trajectories
{p˜t,k−` : t ∈ T \ {1}} of the other firms at iteration k. In this case, Theorem 9 implies
that |p˜t,k+1` − p˜t,k` | ≤ maxt∈T\{1}{
∑
j 6=` γt`,j |p˜t,kj − p˜t,k−1j |/βt`} for all ` ∈ N , t ∈ T \ {1},
k = 2, 3, . . .. For notational brevity, we let Φk` = maxt∈T\{1}{|p˜t,k+1` − p˜t,k` |} so that the
last inequality yields Φk` ≤ maxt∈T\{1}
∑
j 6=` γt`,j Φk−1j /βt` for all ` ∈ N , k = 2, 3, . . .. Us-
ing the inequality Φk` ≤ maxt∈T\{1}
∑
j 6=` γt`,j Φk−1j /βt` for firm ` = j with j 6= i and
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noting the definitions of M and µ, it follows that
Φkj ≤ max
t∈T\{1}

∑
`∈N\{j,i} γtj,` Φk−1`
βtj
+
γtj,i Φk−1i
βtj
 ≤M max`∈N\{j,i}
{
Φk−1`
}
+ µΦk−1i (B.3)
for all j 6= i and k = 2, 3, . . .. Using the inequality Φk` ≤ maxt∈T\{1}
∑
j 6=` γt`,j Φk−1j /βt`
again for firm ` = i, we get Φki ≤ maxt∈T\{1}
∑
j 6=i γti,j Φk−1j /βti ≤ M maxj 6=i Φk−1j
for all k = 2, 3, . . .. If we use the last inequality in (B.3), then for all j 6= i and
k = 3, 4, . . ., we have Φkj ≤ M max`∈N\{j,i}{Φk−1` }+Mµ maxj 6=i{Φk−2j }. So, letting
Θk = maxj 6=i Φkj , the last inequality yields
Θk ≤MΘk−1 +MµΘk−2
for all k = 3, 4, . . .. Adding the inequality above over all k = 3, 4, . . ., we ob-
tain ∑∞k=3 Θk ≤ M ∑∞k=2 Θk + Mµ ∑∞k=1 Θk, which is equivalent to ∑∞k=1 Θk ≤
M
∑∞
k=2 Θk + Mµ
∑∞
k=1 Θk + Θ1 + Θ2 = (M + Mµ)
∑∞
k=1 Θk + (1 −M) Θ1 + Θ2.
Rearranging the terms in the last chain of inequalities, we get ∑∞k=1 Θk ≤ ((1 −
M) Θ1 + Θ2)/(1−M −Mµ).
Therefore, if we can bound Θ1 and Θ2, then we can bound ∑∞k=1 Θk. When
we increase the price of firm i at the first time period by δ, the inventory of firm
i at the second time period changes by at most β1i δ and the inventory of firm
j 6= i at the second time period changes by at most γ1j,i δ. In Appendix A, Lemma
25 shows that if we fix the price trajectories of the firms other than firm i, then
the best response of firm i, when viewed as a function of its initial inventory, is
Lipschitz with constant 1/βmin, where we let βmin = mini∈N, t∈T βti . Note that the
best response of firm i does not depend on the inventories of the other firms, since
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the price trajectories of the other firms is fixed. By definition, if we consider the
problem over the time periods T \ {1} with the inventory of each firm ` at the
second time period given by [c` −D1` (pˆ1)]+, by definition, {pˆt` : t ∈ T \ {1}} is the
best response to the price trajectories {pˆt−` : t ∈ T \ {1}}. Also, if we consider the
problem over the time periods T \ {1} with the inventory of each firm ` at the second
time period given by [c` −D1` (p˜1)]+, by definition, {p˜t,2` : t ∈ T \ {1}} is the best
response to the price trajectories {p˜t,1−` : t ∈ T \ {1}}. Since the price trajectories
{pˆt−` : t ∈ T \ {1}} and {p˜t,1−` : t ∈ T \ {1}} are the same, Lemma 25 in Appendix
A implies that |p˜t,2` − p˜t,1` | = |p˜t,2` − pˆt`| ≤ |(c` −D1` (p˜1))+ − (c` −D1` (pˆ1))+|/βmin for
all t ∈ T \ {1}. As discussed at the beginning of this paragraph, the expression on
the right side of the last inequality is bounded by β1i δ when ` = i and bounded
by γ1j,i δ when ` = j with j 6= i. Therefore, we obtain |p˜t,2i − p˜t,1i | ≤ β1i δ/βmin ≤ β¯ δ
and |p˜t,2j − p˜t,1j | ≤ γ1j,i δ/βmin ≤ β¯ µ δ for all j 6= i. The second one of the last two
inequalities yields Θ1 = maxj 6=i, t∈T\{1}{|p˜t,2j − p˜t,1j |} ≤ µ β¯ δ. The first one of the last
two inequalities yields Φ1i = maxt∈T\{1}{|p˜t,2i − p˜t,1i |} ≤ β¯ δ, in which case, noting
(B.3), we get Θ2 = maxj 6=i{Φ2j} ≤M Θ1 + µΦ1i ≤Mµ β¯ δ + µ β¯ δ. Thus, Θ1 and Θ2
are respectively bounded by µ β¯ δ and (1 +M)µ β¯ δ. In this case, for all j 6= i and
t ∈ T \ {1}, we have
|pˆtj − p˜tj| ≤
∞∑
k=1
|p˜t,k+1j − p˜t,kj | ≤
∞∑
k=1
max
j 6=i,t∈T\{1}
{
|p˜t,k+1j − p˜t,kj |
}
=
∞∑
k=1
Θk
≤ (1−M) Θ
1 + Θ2
1−M −Mµ ≤
(1−M)µ β¯ δ + (1 +M)µ β¯ δ
1−M −Mµ ≤
2µ β¯ δ
1−M −Mµ,
where the first inequality follows from the discussion at the beginning of the proof
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and the equality is by the definition of Θk and Φk` . 
Proof of Lemma 11. We let pˆti be the price charged by firm i at time period t
in the equilibrium without recourse. As discussed right before the lemma, given
that all of the firms use the strategy {PR,t : t ∈ T}, the realized prices are {pˆti :
i ∈ N, t ∈ T}. We use qˆ1i to denote the arbitrary price charged by firm i at
the first time period. Given that firm i uses the strategy {PR,ti (·) : t ∈ T \ {1}}
at the other time periods and the other firms use the strategy {PR,t−i : t ∈ T}, we
let {qˆti : i ∈ N, t ∈ T} be the realized prices. For each firm j 6= i, note that
qˆ1j = P
R,1
j (c) = p
N,1
j (1, c) = pˆ1j . Also, by Lemma 10, for all j 6= i and t ∈ T \ {1},
we have |pˆtj − qˆtj| ≤ 2µ β¯ |pˆ1i − qˆ1i |/(1−M −Mµ) ≤ 2µ β¯ Pmax/(1−M −Mµ). We
use piti(pti,pt−i) to denote the revenue of firm i at time period t when firm i charges
the price pti and the other firms charge the price pt−i = (pt1, . . . , pti−1, pti+1, . . . , ptn). We
have ΠNi =
∑
t∈T piti(pˆti, pˆt−i) and ΠDi =
∑
t∈T piti(qˆti , qˆt−i). In this case, we get
ΠNi =
∑
t∈T
piti(pˆti, pˆt−i) ≥
∑
t∈T
piti(qˆti , pˆt−i) = ΠDi −
∑
t∈T\{1}
piti(qˆti , qˆt−i) +
∑
t∈T\{1}
piti(qˆti , pˆt−i),
where the inequality uses the fact that {pˆti : t ∈ T} is the best response of
firm i to the prices {pˆt−i : t ∈ T} and the second equality uses the fact that
qˆ1−i = pˆ1−i. Using Dti(pti,pt−i) to denote the demand of firm i at time period
t when firm i charges the price pti and the other firms charge the prices pt−i,
by the inequality above, we get ΠDi − ΠNi ≤
∑
t∈T\{1} |piti(qˆti , qˆt−i)− piti(qˆti , pˆt−i)| =∑
t∈T\{1} |qˆti Dti(qˆti , qˆt−i)− qˆtiDti(qˆti , pˆt−i)|. Since Dti(qˆti , qˆt−i)−Dti(qˆti , pˆt−i) = (αti +βti qˆti−∑
j 6=i γti,j qˆ
t
j)−(αti+βti qˆti−
∑
j 6=i γti,j pˆ
t
j) =
∑
j 6=i γti,j (pˆtj−qˆtj), the last chain of inequalities
yields ΠDi −ΠNi ≤
∑
t∈T\{1} qˆti
∑
j 6=i γti,j |qˆtj − pˆtj| ≤
∑
t∈T\{1} Pmax Mβti maxj 6=i |qˆtj − pˆtj|,
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where we use the fact that qˆti ≤ Pmax and M ≥
∑
j 6=i γti,j/β
t
i . At the beginning
of the proof, we show that |pˆtj − qˆtj| ≤ 2µ β¯ Pmax/(1 −M −Mµ) for all j 6= i and
t ∈ T \{1}. In this case, we obtain ΠDi −ΠNi ≤
∑
t∈T\{1} Pmax Mβti maxj 6=i{|qˆtj−pˆtj|} =
2 β¯MβmaxP 2max (τ − 1)µ/(1−M −Mµ). 
Proof of Theorem 10. Consider the problem over the time periods κ, . . . , τ . We use
Revκi (P κi (·), . . . , P τi (·),P−i,x) to denote the revenue of firm i over the time periods
κ, . . . , τ , when the firm uses the strategy {P κi (·), . . . , P τi (·)}, the other firms use the
strategy P−i and the inventories at time period κ are given by x. We let {Qti(·) : t ∈ T}
be an arbitrary strategy used by firm i. We use induction over the time peri-
ods to show that Revκi (Qκi (·), . . . , Qτi (·),PR−i,x)−Revκi (PR,κi (·), . . . , PR,τi (·),PR−i,x) ≤
Γµ (τ − κ + 1) (τ − κ)µ . In this case, the result follows by noting that
ΠAi = Rev1i (Q1i (·), . . . , Qτi (·),PR−i, c), ΠNi = Rev1i (PR,1i (·), . . . , PR,τi (·),PR−i, c) and
using the last inequality with κ = 1. Consider the case κ = τ . We have
Revτi (Qτi (·),PR−i,x)−Revτi (PR,τi (·),PR−i,x) ≤ 0, where the inequality follows form the
fact that PR,τi (x) is the best response of firm i to the prices P
R,t
−i (x). Therefore the
result holds for κ = τ . Assuming that the result holds for κ = t+ 1, we show that the
result holds for κ = t. Using Dt(pti,pt−i) to denote the vector of demands for the firms
when the prices are (pti,pt−i) and letting x′ =
[
x−Dt(Qti(x),P t−i(x))
]+
, observe that
Revti(Qti(·), Qt+1i (·), . . . , Qτi (·),PR−i,x) − Revti(Qti(·), PR,t+1i (·), . . . , PR,τi (·),PR−i,x) =
Revt+1i (Qt+1i (·), . . . , Qτi (·),PR−i,x′) − Revt+1i (PR,t+1i (·), . . . , RR,τi (·),PR−i,x′), since all
firms make the same pricing decisions at time period t in the two revenue ex-
pressions on the left side of the equality. By the induction assumption, the right
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side of the last equality is bounded by Γµ (τ − t) (τ − t − 1)µ. Also, considering
Revti(Qti(·), PR,t+1i (·), . . . , RR,τi (·),PR−i,x)−Revti(PR,ti (·), PR,t+1i (·) . . . , PR,τi (·),PR−i,x),
this expression is the change in the revenue of firm i when firm i deviates from the
strategy {PR,ti (·) : t ∈ T} only at the initial period and there are τ − t + 1 time
periods in the problem. By Lemma 11, this expression is bounded by 2 Γµ (τ − t)µ.
In this case, noting that
Revti(Qti(·), . . . , Qτi (·),PR−i,x)− Revti(PR,ti (·), . . . , PR,τi (·),PR−i,x)
= Revti(Qti(·), Qt+1i (·), . . . , Qτi (·),PR−i,x)− Revti(Qti(·), PR,t+1i (·), . . . , RR,τi (·),PR−i,x)
+ Revti(Qti(·), PR,t+1i (·), . . . , RR,τi (·),PR−i,x)− Revti(PR,ti (·), . . . , PR,τi (·),PR−i,x),
the two differences on the right side above are bounded by Γµ (τ − t) (τ − t+ 1)µ and
2 Γµ (τ − t)µ. Since Γµ (τ − t) (τ − t− 1)µ+ 2 Γµ (τ − t)µ = Γµ (τ − t+ 1) (τ − t)µ,
the result holds for κ = t. 
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4
Proof to Lemma 16:
In the balancing algorithm, let xti be the probability of selling stage 1 item i in
time t. Let yt,ij be the probability of selling stage 2 item j to type i customer in time
t, conditioning on that a type i customer arrives to the system. Note that xT = x
and yT = y. For any stage 1 item i, xti changes in time period t if only if item i is
balanced in period t, and it is nonincreasing in t. If item i is balanced at time period
t, then
xti =
cti
t
.
Similarly, yt,ij changes in time period t if only if item j is balanced in period t,
and it is nonincreasing in t. If item i is balanced at time period t, then∑
i
xtiy
t,i
j =
ctj
t
.
Proving inequality (4.8): We first divide the selling horizon into several long-
enough epochs, and show that with large probability, the realized sales of item i in
each epoch is not too different from its expectation. It follows that for large enough t,
with large probability, xti is bounded from below by xi− (T ), for some (T ) that goes
to 0 as T goes to infinity. Convergence in probability then follows from some algebra.
We divide the selling horizon into epochs, each containing τ periods. We let Dk
be a random variable denoting the realized sales of item i in the kth epoch of time
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periods, under the balancing algorithm. Namely, Dk is the realized sales of item i
from period T − (k− 1)τ to period T − kτ + 1, where k < T/τ . Let B(xi, τ) denote a
binomial random variable when there are τ trails, each with success rate xi. Note that
in each period, item i is sold with probability at most xi, thus Dk is stochastically
dominated by B(xi, τ). Then by Hoeffding’s inequality, we have for any a > 0,
P (Dk − xiτ ≥ a) ≤ P (B(xi, τ)− xiτ ≥ a) ≤ 2−τa2 .
Then by the union bound, for any l < T/τ ,
P(Dk < xiτ + a,∀k = 1, . . . , l) ≥ 1− l2−τa2 . (C.1)
If item i is balanced in the kth epoch of time periods, a lower bound of the
sales probability xti after balancing is obtained when all Dk sales are realized at the
beginning Dk periods of the kth epoch. Namely for any period t in the kth epoch,
xti ≥
cTi −
∑k−1
k′=1Dk′ −Dk
T − (k − 1)τ −Dk .
Now assume that Dk′ < µiτ + a,∀k′ = 1, . . . , k. We have
xti ≥
xiT − (k − 1)(xiτ + a)−Dk
T − (k − 1)τ −Dk
≥ xi − (k − 1)a+ (1− xi)Dk
T − (k − 1)τ −Dk
≥ xi − (k − 1)a+ (1− xi)(xiτ + a)
T − (k − 1)τ − (xiτ + a) .
Note that xti only decreases when balance step is performed, and we can use
the inequality to bound the updated xti after each balance. Thus, assuming that
Dk < xiτ + a,∀k = 1, . . . , l, we have for any period t in the first l epochs of time
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periods,
xti ≥ xi −
(l − 1)a+ (1− xi)(xiτ + a)
T − (l − 1)τ − (xiτ + a) =: xˆi. (C.2)
Using inequalities (C.1) and (C.2), we conclude that with probability at least
1− l2−a2τ , the probability of selling item i in the balancing algorithm is at least xˆi in
any period t in the first l epochs of time periods.
We now provide a lower bound on the probability of Dk greater than a given
threshold, for any k. To be more precise, we construct a lower bound on P (Dk− xˆiτ >
−b, ∀k = 1, . . . , l). Recall that given the conditioned event {Dk < xiτ + a,∀k =
1, . . . , l}, the sales probability of item i in each period of the first lτ time periods is at
least xˆi. Thus, by a coupling argument, conditioning on this event, Dk stochastically
dominates B(xˆi, τ). Therefore, again by Hoeffding’s inequality, we have for any k
and any b > 0,
P (Dk − xˆiτ < −b|Dk < xiτ + a,∀k = 1, . . . , l)
≤ P (B(xˆi, τ)− xˆiτ < −b|Dk < xiτ + a,∀k = 1, . . . , l)
≤ P(B(xˆi, τ)− xˆiτ < −b)P(Dk < xiτ + a,∀k = 1, . . . , l)
≤ 2
−b2τ
P(Dk < xiτ + a,∀k = 1, . . . , l) .
Thus by union bound,
P(Dk − xˆiτ > −b,∀k = 1, . . . , l|Dk < xiτ + a,∀k = 1, . . . , l)
≥ 1− l2
−b2τ
P(Dk < xiτ + a,∀k = 1, . . . , l) .
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Combine the previous inequalities, we get
P(Dk − xˆiτ > −b,∀k = 1, . . . , l)
≥ P(Dk − xˆiτ > −b,∀k = 1, . . . , l|Dk < xiτ + a,∀k = 1, . . . , l)P(Dk < xiτ + a,∀k = 1, . . . , l)
≥ P(Dk < xiτ + a,∀k = 1, . . . , l)− l2−b2τ
≥ 1− l2−a2τ − l2−b2τ .
Note that the total sales of item i is at least ∑kDk, we have
P(Si > (xˆiτ − b)l)
≥ P(Dk − xˆiτ > −b,∀k = 1, . . . , l)
≥ 1− l2−a2τ − l2−b2τ .
Let τ = T 1/2 − T 1/4, l = T 1/2, and let a = b = 1, then
1− l2−τa2 − l2−τb2 = 1− T 1/22−T 1/2+T 1/4+1,
and
xˆi = xi − (l − 1)a+ (1− xi)(xiτ + a)
T − (l − 1)τ − (xiτ + a)
≥ xi − la+ τ
T − lτ − τ − a
= xi − T
1/2 + (T 1/2 − T 1/4)
T − (T 1/2 − T 1/4)(T 1/2 + 1)− 1
= xi − 2T
1/2 − T 1/4
T 3/4 − T 1/2 + T 1/4 − 1
= xi −Θ(T−1/4).
Thus, for given values of a, b, τ, l, we have
1− T 1/22−T 1/2+T 1/4+1
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≤ P
(
Si
xiT
>
(xˆiτ − b)l
xiT
)
≤ P
(
Si
xiT
>
(xi −Θ(T−1/4))(T − T 3/4)− T 1/2
xiT
)
= P
(
Si
xiT
> 1−Θ(T−1/4)
)
.
Thus we obtain inequality (4.8).
Proving inequality (4.9):
Recall that in the proof of inequality (4.8), we show that with probability at least
1− T 1/22−T 1/2+T 1/4 , for any period t in the first T 1/2 epochs of time periods, and any
stage 1 item i,
xti ≥ xi −Θ(T−1/4).
We now consider stage item j. Similarly, we can show that with probability at
least 1 − T 1/22−T 1/2+T 1/4 , for any period t in the first T 1/2 epochs of time periods,
and any type i,
yt,ij ≥ yij −Θ(T−1/4).
Thus, by union bound, with probability at least 1 − nT 1/22−T 1/2+T 1/4 , for any
period t in the first T 1/2 epochs of time periods, the probability of selling j in period
t satisfies ∑
i
yt,ij x
t
i ≥
∑
i
(yij −Θ(T−1/4))(xi −Θ(T−1/4))
=
∑
i
yijxi −Θ(T−1/4).
177
Same argument as before then shows that
P
(
Sj∑
i∈N yijxiT
> 1−Θ(T−1/4)
)
≥ 1− nT 1/22−T 1/2+T 1/4+1,
as desired. 
178
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Vineet Abhishek, Ian A Kash, and Peter Key. Fixed and market pricing for
cloud services. arXiv preprint arXiv:1201.5621, 2012.
[2] Philipp Afe`che. Incentive-compatible revenue management in queueing systems:
optimal strategic delay. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management,
15(3):423–443, 2013.
[3] Philipp Afe`che and Haim Mendelson. Pricing and priority auctions in queueing
systems with a generalized delay cost structure. Management Science, 50(7):869–
882, 2004.
[4] Philipp Afe`che and J Michael Pavlin. Optimal price/lead-time menus for queues
with customer choice: Segmentation, pooling, and strategic delay. Management
Science, 62(8):2412–2436, 2016.
[5] Charalambos D Aliprantis and Kim Border. Infinite Dimensional Analysis: A
Hitchhiker’s Guide. Springer Science & Business Media, 2006.
[6] Gad Allon and Awi Federgruen. Competition in service industries. Operations
Research, 55(1):37–55, 2007.
[7] Amazon. Amazon EC2 instance purchasing options. http://aws.amazon.com/
ec2/purchasing-options, 2015. [Online; accessed 26-June-2015].
[8] K.R. Balachandran. Purchasing priorities in queues. Management Science,
18(5-part-1):319–326, 1972.
[9] Fernando Bernstein, A Gu¨rhan Ko¨k, and Lei Xie. Dynamic assortment customiza-
tion with limited inventories. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management,
17(4):538–553, 2015.
[10] Stephen Boyd and Lieven Vandenberghe. Convex optimization. Cambridge
university press, 2004.
179
[11] Juan Jose´ Miranda Bront, Isabel Me´ndez-Dı´az, and Gustavo Vulcano. A column
generation algorithm for choice-based network revenue management. Operations
Research, 57(3):769–784, 2009.
[12] Rene´ Caldentey and Gustavo Vulcano. Online auction and list price revenue
management. Management Science, 53(5):795–813, 2007.
[13] Xi Chen, Will Ma, David Simchi-Levi, and Linwei Xin. Dynamic recommendation
at checkout under inventory constraint. 2016.
[14] Usman W. Chohan. Dididache - hailing the future, one cab at a time.
https://www.mcgill.ca/channels/news/dididache-%E5%98%80%E5%98%80%
E6%89%93%E8%BD%A6-hailing-future-one-cab-time-235312, 2014. [Online;
accessed 4-Apr-2017].
[15] James M Davis, Guillermo Gallego, and Huseyin Topaloglu. Assortment optimiza-
tion under variants of the nested logit model. Operations Research, 62(2):250–273,
2014.
[16] Guy Desaulniers, Jacques Desrosiers, and Marius M Solomon. Column generation,
volume 5. Springer Science & Business Media, 2006.
[17] Hila Etzion, Edieal Pinker, and Abraham Seidmann. Analyzing the simultaneous
use of auctions and posted prices for online selling. Manufacturing & Service
Operations Management, 8(1):68–91, 2006.
[18] Jacob B Feldman and Huseyin Topaloglu. Capacity constraints across nests
in assortment optimization under the nested logit model. Operations Research,
63(4):812–822, 2015.
[19] Drew Fudenberg and David K Levine. Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in
dynamic games with many players. Journal of Economic Theory, 44(1):1–18,
1988.
[20] Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole. Game theory. The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1991.
180
[21] Guillermo Gallego and Ming Hu. Dynamic pricing of perishable assets under
competition. Management Science, 60(5):1241–1259, 2014.
[22] Guillermo Gallego, Woonghee Tim Huh, Wanmo Kang, and Robert Phillips.
Price competition with the attraction demand model: Existence of unique
equilibrium and its stability. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management,
8(4):359–375, 2006.
[23] Guillermo Gallego, Garud Iyengar, R Phillips, and Abha Dubey. Managing
flexible products on a network. 2004.
[24] Guillermo Gallego, Anran Li, Van-Anh Truong, and Xinshang Wang. Online
personalized resource allocation with customer choice. Technical report, Working
Paper. http://arxiv. org/abs/1511.01837 v1, 2016.
[25] Guillermo Gallego and Huseyin Topaloglu. Constrained assortment optimization
for the nested logit model. Management Science, 60(10):2583–2601, 2014.
[26] Guillermo Gallego and Ruxian Wang. Multiproduct price optimization and
competition under the nested logit model with product-differentiated price
sensitivities. Operations Research, 62(2):450–461, 2014.
[27] Natarajan Gautam. Analysis of Queues: Methods and Applications. CRC Press,
2012.
[28] Srinagesh Gavirneni and Vidyadhar G Kulkarni. Self-selecting priority queues
with burr distributed waiting costs. Production and Operations Management,
2016.
[29] Amihai Glazer and Refael Hassin. Stable priority purchasing in queues. Opera-
tions Research Letters, 4(6):285–288, 1986.
[30] Irving L Glicksberg. A further generalization of the kakutani fixed point theo-
rem, with application to nash equilibrium points. Proceedings of the American
Mathematical Society, 3(1):170–174, 1952.
[31] Negin Golrezaei, Hamid Nazerzadeh, and Paat Rusmevichientong. Real-time
181
optimization of personalized assortments. Management Science, 60(6):1532–1551,
2014.
[32] Refael Hassin. Decentralized regulation of a queue. Management Science,
41(1):163–173, 1995.
[33] Refael Hassin and Moshe Haviv. To queue or not to queue: Equilibrium behavior
in queueing systems, volume 59. Springer, 2003.
[34] Cinar Kilcioglu and Justin M Rao. Competition on price and quality in cloud
computing. In Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on World Wide
Web, pages 1123–1132. International World Wide Web Conferences Steering
Committee, 2016.
[35] Thomas Kittsteiner and Benny Moldovanu. Priority auctions and queue dis-
ciplines that depend on processing time. Management Science, 51(2):236–248,
2005.
[36] Leonard Kleinrock. Optimum bribing for queue position. Operations Research,
15(2):304–318, 1967.
[37] A Gu¨rhan Ko¨k, Marshall L Fisher, and Ramnath Vaidyanathan. Assortment
planning: Review of literature and industry practice. In Retail supply chain
management, pages 99–153. Springer, 2008.
[38] Vijay Krishna. Auction theory. Academic press, 2009.
[39] Yuri Levin, Jeff McGill, and Mikhail Nediak. Dynamic pricing in the presence
of strategic consumers and oligopolistic competition. Management science,
55(1):32–46, 2009.
[40] Guang Li, Paat Rusmevichientong, and Huseyin Topaloglu. The d-level nested
logit model: Assortment and price optimization problems. Operations Research,
63(2):325–342, 2015.
[41] Kyle Y Lin and Soheil Y Sibdari. Dynamic price competition with discrete
182
customer choices. European Journal of Operational Research, 197(3):969–980,
2009.
[42] Qian Liu and Garrett Van Ryzin. On the choice-based linear programming
model for network revenue management. Manufacturing & Service Operations
Management, 10(2):288–310, 2008.
[43] Qian Liu and Dan Zhang. Dynamic pricing competition with strategic customers
under vertical product differentiation. Management Science, 59(1):84–101, 2013.
[44] Francis T Lui. An equilibrium queuing model of bribery. Journal of Political
Economy, pages 760–781, 1985.
[45] Costis Maglaras, John Yao, and Assaf Zeevi. Optimal price and delay differenti-
ation in queueing systems. Available at SSRN 2297042, 2013.
[46] Victor Martinez-de Albeniz and Kalyan Talluri. Dynamic price competition with
fixed capacities. Management Science, 57(6):1078–1093, 2011.
[47] Haim Mendelson and Seungjin Whang. Optimal incentive-compatible priority
pricing for the M/M/1 queue. Operations Research, 38(5):870–883, 1990.
[48] Isabel Me´ndez-Dı´az, Juan Jose´ Miranda-Bront, Gustavo Vulcano, and Paula
Zabala. A branch-and-cut algorithm for the latent-class logit assortment problem.
Discrete Applied Mathematics, 164:246–263, 2014.
[49] Microsoft. Azure pricing. https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/,
2017. [Online; accessed 4-Apr-2017].
[50] Paul Milgrom and John Roberts. Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in
games with strategic complementarities. Econometrica: Journal of the Econo-
metric Society, pages 1255–1277, 1990.
[51] James A Mirrlees. An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation.
The review of economic studies, 38(2):175–208, 1971.
183
[52] Michael Mussa and Sherwin Rosen. Monopoly and product quality. Journal of
Economic theory, 18(2):301–317, 1978.
[53] Roger B Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of operations research,
6(1):58–73, 1981.
[54] Hamid Nazerzadeh and Georgia Perakis. Non-linear pricing competition with
private capacity information. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2015.
[55] Hamid Nazerzadeh and Ramandeep S Randhawa. Asymptotic optimality of two
service grades for customer differentiation in queueing systems. Available at
SSRN 2438300, 2014.
[56] Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, and Vijay V Vazirani. Algorithmic
game theory, volume 1. Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 2007.
[57] XZ Palmer. [how to]: Call a cab with didi chuxing and
kuaidi dache. http://www.smartshanghai.com/articles/smsh/
how-to-call-a-taxi-with-didi-chuxing-and-kuaidi-dache, 2015. [On-
line; accessed 4-Apr-2017].
[58] Margaret P Pierson, Gad Allon, and Awi Federgruen. Price competition under
mixed multinomial logit demand functions. Management Science, 59:8, 2013.
[59] Martin L Puterman. Markov decision processes: discrete stochastic dynamic
programming. John Wiley & Sons, 2014.
[60] J Ben Rosen. Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for concave n-person
games. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 520–534, 1965.
[61] Paat Rusmevichientong, David Shmoys, and Huseyin Topaloglu. Assortment
optimization with mixtures of logits. Technical report, Tech. rep., School of
IEOR, Cornell University, 2010.
[62] Garrett van Ryzin and Siddharth Mahajan. On the relationship between inventory
costs and variety benefits in retail assortments. Management Science, 45(11):1496–
1509, 1999.
184
[63] Kyle Siegrist. The birthday problem. http://www.math.uah.edu/stat/urn/
Birthday.html, 2017. [Online; accessed 15-Aug-2017].
[64] Springwise. In china, cab passengers bid tips to secure a float home. https://www.
springwise.com/china-taxi-passengers-bid-tips-secure-ride-home/,
2013. [Online; accessed 4-Apr-2017].
[65] Kalyan Talluri and Garrett Van Ryzin. Revenue management under a general
discrete choice model of consumer behavior. Management Science, 50(1):15–33,
2004.
[66] Major Tian. Didi dache-kuaidi dache wants to do more than just drive you home.
http://knowledge.ckgsb.edu.cn/2015/05/12/china-business-strategy/
didi-dache-and-kuaidi-dache-to-do-more-than-just-drive-you-home/,
2015. [Online; accessed 4-Apr-2017].
[67] Jan A Van Mieghem. Price and service discrimination in queuing systems:
Incentive compatibility of gcµ scheduling. Management Science, 46(9):1249–
1267, 2000.
[68] Xavier Vives. Oligopoly pricing: old ideas and new tools. MIT press, 2001.
[69] Wei Wang, Baochun Li, and Ben Liang. Towards optimal capacity segmentation
with hybrid cloud pricing. In 2012 IEEE 32nd International Conference on
Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS), pages 425–434. IEEE, 2012.
[70] Tomer Yahalom, J Michael Harrison, and Sunil Kumar. Designing and pricing
incentive compatible grades of service in queueing systems. Stanford University
Working paper, 2006.
[71] Luyi Yang, Laurens Debo, and Varun Gupta. Trading time in a congested
environment. Chicago Booth Research Paper, (15-07), 2015.
185
